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Under the brutal Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979 in Cambodia, 
1.7 million people died from starvation, overwork, torture, and murder. While 
five senior leaders are on trial for these crimes at the Extraordinary Chambers 
of the Courts of Cambodia, hundreds of lower level perpetrators live amongst 
their victims today.  
This thesis examines how rural Cambodians (including victims, 
perpetrators, and bystanders) are coexisting after the trauma of the Khmer 
Rouge years, and the decades of civil war before and after. In this qualitative 
research study, 134 semi-structured interviews were conducted with rural 
villagers, government officials, and peacebuilding practitioners.  
Cambodian culture is characterized by conflict avoidance, and reliance 
on family networks, hierarchy, and patronage. Buddhism is a strong cultural 
influence as well. These characteristics, as well as the lack of trust resulting 
from the Khmer Rouge years, provided important context for this analysis of 
Cambodian social recovery. 
Research on the processes of coexistence and reconciliation inform this 
study (Bloomfield 2006; Huyse 2003; Kriesberg 2001; Lederach 1997; Rigby 
2001). However, few studies have been done that examine community 
reconciliation in Cambodia (Etcheson 2005b). This thesis examines the 
processes of reconciliation, including interfering and facilitating factors. 
Processes such as building relationships and trust, and developing empathy 
and compassion are explored. Cambodians’ views of apologies, revenge, 
forgiveness, and other key concepts are reviewed.  
Models of coexistence, acceptance, perpetrator coping strategies, and a 
victim decision-making tree are presented to assist in the analysis of the data. 
These models provide a theoretical framework for the understanding of the 
situation of coexistence and reconciliation in Cambodia. The thesis suggests 
that Cambodians are currently living in various stages of coexistence (surface, 
shallow, and moderate) and have not yet approached a condition of deep 
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Figure 1. Areas of study identified in white (Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and 
Kampot Provinces) and grey (Kep and Pailin Municipalities)(Krawma Co. 2010).1
  
 
                                               





 ‘We are not fighting roosters that you can just throw in a cage and watch to 
see what happens.’ A prominent Cambodian-American said that to me in 1990 at one 
of the first workshops which brought together Cambodians from two sides of their civil 
war. I had been working for a non-governmental organization (the US Indochina 
Reconciliation Project or USIRP).1
After I had worked at the Thai-Cambodian border in the late 1980s as a 
physical therapist, the call of Cambodia soon brought me to Phnom Penh, the capital 
of Cambodia in 1987, when Cambodia was still under the Soviet and Vietnamese-
backed socialist government. Under the pacifist American Friends Service Committee, 
I became grounded in non-violence as a way of life, and worked on bringing 
assistance to the people around the havoc that was wreaked on this isolated country 
due to international politics. I learned first-hand about those politics, as we were 
unable to phone outside the country, obtain Western goods, or access most 
international airlines. We also learned about living under a strict socialist system, as 
we were not allowed to socialize with our Cambodian colleagues, and our state-
appointed drivers met every Saturday to report on our activities during the week. I also 
 One of our activities was to organize a tour for two 
Cambodian monks from socialist-Cambodia to visit the US, and they attended a 
conference organized by Khmer Conscience at the University of California at Berkeley. 
In spite of these non-conciliatory words, this conference allowed people from two sides 
of the long-standing conflict in Cambodia to start to see the humanity in each other as 
individuals and to recognize their interdependence. This reconciliation effort also 
assisted these former adversaries to begin understanding the reality and truth of the 
‘other’ – and this workshop and other work with USIRP marked my formal entry into 
the practice of reconciliation. 
                                               
1 The US Indochina Reconciliation Project operated in the 1980s and 1990s, and then changed 




learned about the different viewpoints of the Cambodians, and the aid workers, as 
those living at the border and those living inside Cambodia viewed each other with 
suspicion; I was one of the few to have worked on both sides. 
Crossing back and forth between Cambodia, the border camps, and the US for 
several years brought me in touch with some of the same people across time, as I tried 
to carry messages of reconciliation, shared humanity, and mutual understanding to all 
sides. By attempting to be neutral and talking to everybody, I was often accused of 
being a traitor to one side or the other (Vietnamese-head but American body was one 
of the most common!). But I am still in contact with many of the same people I have 
met over the years, and some of them assisted as key informants in this research. 
As my interests shifted from physical therapy to conflict resolution, and I 
obtained a second master’s degree, this time in public policy focusing on conflict 
resolution, I worked in other countries on various coexistence and peace building 
projects, including Rwanda, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Nepal. These equally 
seminal experiences have served to broaden and deepen my understanding and 
appreciation of conflict situations. I have seen first-hand the human bravery as well as 
frailties of people as they attempted to overcome the past of war and conflict, and to 
find a new future of peace and security. In Cambodia I have seen the scars that the 
many years of war have caused, in particular the radical Khmer Rouge regime, and 
Cambodians’ valiant efforts to rebuild their shattered lives and communities.  
In 2007, many years of practice later, I attended a workshop conducted by the 
academic practitioner, Hizkias Assefa on reconciliation.2
                                               
2 The Philosophy and Praxis of Reconciliation, Eastern Mennonite University’s Summer Peace 
Building Institute, May 29 – June 6, 2007. 
 He instructed participants in 
the workshop to do an exercise on the ‘River of Life.’ Participants had to draw or 
describe their life in terms of a river -- its origins, destination, speed, waterfalls, 
tributaries, fish, and other characteristics as a metaphor for life. I, and a few of the 




interdependence of all humanity. I agree with Assefa as he describes this 
interdependence as crucial for reconciliation -- a process of development of both 
individuals and nations, changing from a state of dependence to independence and 
finally to interdependence (2000: 8). This thesis is the story of my personal journey 
researching reconciliation in Cambodia, and the journeys of individuals in four 





CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
 
Imagine that the man who had led your parents and siblings to their deaths 
lives in the next village. Imagine that, besides your family members, he also led about 
three hundred other people to their deaths at that prison in the next village. You feel 
angry, sad, and sometimes you want to take revenge against him. You know that he 
was not the one giving orders: that man was killed by the Khmer Rouge (KR) during 
their regime. But that does not really help your pain much – whenever you see this 
man (I will call him ‘Pel’) you remember your past and mourn the loss of your family. 
So you do not even want to see Pel and you avoid him whenever possible, which is 
fairly easy, as he does not go out much. You feel somewhat better knowing that, when 
you do see him, he appears a poor, broken man, with hunched shoulders and eyes to 
the ground. He seems to feel regret for the past. 
But now, imagine that you are that man who led people to their deaths, Pel. 
You are one of the few former KR cadres who still live in the village. You had to do this 
job during the KR period, or you would have been killed. It was not you who ordered 
those people’s deaths, or even chose which people would be killed. But today, you do 
not dare leave your house, except to till your fields. You do not go to the local Buddhist 
temple, or weddings or funerals, you are totally isolated. Twenty years ago, you spent 
more than a year in prison and you still suffer from the beatings you received there. 
You feel angry and frustrated at what happened to you, and you feel afraid of your 
neighbours. You are filled with anxiety that someone might kill you, as there was an 
attempted robbery at your home, and your father-in-law was killed about ten years ago 
– you think the people were trying to kill you. 
The scenario above is the story of members of one of the communities 




this research was to examine how community-level reconciliation is occurring after the 
years of mass violence of the Khmer Rouge period. How are these victims and 
perpetrators managing to live together – or are they? The processes that Cambodians 
underwent as they rebuilt their communities 30 years after the brutal Khmer Rouge 
regime, and the factors that influenced those processes, provide important insights into 
social reconstruction after mass violence.  
Reconciliation processes have been widely studied, however few have 
examined community-level reconciliation. Although there have been several 
quantitative studies on reconciliation and justice in Cambodia, there have been only a 
handful of qualitative research studies (Etcheson 2005b). In spite of the lack of studies, 
some authors have concluded that reconciliation has already been achieved in 
Cambodia (Urs 2007; Widyono 2009). This research study examines the research on 
reconciliation processes, applied to Cambodia to examine the situation of 
reconciliation today. In order to capture the deep meanings, and detailed nuance, the 
research design was qualitative, using multi-site case study review. Data sources 
included document review and field research through semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation. The data was analysed using the NVivo qualitative analysis 
software program (Bazeley 2007). 
The thesis is the story of the journey Cambodians in four selected communities 
have taken since the years of war to deal with their troubled pasts. To proceed on this 
journey of understanding, I start with a historical and literature review. The rest of this 
chapter then covers the methodology of the research, and ends with a summary of the 
structure of the thesis.  
 Cambodian History and Culture 
After years of destructive civil war, the Khmer Rouge (KR) overthrew the 




wake of women in childbirth and hospital patients grasping their IVs along the roads. 
As the KR implemented a revolution modelled upon Mao Tse Tung’s China, communal 
working, eating and decision-making were implemented in the hopes of reinstating 
Cambodia to the position of power during the Angkor period which covered large parts 
of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Between 1975 and 1979 over 1.7 million out of the 7 
million living in Cambodia died from starvation, overwork, illness, and summary 
executions (Ciorciari and Chhang 2005: 250).  
More than 30 years have passed since the destructive rule of the Khmer 
Rouge. A trial for the Khmer Rouge leaders (the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia, or ECCC) has been completed for one defendant, and another two 
cases are haltingly under way. Cambodians are struggling with conflicting needs and 
desires – for truth, acknowledgement, justice, reconciliation, and healing.  
The social reconstruction process after mass violence is dependent upon 
Cambodian culture and social structure. The majority of Cambodians live in rural areas 
and rely on local administration for support and security. Although Cambodians live in 
a state of relative peace today, the lingering effects of the many years of war remain, 
including the presence of violence in society. The family is the primary unit of 
organization, and Cambodians are linked together in complex webs of kinship, 
hierarchy, and patronage. Dispute resolution styles are profoundly different from those 
in the West and have not always been taken into consideration in the process of 
reconstruction. Cambodian dispute resolution styles of conflict avoidance have also 
affected the way Cambodians think about reconciliation and other transitional justice 
mechanisms, in particular the ECCC. Finally, the predominant Buddhist religion of 
Cambodia greatly influences how Cambodians perceive the various processes of 




The Research Question and Objectives 
The overall aim of this research was to analyse community-level reconciliation 
in Cambodia. The central research question of the thesis is: Has community 
reconciliation taken place in select Cambodian communities? 
The specific objectives were to:  
• analyse Cambodian concepts and understandings of reconciliation processes  
• identify key factors facilitating or interfering with the processes of reconciliation  
• develop a theoretical framework of the process of reconciliation in Cambodia 
which can be applied to other post-conflict settings 
Research Justification 
Since I have been working in the field of reconciliation and peacebuilding for 
more than two decades, this research allowed me finally to step back and deeply 
examine the processes of reconciliation on which I and others have been working. As 
can be seen from the description of my personal journey in the preface, with a deep 
commitment to the subject and the country, the choice of this subject corresponds with 
Baker’s view that ‘The tone of social research is that of genuine concern for the subject 
under study’ (1994: 4).  
The basis for this research project is that there is a lack of adequate research 
on reconciliation done at grassroots levels, and ideas to enhance reconciliation 
processes must come from the affected villagers themselves (Bloomfield 2006: 22-3; 
Theidon 2007: 119). This research project has focused on a community-level analysis 
and is based upon the views of the affected villagers, both victims and perpetrators. As 
did my previous research (McGrew 2000a and 2000b), this study gives voice to 
Cambodians at the community level, as it is they who should ideally have the greatest 
say in the reconciliation mechanism in which they will participate. As Bloomfield has 




there is little argument (at least in rhetoric): it cannot be imposed from outside, but 
must be devised and driven from within’ (2006: 22). Their insights, now 30 years after 
the KR regime, provide important lessons for other countries coming out of similar 
conflicts. As described by Lederach, reconciliation can be bottom-up or top-down, and 
emphasis in research has been on the latter (1997: 39). This research fills a gap in the 
literature by focusing on the bottom-up approach, with interviews in rural Cambodia. In 
addition, the rural views can have implications for national level reconciliation 
processes.  
Methodology 
Research Design Overview 
The research design remained grounded upon my many years of work in 
Cambodia, and work on other reconciliation projects is described below. This PhD 
research process can be described in terms of five phases which serve as background 
for this thesis:  
1. Grounding (1986 intermittently through 2007)  
2.  Background Research (1999-2000)  
3.  PhD Preparation (2005-2006)  
4.  Preliminary Research (2006-2007)  
5.  Field Research (2007-2008 – conducted 134 interviews)  
6.  Analysis and Write-up (2008-2011)1
The methodology chosen was ‘multi-site case study’ based on applied research 
and evaluation tradition (Stark and Torrance 2005: 34, 38). A balance between 
document review, interviews, focus groups, and observation allows in-depth analysis 
of data, yet at the same time the comparison of data from different sources allows not 
  
                                               
1 See Appendix A for the phases of research. I have used the Coventry University Harvard 





a ‘definitive judgment’ but a ‘contribution to the development of evidence-based 
professional knowledge’ (Stark and Torrance 2005: 38). The research design was 
guided by principles of neutrality and objectivity, and care was taken to reduce the 
impact of the researcher’s presence.2
Data Sources  
 
The data sources for this research included document review, field research 
including key informant and community interviews, and participant observation. As I 
had worked in Cambodia for many years, and had done previous research there, I had 
many contacts, much experience, and many observations to rely upon. 
Document review  
The document review included primary and secondary sources from 
government, the UN, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on 
reconciliation in Cambodia and elsewhere. Due to my long-term experience in 
Cambodia, the NGOs and UN agencies consulted were very open to providing reports 
and assessments. However, very few of the reports provided detailed information 
about the process of reconciliation in Cambodia, thus the primary data source was 
through the field research. 
Field research 
To study this complex and little-studied subject, I chose field research as my 
primary method of investigation, based upon long-term experience in Cambodia and 
language skills in Khmer. The field research included two components: interviews and 
observations. I have been conscious that the researcher as outsider must be careful 
not to intrude, and to be open to many interpretations, cultural views, and world views. 
For example, cultural differences such as how Cambodians view their spirit world are 
                                               




substantially different than how Westerners view the world; these issues are discussed 
further in the section in Appendix B on the ‘I’ of research. Through interviews, 
respondents were able to share some of their understandings of those differences.  
Interviews 
I recruited a research assistant who assisted with administrative tasks and 
interpreting in interviews (between Khmer and English).3 A detailed set of guiding 
questions was developed for the in-depth interviews, keeping in mind the recent 
literature on reconciliation. A shortened version was used in the field as an ‘aide 
memoire’.4 During the interviews, the research assistant and I were both present, 
except for some of the interviews in English. Although I conducted the interviews, if the 
respondent or I had difficulty understanding, the research assistant would translate. All 
interviews started with formal greetings, and brief introductions. We then proceeded 
with the consent procedure which included explaining the purpose of the research and 
asking the respondents to agree to the interview on tape.5
Both individual and focus group semi-structured interviews were conducted. 
The semi-structured interviews allowed the interview to be conversational; flow 
smoothly by avoiding reading from a questionnaire; to be flexible and to allow for 
unexpected responses; and to enable follow-on questions to increase the depth of 
 Interviews lasted from 30 
minutes to three hours, averaging about 90 minutes each. Both the research assistant 
and I took notes, and in most cases the interview was tape-recorded. Later the notes 
and the audio files were converted into written transcripts.  
                                               
3 Administrative tasks included:  photocopying, reading documents in Khmer, selecting related 
documents to copy, translating written documents, transcribing tapes., and assisting in 
interpretation (between Khmer or and English)The language and people of Cambodia can be 
called either Cambodian or Khmer. 
 
4 See Appendix C for the Research Question Guide, and Appendix D for more information on 
data collection processes. 
 




understanding (Mikkelsen 2005: 169-170). In the context of rural Cambodia, the 
flexibility and informality of the semi-structured interview are particularly relevant in 
order to put respondents at ease – many of whom had never been interviewed, nor 
ever spoken with a foreigner. The one-page research question guide was used to 
ensure main topics were covered.6 Although standardized questionnaires could have 
provided increased comparability of responses, they allow little flexibility in interviewing 
a wide variety of respondents, especially those living in rural areas. Since the purpose 
of the research was to probe deeply, semi-structured interviews were a more 
appropriate data source. In addition, semi-structured interviews allowed for a wide 
variety of respondents, including officials, practitioners (in the field of peacebuilding), 
and community members, as various topics and questions could be emphasized 
depending upon the experience and identity of the respondent.7
This thesis builds upon research done in 1999 and 2000 when I spoke with 
over 180 Cambodians in individual interviews and focus groups (McGrew 2000a and 
2000b). I have maintained many of these contacts which facilitated access to other 
respondents in this study. In addition, preliminary interviews were conducted with 
Cambodians and expatriates working at the national level during the preliminary 
research phase from April 2006 to March 2007. Additional background interviews had 
been conducted previously in the course of the author’s prior work and research 
interest. Upon approval from Coventry University of the research and ethics plan, 
formal interviews commenced in April 2007, and were completed in July of 2008.  
  
Focus groups were chosen as a means for interviewing in the former KR areas; 
NGOs assisted in setting up meeting and participants often had to travel great 
distances to attend, or I had to travel great distances to meet them and it was 
logistically difficult to stay long periods. A few others were spontaneous focus groups, 
                                               
6 See Appendix C. 
 




for example twice when we went to a temple to interview a monk, but there were 
several elders and Achars (Buddhist laymen) there who joined in the discussion. 
A total of 17 preliminary interviews and 134 formal interviews were conducted. 
Of the formal interviews, 123 individual or small group and 11 focus groups were 
conducted.8
Practitioners in the field of peacebuilding and reconciliation, and officials with 
relevant experience, were the first group of respondents interviewed (making up the 
majority of 17 preliminary interviews). Some were then re-interviewed during the field 
research phase. This group of respondents included individuals with knowledge or 
experience of reconciliation processes or projects; senior or mid-level members of 
NGOs and UN agencies; local Cambodians or expatriates with extensive experience in 
and knowledge of Cambodian history and culture, and included both men and women. 
Government officials were those known to me at the national level, and some others at 
provincial levels with experience in reconciliation processes or projects. In addition 
local government officials of each community of study were targeted. Most of these 
respondents were men, as the vast majority of government officials in Cambodia are 
men. 
 Amongst the 123 individual interviews there were a total of 125 
respondents (although some of the individual interviews were with more than one 
person, several were repeat interviews with the same persons). Respondents were 
chosen from amongst two groups: practitioners and officials, and community members. 
Participant selection criteria for the two interview groups were as follows. 
Community members were drawn from several identity groups: victims, 
perpetrators, and former KR who could be characterized as bystanders.9
                                               
8 The small group interviews comprised two to three persons, and individual responses were 
recorded and attributed to individual speakers. In the case of the focus groups, the group 
numbers were larger, discussions were more informal, and it was not possible to attribute 
statements to each individual. 
 First contact 
 
9 The categorization of people into groups of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders is 




in each community was usually via commune or village-level officials in order to obtain 
permission for the research; then other key village members were identified: monks, 
teachers, traditional healers, security personnel, and others who may be identified as 
‘elders’ in the community. Within each community setting, I tried to obtain a sample of 
villagers representative of the village population as a whole including: men and 
women; middle-aged and elderly (who would have lived under the KR regime); 
educated and not educated; high and low socio-economic status; and those from a 
variety of professions (farmers, NGO workers, business people, home-makers). 
Although a few young people were interviewed, they were not the target of this 
research, as the focus was on people who had lived through the KR period, and the 
relationships between them. 
Over the course of the research period, a few particularly forthcoming key 
informants at the community-level were identified and then were interviewed several 
times to present initial developing concepts and to gather participant’s perspectives. 
These key informants also provided access to other villagers, especially accused 
perpetrators who were often difficult to locate and meet.  
One challenge of this research, and in particular of the data analysis, was the 
large number of interviews conducted (134). Part of the reason for so many interviews 
was that the site selection process took a long time. The challenge was to find 
appropriate communities with perpetrators who were widely accused by others, and 
who would also agree to be interviewed. Although the sample size of accused 
perpetrators was relatively small, the responses provided by these individuals, and by 
the victims around them, were crucial in the analysis and in order to identify patterns. 
These were then validated with repeat interviews, interviews with other community 
                                                                                                                                        
may not have ‘clean hands’; victims may feel guilty for having survived or for not being able to 
save or help others; and perpetrators may also be victims of false ideology, deceit (1998: 121). 




members, as well as interviews about victim-perpetrator relations in other 
communities.  
Observations  
In addition to the interviews, participant observation occurred across the time of 
the research period: while making and waiting for appointments we visited markets, 
temples and coffee shops. Supplementary information about various other 
reconciliation processes was obtained through observing various meetings about 
reconciliation, the ECCC, and outreach activities of the NGOs. In addition observations 
were made at markets, temples, health clinics, and other places and events. 
Observations included comments on behaviour, silences, openness, expressions of 
emotions (such as facial expressions, hesitancy, verbal expressions, raised voices, 
reddened faces, agitation, tears, broken voice, crying). I kept a journal of my 
observations around the interviews, noting what happened, people’s reactions to the 
setting, questions, other events, comments made outside the regular interview 
process, and other non-verbal communication methods. I reviewed this journal as I 
wrote up the findings and analysed the data. 
Sometimes notes were taken during the event, but more often notes were 
written up afterwards. Starting with my research in 1999, I had ‘recruited’ a group of 
NGO peacebuilding practitioners who served as a sounding board, and I held several 
‘reconciliation discussion groups’ usually over dinner, during the course of this 
research. These small group discussions served to assist me in understanding certain 
terms, including reconciliation, revenge, and empathy.  
As part of my previous employment and past research, I had relationships with 
several NGOs who were currently conducting peacebuilding and reconciliation 
projects, most of which were related to sharing information about the ECCC. These 




research, and I observed the activities of several of these NGOs. Through these 
observations, I was able to identify some of the communities of this study.10
Selection of Field Sites (Community Case Studies) 
  
When looking for sites for the community-level research, the main criteria were 
to have the presence of both victims and perpetrators, and a history of mass violence. 
I also focused on areas with high percentages of former Khmer Rouge civilians and 
cadres, and areas that had had contact with reconciliation activities in the past, and 
thus links to practitioners. The areas that fit these criteria include primarily the 
southeast (Kampot Province and Kep Municipality), and the northwest (Battambang 
and Banteay Meanchey Provinces, and Pailin Municipality).11
Recruitment of Respondents - Snowball Sample 
 See map on page ix. At 
the end of the field research phase, ten sites had been visited, four of which were 
identified as the primary research sites for case study review. Chapter 4 reviews the 
final selection process and details of the four community case studies. 
Practitioners, officials, and community members were recruited by ‘snowball’ or 
‘chain’ sampling. Through the process of the background interviews conducted the 
year prior to the field research period, and through previous contacts, practitioners and 
officials who had knowledge or experience in the field of peacebuilding were first 
identified. From them, and my previous knowledge, sites were selected. Once the 
village or commune officials had been contacted and interviewed, other respondents 
were identified from that interview, or through the NGO contact, using the selection 
criteria for interviews described above.  
                                               
10 In order to protect the identity of my research sites, I have not identified the names of those 
NGOs. 
 
11 Siem Reap Province in the north also has a high percentage of former KR, but I focused only 




A risk of the snowball technique is that the respondents could be clustered 
around certain experiences or opinions. In order to combat this risk, I made sure to get 
referrals from as many people in the community as possible, and also spoke with 
some people informally. I then used data from different sources to confirm and to 
validate various pieces of information about the context or particular actors, common 
to all interviews (Baker 1994: 32; Stark and Torrance 2005: 37). As snowball sampling 
can be a risk, so can the collection of too much data, which is a problem I struggled 
with throughout the research process. 
An advantage of the snowball technique is to allow a greater chance of 
serendipitous findings. For example, as I accompanied many NGOs to the field to 
collect background information, I also learned about particularly interesting stories and 
findings that informed my choice of primary communities of study. 
Through this process of collecting the data, the issue of ethics was of 
paramount importance, given the sensitivity of the subject matter, and the trauma 
suffered by the Cambodian victims of mass violence. 
Ethics  
Asking people about reconciliation, even if it is happening in the present, 
usually leads to thinking about the past. Thinking about the past often brings up many 
bad memories for Cambodians. Thus protocols to protect respondents were 
particularly important for this research.12
                                               
12 See Appendix E for the Coventry University Ethics Approval Form. 
 Because the majority of the interviews were 
carried out in rural areas where the majority of the population is illiterate, instead of a 
long, complicated written consent form, a verbal consent form was read aloud (see 
Appendix F), and then the consent was obtained on tape. Signing a written form (or 
even having it read to them) would have caused anxiety in the interviewees for several 
reasons: firstly the context of ethics regulations has no relation to their everyday rural 




extremely unusual; and finally signing (or thumb printing) forms in Cambodia is often 
related to unpleasant situations such as human rights violations, bad land deals, or 
political intimidation. A written consent form was given to participants who were literate 
in English and who had understanding of university ethics regulations (see Appendix 
G). The proposal and a consent procedure were approved by the Coventry University 
Ethics Committee. 
As is typical for ethics procedures the following information was included in the 
verbal and written consents: purpose of the research, description of the researcher, 
expected duration of the interview, how the information will be kept confidential, the 
final product of the research, and the rights of the interviewee to decline participation, 
to withdraw from the interview, to ask questions, and to receive information about the 
study. In addition, since the subject could be sensitive and could cover topics related 
to trauma and violence, respondents were given a business card which included 
contact information for the Khmer-speaking research assistant as well as for the 
largest local psycho-social counselling services. These services were also explained to 
the respondents. 
During the writing-up period, other precautions were taken to ensure the 
identity of respondents would not be revealed. Specific references to places or names 
were removed from quotes if they would identify the respondent or the individual about 
whom they were talking. Key informants were given pseudonyms. Community 
locations were not identified. These precautions, and the ones described above, 







I read through most transcripts at least four times, making comments and 
asking the research assistant for clarification about words used and clarifying English 
translation. As I read through the transcripts, I extracted interesting quotes. The 
English versions of the individual taped interview transcripts were then coded using the 
NVivo 7 data analysis software, which assists in analysis of relationships between 
people, processes, and concepts.13
An open coding procedure was used, where concepts, groups of concepts 
clustered into categories, characteristics, and dimensions were coded (Mikkelsen 
2005: 182). The 134 formal interviews were coded by text segments related to 
identified topics and key themes in seven categories: community, context, emotions, 
individual (characteristics), intervention, justice, and reconciliation. The codes related 
to reconciliation included: advice to others; apology, acknowledgement, and truth and 
reconciliation commissions; contact; definition; forget; forgiveness; healing; heart; 
ECCC and reconciliation; memory and history; mutual assistance; peacebuilding; 
reintegration and national reconciliation; relationship; reparation; respect; tolerance; 
and trust. In addition, there were six free nodes that were not included under those 
main categories, some of which tagged areas of interest for future research. For a 
more detailed description of the coding process see Appendix H. 
 NVivo was chosen in order to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the analysis, because the computer can assist in 
‘recording, sorting, matching and linking’ the data in order to answer the research 
questions (Bazeley 2007: 2).  
When writing and analysing the findings, queries were run: for example all the 
definitions of reconciliation provided by respondents were compiled, and comparisons 
                                               
13 See the NVivo website: http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_previous-
products_nvivo7.aspx Although the current version of this program is now NVivo 9, at the time 
of the selection of my methods, NVivo 7 was the latest version available, and due to installation 




were made between the various individuals’ definitions. All mentions of the word or 
concept of revenge were reviewed, and then, to check various mitigating factors, 
revenge was cross-referenced with other codes. For example, a query was run looking 
at sections of the text which were coded for both revenge and for youth, to see if 
respondents had any observations about the relative culpability of young perpetrators. 
As new ideas or possible factors or theories surfaced, clusters could be identified and 
the meticulous NVivo coding done, allowing me to research these new ideas.  
Because of the large number of interviews, and the fact that some were one-, 
two- and three-person interviews, while others were focus groups, and some were 
repeated interviews with the same respondents, the analysis of the data using the 
demographic information (such as examining differences based on gender or age) for 
each individual was not possible. However, future research could analyse various 
subsets of the data.  
Through the analysis of the qualitative data, the assignment of conceptual tags 
(such as roles, routines, norms, and relationships) can assist to make sense of the 
data and compress it into manageable units (Miles and Huberman 1994: 16). As 
patterns and relationships emerged from the data, explanations or theories were 
developed. Several such theories and lists of relevant factors have emerged from the 
data which are the main substance of this thesis and which will be discussed in detail 
in later chapters: 
This section on data analysis has summarized the process used for analysis of 
the data, and has reviewed the summary/topics of the major theoretical findings of this 






Chapters 2 and 3 comprise the literature review including Cambodia as a post-
conflict society; reconciliation as a process; and reconciliation in Cambodia. This 
important cultural and historical background is necessary to understand the 
communities of study, and ultimately the situation of reconciliation in Cambodia today, 
and to answer the research question, ‘has reconciliation been achieved in Cambodia.’ 
Chapter 4 begins with an overview of the ten original study communities, and 
the two regions in which they sit. Next, a selection of narratives about community 
members’ experiences during the KR regime and a brief conflict analysis is presented 
to help the reader understand the effects of the mass violence and its aftermath on 
Cambodian society. Chapter 4 also looks at the macro-level of the communities of 
study and highlights four communities demonstrating four different types of 
coexistence (surface, shallow, and two types of moderate coexistence), never 
reaching a degree of deep reconciliation.  
Chapter 5 returns to the micro-level of the individuals in the communities, and 
looks at victims and perpetrators, and how they have taken on the identity of victim, 
perpetrator, or former KR (often bystanders). Firstly, several factors affecting victim-
perpetrator relationships are identified, including the type and gravity of the offenses 
and the motivation of the perpetrators. Other general factors such as the community 
population, the amount of fear in the community, and the proximity of victims and 
perpetrators in those communities are discussed. Individual factors such as poverty, 
age and ignorance also have significant effects on victim-perpetrator relations. 
Secondly, eight coping strategies were identified that have been used by perpetrators 
to deal with the legacy of their violent past, in their dealings with their former victims.  
Chapter 6 changes focus from perpetrators to victims, and how victims struggle 




acceptance, partial acceptance, and full acceptance. A decision-making tree is 
introduced to summarize the various levels of acceptance, as well as other factors 
affecting victim-perpetrator relationships which were reviewed in Chapter 5. Next, 
factors that affect victims’ acceptance of perpetrators are reviewed, which include: 
education, relations before the KR period, trauma, culture, hierarchy, and patronage. 
Finally, I return to the model of reconciliation first introduced in Chapter 4 and 
elaborate upon it with more details from the four example communities. 
Chapter 7 looks at the little-studied topic of revenge in Cambodia: what it is, 
how it happened, and its lingering presence. Then respondents’ experiences with 
revenge are reviewed and cases when revenge was prevented, as well as how 
perpetrators are dealing with the threat of revenge today. A confession to a revenge 
killing by a key informant is examined, including reactions to that killing by other 
members of the community. Several factors are then discussed which influence the 
tendency of victims to seek revenge. Finally, the relationship between reconciliation 
and revenge is discussed, as revenge can be a tool of reconciliation. 
Chapter 8 explores the processes of reconciliation, which are divided into 
seven categories. The first and most important is the building of relationship, which 
includes sub-categories such as regard, trust, and interdependence. The second 
category is re-humanization, compassion, and empathy: though these processes were 
found to be beginning they were far from close to being achieved. The third category 
was healing of hearts and minds, which is also an important process especially in 
Cambodia, as the word heart is often used when discussing reconciliation, and 
compassion is important in Buddhism.  
Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, summarizes the key findings on 
reconciliation in Cambodia today and the degree to which it has been achieved. It 
indicates that Cambodia is not yet as fully reconciled as several authors would lead us 





This thesis is an in-depth analysis of Cambodians’ views of reconciliation, and 
how they are managing to live side by side, victim, perpetrators, and bystanders. The 
narratives of individuals, in particular in four selected communities, help us to 
understand and explain some typical settings in rural Cambodia today. The purpose of 
the analysis is to provide insights for other people in similar situations of post-mass-






CHAPTER 2 – History and Culture 
 
This chapter is divided into two main sections, the first on the historical context, 
and the second on the cultural context of Cambodia: significant aspects of the socio-
political context are highlighted which relate to reconciliation processes and the factors 
affecting these processes. 
The historical context begins with the roots of the situation of post-conflict 
Cambodia traced back to the vast Angkor Empire of the twelfth century. Angkor has 
been used as a grand baseline for many leaders, in particular the leaders of the Khmer 
Rouge (KR). During the KR regime which lasted until 7January 1979, approximately 
one-quarter of the population of 7 million (1.7 million) perished from starvation, 
overwork, or extermination (Ciorciari and Chhang 2005: 250).1
The cultural context in the second section of this chapter focuses on the 
aspects of culture and religion that have been affected by the legacy of war. As the 
social fabric was torn, normal relationships between young and old, powerful and weak 
were turned upside down, and trust was destroyed. These social relationships based 
upon hierarchy, kinship, and patronage were disrupted. Other issues such as the 
predominant Cambodian style of conflict avoidance also must be considered, as well 
 The KR period is the 
most significant period influencing reconciliation in Cambodia: the recovery needed 
from such an assault on society is enormous. A review of the country’s recovery 
through the 1980s and 1990s is next, including a review of the processes of national 
reconciliation, transitional justice processes, and the trials for those KR leaders (at the 
ECCC).  
                                               
1 The numbers of people who died during the KR regime varies between one and three million, 
but the figures most commonly used are either 1.5 to 1.7 million: most recently 1.7 million (BBC 
2010; New York Times 2010; Ciorciari and Chhang 2006: 250; Cambodian Genocide Program 
2010, Chandler 1991: 236; Kiernan 1993: 13; Kiernan 1996: 456-460; Mydans 2002; and 




as religion and the spiritual world. Finally, a review of rituals and remembrance 




Cambodia is well known for its majestic ancient temples of Angkor: the twelfth 
century marked the zenith of Cambodian society when hundreds of complex structures 
were built and acres of land cultivated through intricate watering systems (Chandler 
1996). Cambodian territory encompassed large parts of Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, 
and Laos. However, both before and after this period, Cambodia was a land of 
transitions, with waxing and waning powerful kingdoms relying upon various outside 
forces – particularly Thailand, Vietnam, China, and France. Although Cambodia is 
known often as the ‘land of smiles’, the pleasant and smiling faces of the Cambodian 
people also hide much conflict, suffering, and frustration. 
A central figure in recent Cambodian history is retired King Norodom Sihanouk. 
He was appointed to the throne in 1941 at the age of 19, and by 1954 managed to end 
the French protectorate which had started in 1846 (Osborne 1994). Although the 
French brought some improvements in the administration and infrastructure such as 
roads and water systems, assistance to the education system was minimal. The 
French relied upon Vietnamese to staff the ranks of the civil service which seeded 
long-standing competition and resentment of the Cambodians towards the 
Vietnamese.  
Although young and impetuous, King Sihanouk proved to be a masterful 
politician and was able to maintain power until 1970 when he was overthrown by the 
American-backed Lon Nol (Becker 1986). In the 1960s, a group of dissatisfied leftists, 




Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) which Sihanouk named the ‘Khmer Rouge’ 
(Chandler 1999; Short 2004).2
Throughout the 1960s Sihanouk played an important role in the group of ‘non-
aligned’ states, but he could not avoid getting embroiled in the American War in 
Vietnam, as he allowed the North Vietnamese to use the supply lines of the Ho Chi 
Minh trail through Cambodia. The American ‘secret’ bombings in Cambodia were 




The Khmer Rouge Period 
 After Sihanouk was deposed in 1970, he was recruited by the KR and 
called for the people to join him. As the KR insurgency broadened and deepened, 
people fled from insecure rural areas, and Phnom Penh’s population mushroomed with 
war refugees, as did other major urban centres. Popular anger against the civil war 
and US bombings, combined with widespread resentment of the rich urban elite by the 
poor peasants, and a call to join King Sihanouk was a potent recipe that allowed the 
Khmer Rouge to eventually gain power.  
On 17 April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took over Phnom Penh, evacuated cities, 
and brought society to ’year zero’. As two million inhabitants of the refugee-filled 
Phnom Penh were forced to leave with minimal belongings, thousands died. Pol Pot 
and the other KR leaders took the country to an extreme communal lifestyle, in an 
attempt to build a pure socialist society, an agrarian utopia – modelled after the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution (Chandler 1999; Short 2004). All allegiance was to the 
Angkar (the amorphous title of the movement which means ’organization’) rather than 
to the traditional family members, or political patrons. Communal living and work 
                                               
2 In the Cambodian language, surnames are first (Pol or Ieng) and first names are second (Pot 
or Sary). 
 
3 Estimates of deaths of civilians during the civil war period (including from B-52 bombing from 
American planes) range from 150,000 to 600,000 (Kiljunen 1984: 93; Shawcross 1979: 379; 




groups were created, families were separated and people were moved back and forth 
across the country in an attempt to populate rural areas and to break up traditional 
ties. The forced displacements also attacked Cambodian cultural systems of spirit 
worship, as they served to sever ties between villagers and the local spirits who 
resided in their native villages (Kent 2004: 9). These disruptions in social life caused 
further anxiety and erosion of social fabric.  
In reality, a classless society was not created, as ‘old’ or’ base’ (moulithan) 
people, rural farmers, were revered as the ‘real’ Khmer, and the ‘new’ or ’17 April’ 
people were discriminated against as having come from an indulgent, contaminated 
past.4
The KR attempted to erase centuries of tradition as well as modern 
development and culture.
 Amongst the ‘new’ people, former civil servants, especially Lon Nol soldiers, 
were targeted first for extermination. People wearing glasses or western dress, reading 
books, speaking foreign languages, or without calluses from manual labour were 
suspected as enemies. The entire population (except for the KR cadres who ruled over 
others from regional, district, commune village, or group posts of authority) was sent to 
the fields and impossible work tasks were assigned.  
5
                                               
4 As 17 April 1975 was the date of the KR takeover, the ‘new’ people were labelled ‘17 April’ 
people as elite, bourgeois enemies of the KR state. 
 Religion was abolished, monks were disrobed, Cham 
Muslims were prevented from practicing their religion, and temples, mosques, and 
churches were destroyed. Books were burned, libraries destroyed, and modern 
medicine abolished. Family ties were obliterated, as people often had to eat and live 
communally and were divided into different kinds of work groups: for children (kang 
 
5 The KR used a special language of proverbs mixed with threats and euphemisms, which 
provide insights into the tactics of the KR regime. For example, to pull up by the roots meant to 
kill the person and their whole family. To go for education usually meant you were being sent 
for execution. Angkar (the organization or KR leadership) has eyes like a pineapple – in other 
words is all-seeing so you must always follow the rules. To keep him is no loss; to lose him is 
no gain – yet another veiled threat that if you do not contribute to the community outputs you 





komar), women (kang neary), and for particularly able-bodied men and women, mobile 
work brigades (kang chelat). Parents and children, and husbands and wives were 
separated. Children were recruited as spies (chhlop), and were encouraged to report 
on their parents – they were also recruited as guards and executioners. Single people 
were chosen by Angkar and married in large group meetings with no traditional 
ceremonies or family participation. KR military forces were used to guard prisons and 
some communities, but the majority of the military were sent to border areas 
(especially the border with Vietnam) to prevent people from escaping but also because 
border skirmishes continued over the course of the regime.  
People worked from dawn to dusk, often into the night, as their rulers ordered 
them to double or triple previous rice harvests. Food was rationed with most people 
(again, except for cadre) eating watery rice porridge with a few shreds of vegetables. 
Survivors talked of being so hungry that they would eat anything – insects, inedible 
plants, cow skin, anything. Survivors also talked of being treated less than human: ’we 
were treated like animals’ is a common refrain. New people, especially those from 
some minority groups (Vietnamese, Chinese, and Cham) suffered greater hardship 
than the ‘base’ people (Kiernan 1996: 251-312). Other minorities from hill tribes, 
especially those with dark skin, were labelled ‘original Khmer’ and Pol Pot recruited 
many for his bodyguard corps.  
The country was divided into six geographical zones, and then into 32 different 
regions which were assigned numbers. In each region the administrative system was 
similar to previous administrations, with districts (srok), communes or sub-districts 
(khum); but then at the village level, some areas had traditional villages (phum) while 
other areas had cooperatives (sahakar). Each district and each region had a prison or 
detention area, with a central prison established in Phnom Penh: the infamous Tuol 
Sleng Prison or S-21, which also administered the Choueng Ek Killing Fields. 




having been severely tortured (Chandler 1999: 6). The regime was extraordinarily 
paranoid and many of those killed, especially in the later years of the regime came 
from within the KR cadre. 
Post Khmer Rouge – The People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
Finally in December 1978 Vietnamese soldiers and a core group of former KR 
cadres pushed into Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge.6 While the 
Vietnamese-backed faction of former KR installed themselves in Phnom Penh, the KR 
who had been controlling the country under Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Nuon Chea fled in 
disarray to the Thai-Cambodian border, along with thousands of emaciated and 
devastated refugees.7
The Situation in Cambodia during the PRK 
  
Immediately after the fall of the KR, there was mass confusion as the KR either 
killed their captives or tried to bring them to the Thai-Cambodian border. In the 
confusion, there are reports of survivors who carried out revenge killings against the 
KR cadre who killed their relatives (Gottesman 2003: 37-38).8 Decapitated heads of 
former KR cadres on sticks lined the road from Phnom Penh to Battambang (IV # 42).9
                                               
6 Current Cambodian Peoples’ Party (CPP) President Heng Samrin and Prime Minister Hun 
Sen were amongst those KR cadres who came in from Vietnam and created the Peoples 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). 
 
Former KR who were unable to flee, but who were not killed in revenge, were captured 
(or sometimes saved) by Vietnamese soldiers and brought to re-education camps. 
 
7 Although In the early 1980s these Cambodians were accepted as refugees (including 
inadequately screened KR) with thousands relocated to third countries, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) only controlled one of the refugee camps and the 
majority of the population were in other camps in Thailand but were not awarded refugee 
status. The majority of the refugees went to the US, France, and Australia, where over 300,000 
members of the Diaspora play an important though distant role in the political situation, 
including the creation of the ECCC. See May (2007).  
 
8 Chapter Seven discusses the issue of revenge and revenge killings in detail. 
 




Most were released after some months, though there is little known about the details. 
Cambodians traversed the country for months, searching for lost family members. 
The fledgling Cambodian government was initially called the ‘Salvation Front’ 
from which the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and its governing 
Revolutionary Council were created (Gottesman 2003; Slocomb 2003). Under the 
tutelage of their Vietnamese advisors, they immediately set about collecting evidence 
of the crimes of the KR as well as reopening the Tuol Sleng Prison (S-21) as a 
museum to preserve the evidence. A People’s Revolutionary Tribunal was established 
by a government decree in 1979, to try the KR leaders.10
In the meantime, while the PRK attempted to pick up the pieces of the 
shattered society inside Cambodia, over a million Cambodians were living across the 
border in Thailand. 
 The Tribunal offered 
‘leniency towards those people who participated in the armed forces or the 
administration of the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary Clique but are sincerely repentant’ (Fawthrop 
and Jarvis 2004: 42). In August 1979 Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were found guilty in 
absentia of genocide and other domestic crimes in a trial which has been widely 
denounced as a biased and unfair show trial (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004: 47).  
Refugees in Thailand – the Non-Communist Resistance 
While Cambodians in the country struggled to rebuild with help from the 
Eastern-bloc countries, Western-bloc countries provided assistance to refugees who 
had fled from Cambodia to Thailand. Several refugee camps were organized, led by 
three different political factions (which later became political parties): 1) the Khmer 
Rouge; 2) the royalist FUNCINPEC11
                                               
10 The Tribunal focused on three KR leaders: Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan. 
; and 3) the republican Khmer People’s National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by former Prime Minister Son Sann. These three factions 
11 FUNCINPEC is the ‘Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, 





were combined into the non-communist resistance groups (NCR) which served as a 
front organization to sanitize the KR involvement in the coalition, thus allowing 
Western-bloc countries to provide aid.12
In 1979 there were over one million Cambodians at the Thai-Cambodian border 
camps, which gradually decreased to 360,000 in 1993 when the camps finally closed. 
A civil war was waged: between the NCR (including the KR and the other two non-
communist groups, or Para) and the Vietnamese-backed government of the PRK 
which continued through the 1980s. Throughout the 1980s cold war politics placed a 
Western embargo on the PRK, while the Cambodian UN seat was held by the KR 
(also representing the NCR). Finally by the late 1980s the Cold War was ending, and 
the superpowers were tiring of supporting the proxy war in Cambodia. The PRK 
readied itself for a new phase, and instituted many changes to create a more liberal 
facade. Monks were allowed to be ordained freely, the name of government was 
changed to the State of Cambodia (SOC), and, most importantly, in 1989 the 
Vietnamese troops were withdrawn. These changes were in preparation for peace 
talks, which ushered in the next period of UN intervention. 
 
The UN Period 
Various attempts were made to negotiate a settlement between the four parties 
through the 1980s, which failed until 1991, when the Paris Peace Agreements were 
signed. King Norodom Sihanouk relinquished his title to become a Prince, so that he 
could provide a unifying umbrella for the four factions. A quadripartite power-sharing 
formula was guaranteed by 19 countries, and the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) was created. UNTAC spent US$2 billion in 1992 and 1993 to: 
1) demobilize and disarm troops, 2) hold elections, 3) return 360,000 refugees, 4) 
reform the civil administration, 5) enforce and educate about human rights and 
                                               
12 The NCR was not formally created until 1982. The non-KR groups in the NCR were called 




democracy. The ultimate aim was to achieve peace and reconciliation. Although 
UNTAC achieved much of its mandate such as elections and repatriation, future 
democratic development in Cambodia was hampered because administrative and 
judicial reform, and human rights enforcement were never carried out (Findlay 1995: 
106). After the 1993 elections, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) was 
created, with a co-minister system where posts were split between the two winning 
parties of Cambodian People’s Party (CPP successor party to the PRK) and 
FUNCINPEC. Most of the entrenched PRK power structures of the 1980s remained in 
place, and as FUNCINPEC lost power over the years, these structures solidified with 
CPP as the main controlling force of the executive, legislative, and the judiciary 
(Gottesman 2003). 
Unfortunately in 1992, the KR withdrew from the UNTAC process and re-
camped along the Thai-Cambodian border, continuing a civil war through 1998. 
Although UNTAC was widely heralded as a success: ‘In Cambodia, the peace process 
left behind contradiction, not reconciliation in the political arena’ (Doyle 2001: 102). We 
now turn to the post-UNTAC period. 
Post-UNTAC Cambodia 
The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) was created in 1993 after the 
UNTAC-run elections. The RGC continued to limp along as it attempted to rebuild a 
devastated infrastructure, both physical and psychological. Although aid poured into 
the country, rebuilding was slow due to the legacy of war and a lack of educated civil 
servants, political infighting between the major parties, and an environment of 
corruption, weak judiciary, lack of accountability, and human rights abuses.13
                                               
13 The Cambodian judiciary is fraught with problems and is often cited as being corrupt, 
incompetent, and not independent (Amnesty International 2000; Un 2009: 71; World Bank 
2004). These reports note that the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, 







 In 2010, the population was over 15 million people. Literacy rates are variably 
quoted, but are quite low in the region, with the high estimates at 76 percent for 
women and 85 percent for men (Population Reference Bureau 2010). Eighty percent 
of the population is from rural areas and primarily engaged in agriculture. The 
economic and health situation is poor: life expectancy is only 61 years, 36 percent of 
children under five years of age are malnourished, only 18 percent of rural populations 
are using improved sanitation (Population Reference Bureau 2010). While 78 percent 
of the population lives on less than two US dollars per day (the highest percentage in 
the Southeast Asia region) and 36 percent live on less than one US dollar per day, the 
per capita gross national income increased from US$280 in 2000 to US$ 430 in 2005 – 
the gap between the urban rich and rural poor is rising with the problem of 
landlessness increasing (World Bank 2006). 
Young people under 15 years of age comprise 35 percent of the population, 
and thus a large proportion of the Cambodian population only knows of the KR regime 
from hearing from their parents, neighbours, or media (Population Reference Bureau 
2010).14
The Legacy of War 
 However, the legacy of the war remains strong upon even these young 
people. The next section summarizes the after-effects of the wars and the KR regime 
upon Cambodian society. 
Many cleavages were created or exacerbated in Cambodian society after this 
convoluted history, including the KR period of mass violence between: urban (or ‘new’ 
people) and rural (or ‘base’ people); former KR and non-KR; direct victims, 
perpetrators, and bystanders; returning refugees from the border camps and those 
who never left the country; Cambodians in the Diaspora and those who stayed in 
                                               
14 Cambodians under the age of 30 at the time of this research (in 2008) would have been born 




Cambodia or at the border; and most recently between different members of political 
parties.  
Cambodians still suffer from the effects of these protracted civil wars as 
individuals, families, and armies changed alliances and ideologies over the years. The 
legacy of the KR and civil war is still felt today, as such a large proportion of educated 
people were killed, infrastructure destroyed, and social fabric torn apart: A government 
report from September 1983 gave the following figures for those who died: 594 
doctors, pharmacists and dentists; 675 lawyers and professors; 18,000 teachers; 
10,550 students, 191 journalists; and 1,120 artists.’ Only seven lawyers survived 
(Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004: 15 and 41).  
As mentioned above, human rights violations are common, and the judicial 
system is weak. Weapons are still widely available, and the violence which occurs in 
today’s society is often attributed to the past history. The social fabric was frayed, 
social order upset, and trust was broken. In addition, there are high incidences of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as the stress and fear of the ongoing civil war 
continued through the late 1990s. We now turn to the topic of trauma in Cambodian 
society. 
Trauma 
Traumatic events that almost all Cambodians were subject to are events that: 
’involve threats to lives or bodies; produce terror and feelings of helplessness; 
overwhelm an individual’s or group’s ability to cope or respond to the threat; lead to a 
sense of loss of control; and challenge a persons’ or group’s sense that life is 
meaningful and orderly.’ (Yoder 2005: 10). Layered on top of these specific traumatic 
events is the trauma caused by structural violence that includes poverty, and the lack 
of development, security, and human rights, especially in the rural areas.15






After the terror, starvation, overwork, and instability of Cambodia’s past, 
especially the KR period, many Cambodians are plagued with health problems that 
include mental health disorders, diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease (Kuoch and 
Scully 1998). The mental health disorders include major depression, anxiety disorder, 
PTSD, and conversion disorder (loss of specific sensory or motor functions without any 
organic cause) (van de Put and Eisenbruch 2002: 104).16
In spite of the grave and almost insurmountable legacy of war described above, 
there were efforts made towards national reconciliation which finally contributed to the 
peace that Cambodia is enjoying today. These are reviewed in the next section. 
 Sonis et al. report that the 
incidence of PTSD in the Cambodian population over the age of 18 is 11 percent 
(2009: 535), while de Jong, Komproe and van Ommeren found a 28 percent incidence 
of PTSD (2004: 2129). In the United States, where many more studies have taken 
place, the rates of PTSD in Cambodian refugees have been reported as high as 62 
percent (Marshall et al. 2005: 571). However, the very concept of trauma and PTSD in 
non-Western countries has been debated, as these categories may not be sufficient to 
understand all the underlying cultural and psychological meanings (Beneduce 2007: 
43; Pouligny, Chesterman and Schabel 2007: 6). Although these rates of PTSD are 
very high, psychosocial services have taken years to develop and are widely 
insufficient. 
National Reconciliation 
  Many negotiations were attempted by various governments and politicians in 
the 1980s and 1990s to encourage the former KR to defect to the government. Starting 
                                                                                                                                        
15 On a societal level, the effects of trauma and mass violence may be linked to increased 
levels of violence such as rape and domestic violence (Barsalou 2005: 4).  
 
16 Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) developed from the 1980s as a model to understand 
suffering caused by a wide variety of traumatic events; it is characterized by the presence of 
three categories of symptoms -- re-experiencing the traumatic event, hyper-arousal and 





in the late 1980s and resuming after the politically neutral hiatus during UNTAC, the 
RGC pursued a two-pronged approach in dealing with their political opponents: while 
continuing a civil war, they also pursued a policy of national reconciliation, trying to win 
over the former KR in order to control the entire Cambodian territory. These attempts 
to encourage the KR to defect to the RGC through their policy of national reconciliation 
were also known as ‘Prime Minister Hun Sen’s Win-Win Policy‘. As part of the Win-Win 
Policy, in 1994, the RCG passed a law which amnestied KR members who defected 
between 7 July 1994 and 7 January 1995 (Royal Government of Cambodia 1994).  
KR leaders finally started defecting in 1994 in Kampot Province in southeast 
Cambodia. Two major strongholds in the northwest defected in 1996 (senior leaders 
Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary from Pailin and Khieu Samphan from Malai).17
Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
 KR leaders 
Pol Pot and Ta Mok held out in Siem Reap Province’s Anlong Veng until Pol Pot was 
captured by his fellow KR comrades in June 1997. After a pro forma ‘show’ trial, Pol 
Pot died on 16 April 1998. Finally the last holdout, Ta Mok was arrested in 1998 and 
brought to the military prison in Phnom Penh. This marked the official end of the KR 
regime and the civil war, and Prime Minister Hun Sen claimed the success of his ’Win-
Win Policy’ of national reconciliation. This policy, however, has been an entirely ‘top-
down’ process with little input from grassroots levels of society. These efforts at 
national reconciliation can be considered part of transitional justice mechanisms to 
which we turn next. 
In the 30 years that have passed since the end of Khmer Rouge rule, many 
models of transitional justice mechanisms to deal with accountability for serious human 
rights abuses have been established, including truth commissions, civil sanctions or 
vetting, reparations, apologies, memorials, commemorations, and community 
                                               
17 After Ieng Sary defected the RGC issued a Royal Decree from the 1979 People’s Tribunal, 





reconciliation mechanisms (Minow 1998).18 The ECCC, a mixed national and 
international tribunal, was the primary solution chosen by Cambodia to deal with the 
crimes committed by the KR leaders.19
Other complementary means to assist societies in recovering from mass 
violence have already been undertaken in Cambodia, most importantly by the 
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) which has documented the crimes of 
the KR, and more recently conducted activities to promote reconciliation.
 However, the judiciary is weak, and the 
Cambodian public has little trust in the courts. In spite of these weaknesses, the ECCC 
as one tool of transitional justice (and some claim ultimately towards reconciliation) is 
well underway. 
20 Many other 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have conducted a wide variety of activities to 
educate people about the KR regime and the ECCC, to create memorials, and to 
promote reconciliation.21
Some other examples of activities to deal with the legacy of the past are on-
going and based on Cambodian culture and tradition (the yearly ceremonies to honour 
the ancestors or Bun Pchum Ben, and other ceremonies to honour those who have 
died) while others are more recent additions to Cambodian society (the public ‘Day of 
  
                                               
18 Transitional justice is defined as: ‘a response to systematic or widespread violations of 
human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, 
reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice 
adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse’ 
(International Center for Transitional Justice n.d.). 
 
19 The ECCC is currently predicted to be completed in 2014 (Open Society Justice Initiative 
2010). 
 
20 See Documentation Center of Cambodia website: www.dcccam.org. DC-Cam’s mission is 
captured in their monthly publication titled: ‘Searching for the Truth’. Their many projects 
include documenting written, photographic, and other materials; gathering histories; 
interviewing victims and perpetrators; researching various topics such as particular minority 
groups and the former KR military; planning public memorials; surveys; writing competitions; 
translation of materials; and reconciliation mechanisms including production of plays and films. 
Their public information room opened in 2005 and includes a library, education centre to show 
films, a café shop welcome point, and a tribunal response team to provide research assistance 
to the public (Documentation Center of Cambodia 2005: 42). 
 





Hate’ holiday, community reintegration projects, and conflict resolution training) 
(Etcheson 2004; McGrew 2006). These are discussed below in the section on 
Cambodian culture and religion. The next section covers the ECCC. 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
In July 2006, the UN and the RGC agreed to set up a ‘mixed’ or hybrid tribunal 
to try the senior leaders and those most responsible of the Khmer Rouge regime: the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia or ECCC. This has been to date 
the most important step in transitional justice since the ending of the KR Regime 
almost thirty years before, and many have claimed that the trials will bring national 
reconciliation. 22
The law to create the ‘Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia to 
Prosecute the Crimes Committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea from 17 
April 1975 to 7 January 1979’ was passed by the National Assembly then signed by 
the King on 10 August 2001. On 6 June 2003 the United Nations and the RGC signed 
the agreement to establish the ECCC which is a mixed (Cambodian and international) 
or hybrid court to try ‘senior leaders’ or those ‘most responsible’. One trial has been 
completed, for that of Duch, the Director of S-21 Prison, and he was found guilty. The 
second trial should be starting in 2011, of four senior leaders (Nuon Chea, Khieu 
Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith).
 
23
The ECCC however is trying only the senior leaders and those most 
responsible. Neither the Cambodian leaders nor the international community seemed 
 
                                               
22 For example Prime Minister Hun Sen stated: ‘The trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders will be a 
fair ending of its political organization after they were finished politically and militarily. We will 
not forget about justice as we will never forget about national reconciliation, peace and stability. 
The two objectives could be compared to heart and lung of every one of us; i.e. we cannot go 
without either one of them’ (Hun 2000: 2).  
 
23 Evidence for a third trial has been collected by the prosecution but this trial has been resisted 





ready to discuss the thornier issue of lower level perpetrators. One other mechanism 
of transitional justice is through truth-telling. 
Truth-Telling Mechanisms 
Truth-telling and acknowledgement are important aspects of transitional justice 
and reconciliation processes, in that the nature and extent of the human rights 
violations need to be widely known and understood, but also acknowledged by victims, 
perpetrators, governments, and the international community. Many in and outside of 
Cambodia think that this ‘truth’ is especially important for the younger generations and 
for other countries, and the refrain ‘never again’ is often repeated. 
To date, both the Cambodian government and NGOs have done a great deal to 
document the past crimes of the KR regime.24
This summary of transitional justice mechanisms marks the end of the section 
on the historical context. We next turn to a review of Cambodian culture and religion, 
which will assist us in understanding the challenges facing the Cambodian people as 
they struggle to recover from the years of mass violence.  
 Most of the government efforts were 
undertaken in the early 1980s when Cambodia was under Vietnamese tutelage so, 
given the cold war politics of the time, these efforts were almost entirely discounted by 
the West. And indeed they were far from independent, fair, or neutral. They do 
however provide a strong basis for the current ECCC, as well as some of the broader 
transitional justice mechanisms that are being considered by some NGOs. 
 
Cambodian Culture and Religion 
Cambodia’s unique cultural mix profoundly shapes the way the people have 
responded to the mass violence, and how they are recovering. Cambodians are 
                                               
24 See page 33 above describing the activities of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-





primarily Buddhist (96 percent) while two percent are Cham Muslim and about one 
percent Christian (Central Intelligence Agency 2010).25 The majority of Cambodians 
are ethnic Khmer (90 percent), while five percent are Vietnamese, one percent are 
Chinese, and another four percent are other groups (including hill tribes as well as 
Cham Muslims) (Central Intelligence Agency 2010).26
Governed Space - Administrative Structures 
 Buddhism profoundly shapes 
the Cambodian identity: ‘To Be Khmer Is to Be Buddhist’ (Smith-Hefner 1999: 21-63). 
However ancient Hinduism and animistic spirit worship also affect Cambodians’ views 
and practices of everyday life. The majority of the population (80 percent) has been for 
centuries (and still is) involved in agriculture in rural areas – life and the many 
traditional ceremonies revolve around the rice cultivation system.  
The smallest unit of government settlements in Cambodia is the village (phum), 
with several villages making up a commune (khum), several communes making up a 
district (srok) and several districts making up a province (khet). There are 21 
provinces, and two municipalities in Cambodia: this research has focused on two 
regions (southwest and northwest) due to the presence of former KR strongholds in 
those areas.27
The village chief is the main authority figure in most villagers’ lives. He (there 
are only a handful of female village chiefs) decides who gets assistance, how conflicts 
 The village and commune structures are the most important for 
regulating how the population, and thus victims and perpetrators, relate to each other. 
                                               
25 While the Cham culture and Muslim religion, as well as Christian and other hill tribe practices 
are also unique and important, this research study was only able to focus on the majority 
Buddhist identity. 
 
26 Cambodia (or Kampuchea) is the name of the country, the people are called Cambodians, 
but since most of the population is ethnic Khmer, the words Cambodian and Khmer are often 
used interchangeably. The language spoken in Cambodia can be called either Cambodian or 
Khmer. 
 
27 The southwest region includes Kampot and Kampong Som Provinces, and Kep Municipality, 






are solved, and where roads and schools are built. Most village chiefs are political 
party appointees, if not formally then informally and thus they are also responsible for 
ensuring that the entire village votes for their party (which is predominantly the ruling 
Cambodian People’s Party). Villagers who join opposition parties will not receive 
assistance from the village chief. Quite a few of the village chiefs have served in their 
positions since 1979, though some of them have moved up into positions in the 
commune or have retired due to old age or ill health. In a few cases, the village chief 
from the KR period remained so under the PRK regime. Some village chiefs have 
been chosen fairly by the elected commune council and are chosen on the basis of 
their charisma, fairness, or administrative and leadership skills.28
Other individuals in villages (usually elders) may be consulted for various 
issues such as solving conflicts or other advice, and these can include monks, Achars 
(Buddhist laymen who serve as advisors of the temples), teachers or businesspeople. 
In the past, these elders (chas tum) played an important role in village affairs, including 
guiding moral behaviour and solving local conflicts. However, the elders’ role has been 
diminished partly due to the village chief’s authority from the CPP, and partly due to 
the destruction of the social bonds during the years of war (Luco 2002: 103).  
  
Although there have been many recent efforts at decentralization, and many 
UN and government programs have supported the creation of village development 
committees, the village chief system retains the most power. The village chief reports 
to the commune chief, then to the district chief and to the provincial governor. There 
are police at the commune and district levels, though there is also a system of informal 
village militia – which played an important role in party control, law enforcement and 
military defence in the 1980s and 1990s. 
                                               
28 Commune councils were first elected by national election in 2002, with a second election in 
2007. Each commune council includes from five to 11 members, depending upon the 





Violence and Security 
Traditionally, extreme violence has been carried out against enemies (Oveson 
2005: 40-41, Vickery 1984: 7). But this extreme violence was perfected by the KR 
through the practice of ‘annihilating’ one’s enemies (Hinton 1998: 112). In the 1980s 
the PRK cultivated the feelings of insecurity so as to encourage the population to fight 
the evil KR ‘genocidal clique’. 
As a culture of violence was present in Cambodia after the years of mass 
violence and civil war, fear of future violence stayed with many survivors for decades, 
especially those that lived in the war-affected areas in the northwest and southwest of 
Cambodia. The country is still awash in weapons, and there is much political violence. 
Law and order remains a challenge as the security forces are underpaid, and 
corruption is rampant. As a result of the KR tactics, basic trust was lost and remains 
lost (Eisenbruch 2007: 93). Mistrust lies just below the surface of everyday village life: 
‘at the slightest hurdle, mistrust comes running back’ (Luco 2002: 87). Luco also 
emphasized the divisions between insiders and outsiders in the village, with a 
profound lack of trust of outsiders (2002: 13-14).29
                                               
29 The following quote provides a picture of traditional Cambodian society that shows the 
challenges of reintegrating victims and perpetrators after a period of mass violence:  
 Although Cambodians often refer to 
themselves as ’we’ Khmer (Khmer yeung), this does not imply a strong sense of 
nationality, rather only excludes people who are different than they are, that is, not 
Khmer (Luco 2002: 13). Villagers rely on family and patron networks as important 
sources for security and power. Additional security is sought from spiritual powers 
which play an important role in Cambodia.  
A Cambodian srok is rather impenetrable and outsiders are not readily admitted. To fit 
in, one must abide by an implicit code of conduct that demands people do not draw 
attention to themselves, know their place and avoid causing trouble. Individuals who 
stand out because of peculiar behaviour are pushed aside. The only options available 
are either to fit into the social mould and be tolerated or face being ostracized by the 
locals, or to leave (move to a different area, join the army, enter the monkhood). In 
some extreme cases, populations have been known to physically eliminate the culprit, 
under accusations of witchcraft. Indeed, someone who is ‘different’ will often be 




To maintain security the village chief can call upon members of informal militia, 
and also upon commune-level police. The security apparatus also relies upon district 
and provincial police forces, as well as provincial-level military. The threat of imminent 
attack from military groups from inside or outside Cambodia has been eliminated. 
However, the population has not been able to rely on the security forces to keep them 
safe, as the forces have often been involved in human rights abuses. Moreover, some 
areas especially close to the borders may be more insecure due to trafficking in drugs, 
timber, and people.  
Social Structure and Social Space 
Cambodia has a conservative, traditional society that puts high value on 
discretion, humility, modesty, hierarchy, and responsibility to parents. As noted by 
many authors, Cambodian systems of hierarchy and patronage are deep, extensive, 
and operate very differently from the west (Chandler 1996; Ledgerwood and Vijghen 
2002; Luco 2002; Roberts 2009). Status and rank are important and even in everyday 
speech Cambodians estimate their position in relation to others (based on age, wealth, 
or position) in order to choose the correct greetings. Nuclear families operate as units, 
with extended family in looser relationships. Most people have patrons, to whom they 
provide allegiance and support in exchange for protection. 
Social relationships are very sensitive to public shaming, especially in the 
context of the hierarchical structure which will be discussed further below. Shame is 
explained through the concept of ‘face’ (mok) and is extremely important in Cambodian 
relationships: to lose face (bak’ mok) can also be translated as to feel ashamed. 
Cambodians usually try to avoid open conflict or other situations where they may be 
required to admit a mistake or wrongdoing to another. It is much safer to tell someone 




angry. Losing an argument causes a loss of face, which then threatens one’s position 
in society.  
Family Structure 
The family (traditionally mother, father, children, maternal grandparents) is the 
smallest unit of social organization.30 The family unit works together to provide 
economically and all members of the family participate. Traditionally, for the majority of 
families marriages are arranged as an extension of the family economic and social 
unit. At marriage, the young man will usually move to the wife’s village, but if possible 
all new couples will have their own house.31
During the KR period, often not only was the suspected traitor killed, but so 
was the whole family – KR slogans referred to pulling up the roots with the tree. Part of 
this could have been paranoia, but part rooted in Khmer culture, as nuclear family ties 
were so strong. There are also several proverbs about lengthy cycles of revenge over 
generations – thus eliminating an entire family is a means to avoid retaliation. Hinton 
has described this strong revenge reaction as ‘disproportionate revenge’ (2005: 25-
27). 
  
In the immediately post-KR period, the government created ‘solidarity groups’ 
(krom samaki). These were mandatory family groupings, to allow widows or those 
without able-bodied men to join forces in order to harvest crops. These groups were 
not very popular and by 1983 most families had reverted to traditional nuclear family 
groupings (Slocomb 2003: 104-111). Thus the nuclear family remains the most 
important social structure in Cambodia. 
                                               
30 In urban areas this structure may differ due to economic and space reasons, and in many 
areas there are other forms of family structures as there are many widows and female-headed 
households.  
 
31 This practice of arranged marriage is gradually decreasing, as increasingly offspring are 




Hierarchy, Kinship, Patronage, and Power 
Social structures in Cambodia are organized according to status, position, and 
rank. There are strict social guidelines about relating to people of different status 
(depending on age, gender, social status, and wealth) which are echoed in the 
language. When addressing another person titles must be chosen based on the 
relationship between the two; in addition there are special languages for royalty and 
monks which reflects the hierarchal system. Cambodians must be obedient to their 
social superiors and show deference towards them. The heights at which one’s hands 
are held in the traditional greeting are strictly ordered, with hands held higher for a 
more important person. Patron-client relations are central to the structure of 
Cambodian society, and a dominant feature (Roberts 2009: 10). While the patron 
offers protection, the client offers allegiance. Power relations between the two parties 
are usually unequal, as the patron is more powerful than the client (Ledgerwood and 
Vijghen 2002: 110-111).  
Another important aspect of social structure related to relationships between 
victims and perpetrators is Cambodian dispute resolution styles. 
Dispute Resolution Styles 
In Cambodian culture one of the most important societal rules is to maintain 
balance and harmony – arguments, conflicts, mistakes, and going outside traditional 
rules all may result in loss of face and possibly even social ostracism. This rule could 
also be described as a desire to ‘stay out of trouble’ (Oveson 2005: 37). This approach 
of avoidance can also be a form of ‘self-preservation’ in order to avoid collision with 
outsiders of greater social power (Zucker 2009: 34-35). These rules are also followed 
as disputes are resolved: the most important outcome is the maintenance of social 
harmony, and root causes of conflict and other important issues may be papered over. 




serves to isolate people (van de Put and Eisenbruch 2002: 107). Dispute resolution in 
the countryside is usually in the form of facilitation (samrap samruol) or mediation 
(samroh samruol) with the goal to smooth over relationships (Urs 2007: 67). In 
addition, Cambodian culture encourages the Buddhist principle of forbearance (khanti) 
in order to avoid and prevent conflict ‘to stay calm and search for a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict’ (Prum 2006: 20; Morris 2004).  
But there are contradictions: even under the umbrella of the Buddhist principles 
not to kill and to forgive and forget one’s feelings of anger and vengeance: in today’s 
Cambodia mob and witch killings are prevalent (United Nations Special Representative 
of the Secretary General for Human Rights in Cambodia 2002).32 ‘Self-help justice’ in 
Cambodia can be swift. In some cases of murder, families prefer to kill the suspected 
perpetrator quickly and face the legal system themselves, as they feel they owe a debt 
to their slain relative.33
                                               
32 Although I am not focusing in this thesis upon judicial solutions, I should point out that the 
above conflict styles are in contradiction to an adversarial justice system used in common law 
systems. Although the ECCC is based on a Cambodian civil law system, there are many 
common law and adversarial functions that are in contradiction to the indigenous Cambodian 
approach to dispute resolution.  
 Most ordinary conflicts are settled in the family however. If this 
does not work, a village chief or sometimes an elder at the temple can be consulted. 
Going to the court is the last resort. In fact the most frequent way of settling the conflict 
is to ignore it and try to forget. It is better to repress one’s anger and maintain harmony 
(Bagdasar 1993: 110-120). This then evokes a paradox between forgiveness and 
repressed anger. While forgiveness and conflict avoidance are important cultural 
tendencies, when anger is repressed it can take a long time to forgive, if ever. These 
cultural characteristics can lead to volatile situations when repressed anger escapes, 
or to smouldering situations as anger is repressed for years. These issues are 
discussed at length in Chapter Eight on the processes of reconciliation. Another 
 




important aspect to increase understanding of Cambodian social reconstruction is 
religion and the spiritual world. 
Religion, the Spiritual World, and Remembrance 
Buddhism and the Cambodian spiritual world profoundly shape the Cambodian 
worldview and these beliefs must be considered in the process of reconciliation. 
Cambodia is primarily a Theravada Buddhist country. Cambodia is one of the few 
countries in the world where Buddhism is the religion of the state. However since 
Buddhism did not flourish until the sixth century, the influences of Brahmanism, 
Hinduism, and Animism are still strong in the Cambodian culture. For the majority of 
Cambodians, all activities of daily life are influenced by their religious and spiritual 
beliefs. Some traditional beliefs are shared by all religious groups such as belief in the 
spiritual world, the importance of ancestors, and ritual practices performed by 
traditional healers.  
Buddhist teachings or dharma, instruct followers to respect the five precepts, 
pray to Buddha, give rice and donations to monks, and do other acts to gain merit so 
as to gain a good position in the next life. 34
In spite of the attempts by the KR to destroy culture and religion, and a 
repression of religion during the PRK rule, Buddhism was not destroyed.
 All actions have consequences in this or 
the next life and are seen in a good (bon or merit) or bad (bop) dichotomy - do good 
receive good, do bad receive bad. One’s karma is of key importance and making merit 
for the next life is the main activity for many people (including several of the former KR 
leaders). The threat of Buddhist hell remains overhead with graphic photos of the 
various torments painted on the walls of pagodas.  
35
                                               
34 The five precepts are you shall not: kill, lie, drink alcohol, commit adultery, and steal. 
 However, 
 
35 An integral part of the KR reign of terror was to destroy religion by disrobing and killing 
monks. Approximately 50 percent of the 50,000 monks were reported to have been killed, but 
only 1,000 returned to the monkhood (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004: 15). The KR also physically 




not all Cambodians today follow all five precepts nor are most Cambodians 
knowledgeable about Buddhist theory. Older Cambodians frequently worship at the 
Buddhist temples, but those of middle and young ages less often.  
The majority of Cambodians do share a deep belief in the significance of the 
spirit world. The forest spirits which are also ancestor spirits (neak ta) are extremely 
important and are worshipped daily and in times of need. Bad events may be 
perceived in terms of punishments from the neak ta, spirits who will have to then be 
appeased with special ceremonies. Traditional healers including monks, fortune-
tellers, traditional healers (Kru Khmer) and mediums are also important sources of 
comfort and cure.36
Honouring the Dead 
  
Traditional and religious approaches to the legacy of the KR regime are many, 
in particular within families, to mourn their lost relatives. Many Buddhists offer daily 
prayers to the ancestors37
                                                                                                                                        
Churches were destroyed as were mosques, and Cham Muslims were prohibited from 
practicing any religious rituals and were for example forced to eat pork. In 1979 only about 
1,000 monks remained in the monkhood (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004: 15). In the 1980s the PRK 
brought Khmer Krom monks from Southern Vietnam to re-start the Buddhist clergy (sangha); 
during this period the Supreme Patriarch Tep Vong also held a series of political offices. 
Throughout most of the 1980s, men over age 50 were not allowed to be monks. However in 
1989, as the PRK tried to shed its socialist skin, more monks were ordained and temples rebuilt 
-- in the 1990s there were thousands of dollars donated by Cambodians inside (even poor 
Cambodians would eke out money to donate) as well as the Diaspora to renovate temples all 
over the country.  
, and when they give rice to the monks. The Buddhist Bun 
Pchum Ben (Ceremony of the Ancestors), Kathin (Buddhist Lent), funerals, and other 
  
36 Traditional healers are often consulted when people are suffering either physical or mental 
ailments. Sometimes the illness is blamed on roaming souls, and special ceremonies are done 
to appease them, sometimes including traditional medicines or other methods such as 
sprinkling holy water. Mediums can be consulted to contact lost relatives as well. These 
ceremonies are often very helpful to the sufferer who believes in these methods, though the 
youth today are less interested in these traditional methods. Astrology and fortune-tellers are 
also often consulted and, again, can provide relief. Traditional healers use various methods of 
resolving community disharmony including treating thinking-too-much madness, lovesickness 
madness, and ancestral spirit disorder (Eisenbruch 2007: 92). 
 
37 Many Cambodians have spirit houses outside their homes to attract the bad spirits from the 
home, and where offerings are left to ancestors and other departed souls; there are also small 





ceremonies are practiced widely, and all provide opportunity to remember the dead. 




During the KR regime, traditional ceremonies including funerals and cremations 
were prohibited, only resuming in 1979. Although most Cambodians are cremated and 
the urn with ashes is placed inside other shrines (stupas) or in the Buddhist temples, 
some Cambodians (especially Chinese-Cambodians) are buried in coffins in burial 
grounds on ancestral lands. Cham Muslims have burials and cemeteries with 
identification of individuals in graves. For many who perished during the KR regime, 
funeral rites were not done, and the location of remains of loved ones is unknown.  
Many Cambodians offer daily prayers for their ancestors, providing favourite 
foods and drinks in small shrines in the house or spirit houses outdoors.39
                                               
38 The Khmer New Year is recognized by all Cambodians except the Cham, who instead 
remember their ancestors during Eid and Ramadan. 
 Given the 
importance of burial rituals and of the various holidays to respect one’s ancestors, and 
the livings’ obligations to free their wandering souls from eternal suffering, it would 
presumably be important for Cambodians who lost loved ones to find their remains and 
do ceremonies, even if many years later. Although some families have done this, the 
majority have not. Some do not have the means to search. Many have no idea where 
Angkar took their lost family members. Many perhaps cannot bear to return to the 
scene of so much suffering. Some families invite monks to their homes on particular 
days of significance to pray to Buddha and honour their departed relatives. There is 
thus a conceptual conflict for Cambodians, between the importance of burial rituals 
and annual paying of respects to ancestors, and the lack of a specific location to carry 
out these ceremonies. A complete process of social reconstruction and reconciliation 
 
39 In the KR controlled areas, traditional ceremonies including funerals and cremations were 




will require alternative methods to deal with the issue of the many missing relatives in 
Cambodia.  
Ceremony of the Ancestors (Bun Pchum Ben) 
Bun Pchum Ben, held towards the end of September, and celebrated for at 
least three days, but sometimes as long as 15 days. During Bun Pchum Ben, families 
visit about five different temples, and try to return to their home villages, to pay respect 
to their ancestors by making offerings: Cambodians believe that during this period the 
souls of the dead are freed from hell to search for relatives, offerings, and redemption. 
This holiday is of great importance for all Cambodians (except Cham Muslims) to 
commemorate relatives and friends who died during the KR regime. Bun Pchum Ben 
serves as a unifying national process for Cambodians, a necessary acknowledgement 
ceremony to allow wandering spirits to rest, and to focus on the living by recognizing 
all of the deaths that occurred – of both victims and perpetrators.40
Besides these religious and spiritual means to honour those who died during 
the KR regime, there are also secular holidays focusing on remembering Cambodia’s 
brutal past. 
  
Government Holidays to Remember the Past 
There are three main non-religious holidays related to remembering the past. 
‘Liberation Day’ (7 January) commemorates the day the Vietnamese troops and their 
Cambodian colleagues (of the PRK) overthrew the KR. On 17 April the KR took over 
Phnom Penh (in 1975), and 20 May is the ‘Day of Hate’. Both 7 January and 17 April 
are overtly political holidays, reminding people not to forget the PRK saving the 
population from the KR and the bad years of the KR period. The origins of the 20 May 
holiday are more obscure. In Cambodia in 1982 the PRK created a ‘Research 
                                               
40 The Pchum Ben ceremony brings both aspects of individual and collective mourning and 
memory together: ‘The notion of private and public is also articulated through the combination 
of paying respect to the deceased of one’s own family as well as to the deceased of the 




Committee into the Crimes of the Pol Pot Regime’ which gathered petitions and 
produced a report in July of 1983 documenting the deaths during the regime (Fawthrop 
and Jarvis 2004: 72). In August 1983, the PRK National Assembly formally recognized 
the report, created a national ‘Day of Tying Anger’ (thngai chang kamhoeng) also 
known as the ‘Day of Hate’, and the committee also called for the construction of 
memorials and gathering of evidence throughout Cambodia. In the 1980s, the 
government was clearly and openly using this day to remind people of the suffering of 
the KR period, to give them the motivation to continue the gruelling and painful civil 
war against the former KR perpetrators. The purpose was also to remind Cambodians 
of their indebtedness to Vietnam for liberating them and Hughes notes that the day is 
clearly not only a commemoration day (2000: 39-42).  
The Day of Hate has not been a public holiday, and spontaneous celebrations 
by the population did not occur. But in the 1980s the entire population participated in 
ceremonies at killing fields and KR prison sites around the country, including school 
children who listened to their teachers talking about their painful memories and 
vigilance to fight the KR. However, its prominence has been gradually decreasing over 
the years and in 2008 there were only scattered events held in the capital Phnom 
Penh, and some provincial headquarters, organized by the ruling political party (CPP).  
 
This chapter has shown how conflict has been a dominant thread throughout 
Cambodia’s history, both ancient and recent. Of particular importance for this research 
study were the years of the Khmer Rouge rule during which 1.7 million people 
perished. A major consequence of the extended civil war and terror of the KR period 
has been a profound lack of trust in relationships, which has made social 
reconstruction extremely difficult. With little experience of close-knit associations or 
other ways to bind communities together, and lack of reliance on government or other 




strings of power and linkage) to survive and get ahead. Multiple and many-layered 
cleavages in society were created by the various conflicts. Many people are 
traumatized by what they experienced, witnessed or did during the war years, 
especially during the KR regime. Especially in the many communities across 
Cambodia, where victims and perpetrators live side by side, the challenges of social 




CHAPTER 3 – Reconciliation: What Is It? 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the various processes of reconciliation 
described in the current literature. First I begin with a Cambodian definition of 
reconciliation. This leads to a review of six basic assumptions relating to processes of 
reconciliation. Reconciliation is a (1) process and goal; (2) based fundamentally on 
bilateral relationship building; (3) focused on the future but deals with the past; (4) 
based on human needs and rights; (5) requires institutional and societal change; and 
(6) made up of constituent elements.  
Seven core processes of reconciliation are reviewed: (1) building relationship; 
(2) re-humanizing; (3) healing; (4) acknowledgement and confession; (5) apology; ((6) 
forgiveness; and 7) forgetting. Finally, the current research is reviewed concerning 
whether or not Cambodians are reconciled. 
 
Definition of Reconciliation 
The working definition of reconciliation for this thesis was devised by a 
Cambodian and international team at the Center for Peace and Development (CPD)1
Reconciliation is a long term process to restore or rebuild relationships 
between people previously in conflict. It aims for a profound change from 
enmity, hostility, or complete separation to mutual understanding or 
harmonious co-operation. In post-conflict societies, true reconciliation has 
taken place when a society can look to the future and its actions are no longer 
dictated by the wrongdoing of the past; when that society is inclusive and all 
members of the society are valued; and trust has been restored. Kar phsah 
 
based on their work in conflict resolution training from 1994 to 2000:  
                                               
1 The Center for Peace and Development (CPD) was a project of the Cambodian Development 
Research Institute. Contacts from this institute served as key informants for this research, as 
they have been working on conflict transformation specifically, longer than any other institution 







 means the act of healing; the act of getting back together two or more 
parties previously involved in conflict. In Khmer [Cambodian language] the 
healing process emphasizes 'a change of heart' and the healing of divisions 
(Cambodian Centre for Conflict Resolution and Cambodia Development 
Research Institute 2000:10-11). 
In the Cambodian language, the two main terms for reconciliation (phsah 
phsaa and bangruop bangruom) are not clearly understood nor often used in everyday 
speech, and are often confused with other words such as mediation and facilitation.3
Degrees of Coexistence and Reconciliation  
 
As noted in the definition above, the roots of the Cambodian words include terms for 
healing wounds and hearts. This definition includes the major elements of the 
reconciliation as described above. Later chapters will explore how rural Cambodians 
defined reconciliation in their daily lives. 
Reconciliation can be seen as travelling along a continuum: from an anarchic 
state of war to a utopian state with perfect harmony, from zero to total peace, and from 
simple coexistence to forgiveness and consensual democratic reciprocity (Etcheson 
2003: 2). Interim stages of coexistence can be described in terms of ’passive 
                                               
2 Kar is a modifier to signify a noun; without the kar, the word phsah phsaa could be used as a 
verb or in informal use, a noun. Phsah phsaa is the core root of the word reconciliation, and is 
used commonly and colloquially especially in the countryside and is the primary word used in 
this study. Kar phsah phsaa lang winh is a compound word: lang winh means to do something 
again, to return, and encompasses the ‘re’ of reconciliation but is rarely used colloquially when 
using the term phsah phsaa. On their own, the word phsah means pain, and phsaa means to 
heal. A word that sounds the same but is spelled differently, phsaar, means to weld or solder, 
and some respondents assumed that this was also part of the meaning of phsah phsaa. 
Another common word for reconciliation which has the same meaning for most Cambodians is 
bangruop bangruom, and when used with the modifier cheat (national) is the commonly used 
word for national reconciliation. 
 
3 Some authors have used other definitions for reconciliation: Urs (2007: 79) used ‘somros 
somroul’ (which she also defined as facilitation or mediation). Hettne and Eastmond used the 
term ‘rup rum cheat, for ‘everybody joining together pure-heartedly’ and also suggested that 
sros sruel knea or to cooperate is more common, though not a true definition of reconciliation 
(2001: 7). I argue that the term used by CPD (phsah phsaa) is more appropriate as it is most 
commonly used in Cambodia, and because CPD has by far the greatest amount of experience 
in this field in Cambodia. Samroh samruol in the glossary (same as somros somruel) or 
mediation, and samrap samruel, or facilitation, both have the meaning to smooth over and seek 
harmony. In practice mediators often encourage parties to paper over their conflicts and live 




coexistence’ meaning negative peace (absence of violence), or as ‘active coexistence’ 
meaning positive peace (capacity to deal with conflict non-violently and creatively) 
(Galtung 2001: 3). The ‘amount’ of reconciliation can also be described by its ‘depth’ 
and can be referred to as thin or thick (Crocker 2002: 528).  
Three stages or degrees of coexistence or reconciliation as described by Rigby 
will be used as the initial starting point for this thesis: (1) surface coexistence or non-
lethal coexistence of separate lives (parties living apart); (2) shallow coexistence of 
parallel lives (parties living alongside each other, but with role-specific interactions); 
and (3) deep reconciliation of community (parties living with and amongst each other 
with rich and multi-textured interaction) (Rigby 2006a: 5-6, 16).4
Coexistence is a less politically loaded term than reconciliation, and may be a 
more practical and easily obtainable goal to try to attain during early stages of post-
mass-violence reconciliation processes. Coexistence does not necessarily include the 
more difficult components of apology and forgiveness. Coexistence is less personal or 
emotional, a condition where individuals, communities or nations can live together, 
trade, develop, and share a future but where full relationships are not yet built or 
developed. Reconciliation is a more advanced state than coexistence and is 
characterized by relationships with mutual trust and understanding (Staub and 
Pearlman 2001: 206-7).
 Surface and shallow 
coexistence may occur in early stages of resolving conflict, while deep reconciliation is 
more a long-term process. But the process of reconciliation is not linear so these 
stages or degrees may not always occur in a progressive sequence; there may be 
steps forward, then back. 
5
                                               
4 The term non-lethal coexistence was coined by Kriesberg (1998: 183).  
 
  
5 The following quote summarizes the relationship between coexistence and reconciliation: ‘But 
as positive peace is the presence of social or structural justice and of positive relationships so 
positive coexistence would be the presence of something more dynamic: shared values, 




In the ideal end-state of deep reconciliation, healing is well on its way, 
apologies have been made and forgiveness granted. Relationships are restored and 
an inclusive, fair society is rebuilt meeting all citizen’s basic human needs and rights. 
Porter suggests three requirements which would apply to deep reconciliation: ‘(1) it 
requires fair interactions between members of opposing groups; (2) it requires that we 
overcome our antagonistic divisions by occupying common ground and (3) it requires 
the presence of a society in which all citizens have a sense of belonging’ (Porter cited 
in Hamber and Kelly 2005: 67). The various study sites examined in this thesis in 
Cambodia were analysed as to their stage of coexistence or reconciliation: surface, 
shallow, or deep. We now turn to levels of reconciliation. 
Levels of Reconciliation 
Various levels of reconciliation can be identified including: individual, family, 
neighbour, community, region, nation, and international.6
                                                                                                                                        
Coexistence as end-state simply means an accommodation, a much more achievable goal than 
reconciliation as an end-state’ (Bloomfield 2006: 16). 
 This thesis focuses upon 
three main levels: primarily community, but also individual and national reconciliation. 
Many authors believe that for sustainable peacebuilding to be effective, reconciliation 
must occur at all levels (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 27; Bloomfield 2006: 26; and 
Lederach 1997). Both horizontal and vertical linkages between the various levels are 
important for sustainable peacebuilding and should be complementary (Lederach 
1997: 38-55 and Huyse 2003: 25). Vertical reconciliation processes can also be 
described as bottom-up (individual to national) and top-down (from political elites at 
national levels down to grassroots). Horizontal linkages can occur at all levels: for 
example at the middle level is the building of relationships between civil society actors. 
 
6 Reconciliation at the individual level can be further divided into three categories: the 
reconciliation of an individual with the self, with other individuals and with the community 
(Stovel 2003: 10). Another level of reconciliation is reconciliation between the self and the 
environment (Assefa 2001a). The issues of reconciliation with the self and the environment will 




The focus of this research is community reconciliation at the lower and middle levels, 
which is analysed through the views of individuals in rural Cambodia. Community 
reconciliation however cannot be entirely divorced from national reconciliation and 
national processes. This thesis thus fills a gap in the literature, as there have been no 
other qualitative studies of community reconciliation in Cambodia. 
The terms used to describe the components of the reconciliation process at the 
individual level are often psychological or sociological (such as suffering, pain, hurt, 
remorse, revenge, forgiveness, apology, etc.) and may not apply to other levels of 
reconciliation. And individual processes of change such as the development of 
empathy and understanding at the individual level do not necessarily translate to 
similar processes at the national level. This research asked individuals how they have 
healed and dealt with the past, and then made observations about these findings as 
well as the interactions between the individuals and other community factors of 
reconciliation. Thus my primary interest is in the relationships both between individuals 
and among individuals but not within the individual self. Influences from the national 
level are further analysed as to their influence on community reconciliation.  
Focus on Community Reconciliation 
Communities are made up of individuals and each will be on their own 
individual path of history, culture, recovery, and healing: ‘anger, hurt and pain may still 
be too raw, too unexpressed for some to even contemplate reconciliation’ (du Toit 
2003: 11). After mass violence, besides the physical and psychological damage to 
individuals, community is also damaged, as mistrust, anger, and fear overwhelm 
community solidarity. A Cambodian psychologist, Meas Nee, observed that during and 
after conflict, values shift to prioritize survival and family and patronage ties, over the 
ties to community or nation (Nee and Healy 2003: 37). Attempts to rebuild 




perpetrators, but should also consider the damage to the community as a whole 
(Fletcher and Weinstein 2002: 639). As individuals (victims, perpetrators, and 
bystanders) begin to communicate and interact, community is built and social capital is 
increased.7
This section has summarized the thesis’s working definition of reconciliation, as 
well as various aspects of degrees and levels of reconciliation, with a focus on 
community reconciliation. We now turn to six basic assumptions of reconciliation, 
which are the fundamental building blocks of the concept. 
 In a state of deep reconciliation, communities, and indeed the larger 
society, must also be healed: people come together in solidarity and mutual support, 
then trust is built, and finally interdependence is realized. 
 
Assumptions 
Reconciliation touches many fields of study including anthropology, 
international relations, genocide studies, law, peace studies, political science, 
psychology, and sociology (Pouligny, Chesterman, and Schnabel 2007: 2-3). There 
have been a large number of studies on reconciliation but many of them disagree 
about its definition and how it relates to various constituent elements such as justice, 
truth, and forgiveness.8
There are however, several key assumptions about reconciliation which are 
common to the majority of the literature. Reconciliation is (1) a process and goal which 
requires change and time; (2) bilateral, voluntary relationship building, leading to 
  
                                               
7 The term ‘social capital’ implies that relationships in society are its core building blocks, that 
those social networks are an important ‘asset’, and that social cohesion is necessary for 
development and economic prosperity (Smith 2000-2009: 2). 
 
8 See for example: Bar-Siman-Tov 2004; Barsalou 2005; Bloomfield 2003 and 2006; Chayes 
and Minow 2003a; De Gruchy 2002; du Toit 2003; Hamber and Kelly 2005; Helmick and 
Petersen 2001; Kriesberg 2004; Lambourne 2004; Lederach 1997; McGregor 2006; 
Meierhenrich 2008; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004; Skaar Gloppen, and Suhrke 2005; 




interdependence; (3) focused on the future but deals with the past; (4) based on 
human needs and rights; (5) requires reform of society and institutions; and (6) 
includes constituent elements.  
1. Process and Goal: Requires Change and Takes Time 
Reconciliation is both a process and a goal (Lederach 1997; Rigby 2006a: 1-2). 
It is a slow, long-term process (Rigby 2006a). While mass violence and genocide can 
take place in days or months, rebuilding the relationships and social fabric can take 
years or decades. In this process of reconciliation, change is necessary; it is not 
possible to return to a pre-conflict situation. As society suffering from mass violence 
becomes changed irrevocably, it must find a new world that comes to terms with the 
violence and suffering (Schreiter 1992: 11-12). Reconciliation requires change in 
relationships, in beliefs, attitudes, emotions and goals, as well as deep and broader 
social changes (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004: 4 and Broneus 2007: 5).  
2. Relationship Building – Interdependence  
A core concept of reconciliation is that of rebuilding relationships between 
parties after conflict. (Galtung 2001: 4; Kriesberg 2001: 48; Lederach 1997: 26; Rigby 
2006a: 1). Lederach emphasizes the centrality of relationship as the ‘birthplace and 
home of reconciliation’ and the need to build trust (2001: 195). Connections (both 
instrumental and affective) are re-formed across ethnic, racial, social, or religious lines 
(Stover and Weinstein 2004: 4). Relationships are transformed from being hostile and 
resentful to friendly and harmonious, or destructive to constructive (Bar-Siman-Tov 
2004: 4 and Broneus 2007: 5). An important factor is the nature of the relationship 
prior to the conflict as well as how the parties came to be in conflict. The more complex 




These relationships cannot of course be one-sided: du Toit notes that 
reconciliation can ‘never be owned or fully described from only one perspective’ (2003: 
10). Reconciliation requires participation on the part of both victims and perpetrators 
(Rigby 2001: 12). Part of the process of relationship building is to learn to see the 
‘other’ in a different light.9
In its complete or fullest form reconciliation should be voluntary, mutual, and 
consensual (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004: 5; Hamber and Kelly 2005: 37). However 
reconciliation may be born of necessity in particular when war-stricken impoverished 
populations must return to their homes, victims next to perpetrators: these early post-
conflict stages can also be called non-lethal coexistence. What may start out as 
facilitated, involuntary, or coerced can over time become consensual, as people learn 
to see the humanity in each other and recover from their trauma. However many of the 
individual actions of reconciliation, such as apology, forgiveness, and remorse – must 
be voluntary, not forced. If they are not authentic and from the heart they lack meaning 
and may not have any effect or be accepted by the victim. In conclusion, the process 
of building bilateral, voluntary relationships lies at the very core of the reconciliation 
process. 
 As recovery from the violence occurs, will the ‘other’ be 
seen as equal, as the same, or be embraced as different? Especially in the most 
robust form of reconciliation, deep reconciliation, interdependence and cooperation are 
crucial (Lederach 1997: 27). Pham describes interdependence as a core element of 
reconciliation: ‘to establish mutual ties and obligations across lines of social 
demarcation and ethnic groups’ (Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004: 604). In an 
ideal world, a condition of deep reconciliation would find a society profoundly 
interdependent, unified and the society would have cooperation amongst individuals 
and groups formerly in conflict.  
                                               
9 One must look at how the ‘other’ became to be seen as such, and Schreiter describes seven 
ways of perceiving: demonizing, romanticizing, colonizing, generalizing, trivializing, 




3. Focused on the Future but Deals with the Past 
Both the future and the past are key aspects of reconciliation: ‘Reconciliation, 
in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about both the 
past and the future can meet’ (Lederach 1997: 27). Sharing is an important aspect of 
the future: ‘At the core of any reconciliation process is the preparedness of people to 
anticipate a shared future’ (Rigby 2001: 12). Various other aspects of dealing with the 
past are important, including ‘acknowledgement, remembering, and learning from the 
past’ (Bloomfield 2003: 14). The issue of dealing with the past however is somewhat 
complicated, as there are many versions of the past (and of ‘truth’), so how to come to 
a view of the past acceptable to all parties is no simple task. Papering over the past 
can lead to simmering resentment, yet too much of a focus on the past can actually 
impede reconciliation – a balance must be found.  
4. Based on Human Needs and Rights 
The experience of mass violence and serious human rights violations serve to 
disturb the victim’s (and often the perpetrator’s) identity and security. These violations 
of human rights and resultant feelings of pain, fear, and vulnerability cause questioning 
of the very meaning of life (Schreiter 1992: 29-34). Thus the restoration of human 
rights, through transitional justice and human rights development, including the rule of 
law, are important to the process of reconciliation (Hamber and van der Merwe 1998: 
1). Post-conflict peacebuilding must also address the root causes of the conflict. Root 
causes of conflict often relate to unmet basic human needs including: a reasonable 
standard of living (food, shelter, clothing, and health), security and order, identity, self-
esteem, dignity, recognition, participation, and equity (Lambourne 2004: 3-4; Montville 
2001: 130). If these basic human needs are not addressed, then conflicts can easily 




In Cambodia, while many of the basic human needs for food and shelter have 
now been met (in rural areas only to a bare minimum standard), the needs for self-
esteem, respect, recognition, dignity, and justice are still challenged by the 
dehumanizing past of the KR regime and by unjust social conditions and lack of rule of 
law. Although the ECCC may serve to fulfil a partial need for justice which seems to 
satisfy many Cambodians (see survey section below), the economic and security 
needs remain a great challenge. Some of these specific human needs are described 
below as ‘factors’ that have strong influence on reconciliation and are analysed further 
in later chapters. 
Personal and collective security is one of the most important human needs to 
be met in post-conflict peacebuilding and is a necessary condition for reconciliation (du 
Toit 2003: 113-125; Halpern and Weinstein 2004: 580; Ignatieff 2003: 331; Rigby 
2006b: 9). At both the individual level and the societal level, there are strong links 
between physical security and reconciliation. When emotions are high and one is in 
fear of one’s life, it is not easy to re-establish trust and relationships. Healing, as an 
important process of reconciliation, is difficult if not impossible in the presence of on-
going threats (Staub and Pearlman 2001: 206). Unfortunately, security is a precious 
commodity for most Cambodians – both physical and economic security.10
5. Requires Institutional and Societal Change and 
Rebuilding 
  
In many post-conflict societies, including Cambodia, the years of war have 
taken a toll, leaving a country ravaged both physically and psychologically by the war 
and the violence. Cambodians continue to suffer from politically ordered summary 
executions, mob killings, acid attacks, widespread corruption, and blatant political 
                                               
10 Respondents’ views on security will be covered in Chapter 5, and its relationship to other 




manoeuvring of powerful parties. In this environment it is difficult for the normal 
Cambodian citizen to begin to build trust in government and society. For a full 
reconciliation, institutional and societal change and rebuilding are needed.  
For deep reconciliation, the structures and social context that caused the past 
violence must be acknowledged and addressed so the violence will not continue or be 
repeated (Schreiter 1992: 22). Institutions must be developed which deal with 
accepting and promoting human rights, rule of law, tolerance of social diversity, 
‘equality of opportunity’, and non-violent conflict management (Bar-Tal and Bennink 
2004: 23-26; Pham et al. 2004: 604). There is however no ideal end-state of a 
‘comprehensive idea of social harmony’, as conflict is a natural part of relationships 
and processes of change and recovery are continuous. Since the focus of this 
research study is on community-level reconciliation, the topic of institutional change 
will not be addressed, though aspects of societal change and social reconstruction will 
be discussed in later chapters. The next assumption of reconciliation is that there are 
certain constituent elements of the process. 
6. Constituent Elements of Reconciliation 
While there is wide agreement that reconciliation incorporates several 
constituent elements, there is no consensus on what these are. The most widely 
quoted scholar includes four main elements: truth, mercy, justice, and peace 
(Lederach 1997: 28 – 30). Reconciliation is defined as a place where truth (honesty, 
revelation, vulnerability, accountability, and clarity), mercy (compassion, forgiveness, 
acceptance, and a new start), justice (making things right, creating equal opportunity, 
rectifying wrong, and restitution) and peace (harmony, unity, and well-being) meet.11
                                               
11 Lederach stresses the importance of the various paradoxes of achieving reconciliation 
through these four elements: ‘Truth is the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and the 
validation of painful loss and experience, but it is coupled with Mercy, which articulates the 
need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning. Justice represents the search for 





Particularly thorny is the relationship between reconciliation and justice. 
Several authors suggest justice is a precondition for reconciliation (Bloomfield 2006; 
Lambourne 2001). Lambourne discusses several types of justice to be addressed in 
reconciliation processes, including restorative; procedural; economic and social; and 
symbolic (2001: 312-315). Although I would personally think that justice is an integral 
part of a reconciliation process, there are many examples where justice does not 
occur, yet some sort of reconciliation (or at least coexistence) is possible. This thesis 
provides an example of just that situation, as we will see many examples of 
coexistence occurring in Cambodian society, yet in the absence of justice – except for 
the procedural justice mechanisms of the ECCC which is trying only five senior 
leaders. There have been no processes of: restorative justice, procedural judicial 
targeting lower-level perpetrators; economic and social justice for victims; and no 
symbolic justice (no truth commission or public apologies).12
 
 I now turn to the 
processes of reconciliation. 
Processes of Reconciliation  
This section describes seven processes of reconciliation: (1) building 
relationship; (2) re-humanization and the development of compassion and empathy; 
(3) healing; (4) acknowledgement, confession, and regret; (5) apology, (6) forgiveness; 
and (7) forgetting.13
                                                                                                                                        
which underscores the need for interdependence, well-being and security…. Reconciliation is 
where truth, justice, mercy and peace meet: it is a process and a place’ (Lederach 1997:28-31). 
 Through these processes of reconciliation, hatred, fear, and anger 
 
12 There have been a wide variety of symbolic processes incorporating commemorations, 
monuments, and ceremonies, but none of these have been carried out by accused 
perpetrators. 
 
13 Besides the main processes described in this section, there are various other descriptions of 
the reconciliation processes that can occur. Rigby divides processes into two types: cultural or 
personal, and institutional or structural: both types are necessary as reconciliation is not 
complete with one alone (2006b). Bloomfield suggests four separate processes of 




can be replaced by non-violent coexistence, trust and confidence, and ultimately 
empathy (Huyse 2003: 20). 
1. Build Relationships, Trust, and Interdependence 
As noted above, an assumption of the process of reconciliation is that it is 
necessary to build relationships. Assefa described a process of relationship-building 
between two parties, bringing forth the key characteristics of acknowledgement, 
remorse, and apology (2001b: 340).14 Trust is another important factor to examine 
when analysing the process of reconciliation. One major characteristic of people living 
in conflicted areas is that trust has been lost.15 The process of reconciliation is to 
rebuild the broken trust; this happens over time, and can be influenced positively or 
negatively by actions taken by victims, and by perpetrators.16
                                                                                                                                        
sequential process of reconciliation as dialogue, acknowledgement, apologies, forgiveness, 
and promises of non-repetition (2001: 28). Montville (2001) and Tavuchis (1991) describe 
similar processes but they also include accepting responsibility and expressing sorrow. Hamber 
and Kelly describe ‘five interwoven and related strands’ of the process of reconciliation: 
‘developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society; acknowledging and dealing 
with the past; building positive relationships; significant cultural and attitudinal change; and 
substantial social, economic and political change’ (Hamber & Kelly 2005: 49). My premise is 
again the ‘shopping basket’ approach, as certain processes may be more appropriate at certain 
times, and may not occur in a particular order.  
 As parties get to know 
each other and trust each other they can reduce their fear. Trust is closely related to 
the basic human need for security; we need trust in various individuals and institutions 
 
14 Assefa observed: ‘Reconciliation entails honest acknowledgement of the harm/injury each 
party has inflicted on the other; sincere regrets and remorse for the injury done; readiness to 
apologize for one’s role in inflicting the injury; readiness of the conflicting parties to let go of the 
anger and bitterness caused by the conflict and the injury’; commitment by the offender not to 
repeat the injury, sincere effort to redress past grievances that caused the conflict and 
compensate the damage caused to the extent possible, and entering into a new, mutually 
enriching relationship’ (2001: 340).  
 
15 Lederach found that the conflict parties: ‘. . . have direct experience of violent trauma that 
they associate with their perceived enemies and that is sometimes tied to a history of grievance 
and enmity that has accumulated over generations. The conflicts are characterized by deep-
rooted, intense animosity; fear; and severe stereotyping’ (Lederach 1997: 23). 
 
16 Trust can be defined in terms of three variables: relationship, expectations, and behaviour 
(Notter 1995: 3). An analysis of such factors as risk, power, interdependence, and cooperation, 
then relate to these three variables, yielding information about: various views of trusting 




in order to feel secure. The process of building trust is closely related to cooperation 
and can also be looked at as a process of reconciliation whereby specific activities 
may be designed to encourage cooperation, trust-building, and eventually 
reconciliation. Factors that affect trust-building include the (baseline) amount of trust 
that parties had in the past (how well they knew and trusted each other), how and how 
deeply the trust relationship was broken, how trust is being built (direct communication 
or other means), and pressures and influences in the present on trust (the proximity of 
the parties, influence from outside parties encouraging relationship, etc.). 
A legacy of distrust was left by the KR regime as well as the surrounding 
decades of war in Cambodia: in fact the KR specifically attacked trust relationships by 
creating betrayal and suspicion and dissolving traditional social and family ties (Luco 
2002: 72; Zucker 2008: 197; Zucker forthcoming). Zucker suggests that distrust is 
highly related to anxiety, and distrust was cultivated by the KR through a wide variety 
of methods which in turn caused increasing cycles of distrust (forthcoming). Another 
aspect of the process of relationship-building is the development of regard, 
recognition, and respect. 
Develop Regard, Recognition, and Respect  
Regaining one’s humanity and self-respect, and attaining recognition as a 
valued human being are important aspects of recovery from mass violence and of 
reconciliation, and are also related to trust-building. ‘Violence is aimed precisely at 
stripping us of our humanity, of that which distinguishes us from the other animals – 
that network of meaning that is our sense of safety and self . . . the nucleus of our 
humanity is restored to us in re-establishing the ability to trust’ (Schreiter 1992: 37-8). 
Regard is another related concept, defined by Kriesberg as recognizing the humanity 
and identity of others, the minimal form being recognition, while the deeper forms 




victims develop regard, recognition, and respect for each other is an important factor in 
reconciliation, and indeed are also basic human needs of identity.  
Regard, recognition, and respect can be provided through various means. De 
Greiff suggests transitional justice measures can ‘provide recognition to victims, 
promote civic trust, and make a contribution to the democratic rule of law. In these 
ways, they help redress some of the obstacles to development left by massive human 
rights abuses in their wake, obstacles that include, precisely, ‘adverse terms of 
recognition,’ weak bonds of trust, and fragile or nonexistent regimes of rights’ (de 
Greiff 2008: 143).  
The need to be recognized by others is an important part of each individual’s 
identity (Albert 2010: 2-3). Thus, regard, recognition, and respect are also important 
components of reconciliation on an individual level.17
Tolerance 
  
  Another important part of the process of reconciliation is tolerance, and the 
ability to tolerate difference: ‘. . . [R]elating to another on an on-going basis will involve 
disagreements, and therefore tolerating differences is part of a resilient relationship. 
Further, models of cooperation and political or joint action depend on the idea of 
respecting each other’s distinct perspectives’ (Halpern and Weinstein 2004: 575). As 
tolerance is developed, relationships can be built.  
2. Re-humanization, Empathy, and Compassion 
 Dehumanization is when opponents see each other as less than human, as 
hated enemies, or even animals. Both perpetrators and victims may become 
dehumanized during periods of mass violence.18
                                               
17 The issues of regard, recognition, and respect are discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 After people have been dehumanized 
 
18 Hicks observed dehumanization as affecting both victims and perpetrators: ‘[a]ll of the 




during mass violence such as the Khmer Rouge regime, re-humanization is a process 
of reconciliation whereby warring parties recognize each others’ humanity and 
integrity, and thereby create bonds between them (Hicks 2008: 12-13). The degree of 
dehumanization and the direct experience of dehumanizing practices between two 
individuals affect their future relationships. In order to understand recovery, one has to 
understand the way dehumanization was created through the construction and 
deconstruction of the ‘enemy’ (Theidon 2007: 103). The KR regime was notorious for 
using euphemisms (to take for ‘education’) and code words (to smash) to signify death 
and killing in order to dehumanize the victims and to avoid dealing directly with 
atrocities. During historian David Chandler’s testimony in front of the ECCC, he spoke 
about the dehumanization processes used by the KR regime, where dehumanization 
became routine, and he ‘compared the Khmer Rouge to a waterfall in which everyone 
was caught up’ (Nhean and Cryder 2009). In later chapters, individuals’ experiences 
with dehumanization, and the victims’ ability to understand the process, will be 
analysed as factors of reconciliation. 
 The development of empathy is also an important aspect of reconciliation 
(Huyse 2003: 20 and Schreiter 1992: 52-53). Empathy can be broken down to include 
three components: being able to individualize and resonate emotionally; expressing 
curiosity about the other’s perspective; and development of the ability to tolerate 
ambiguity (Halpern and Weinstein 2004: 571-2). On the other hand, empathy can be 
considered a discrete stage of reconciliation. Huyse described empathy as the third 
stage of reconciliation: firstly replacing fear by non-violent coexistence, secondly 
building confidence and trust, and thirdly moving towards empathy (2003: 19-21).  
 The processes of re-humanization, developing empathy, and compassion are 
important to reconciliation, primarily at the individual level of reconciliation. All three 
                                                                                                                                        
What they failed to point out was that they de-humanized themselves in the process: they had 





involve the process of being able to see the perspective of the ‘other’ or to walk in 
someone else’s shoes. All three involve healing.  
3. Healing 
 Healing of torn relationships is central and essential to reconciliation, and the 
healing processes take place both on an individual and a community level (Lederach 
2001: 200; Staub and Perlman 2001: 206). Galtung defines reconciliation as ‘closure 
plus healing: closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities [and] healing in the sense 
of rehabilitated’ (2001: 4). Healing requires dealing with strong emotions such as 
hatred, anger, and fear. The tasks of healing are to deal with the hurts, resentments, 
and enmities that have arisen during mass violence (Stevens 2004: 42-43 cited in 
Hamber and Kelly 2005: 18). As healing progresses, so also does reconciliation, but if 
delayed, so is reconciliation.  
 On an individual level the concept of healing initially drew from psychosocial 
literature and can be seen as unspecified general healing, healing of heart and mind, 
and/or trauma healing.19
                                               
19 A 2007 handbook on trauma in Cambodia stated:  
 As noted earlier, the degree of trauma, and how trauma was 
experienced and recovered from are important factors in individual reconciliation 
processes. In any case the process of healing is an important process of reconciliation: 
‘Processes where victims are recognized, wrongs acknowledged, and responsibility 
allocated are seen to be required to bring closure and healing’ (Skaar, Gloppen, and 
Suhrke 2004: 4-5). As delineated by Rigby there are two dimensions of the process of 
reconciliation and thus two types of healing, personal healing (reconciliation to past 
loss, trauma, etc.) and social healing (reconciliation with others, or between people): 
We believe that a greater consciousness about the socio-political and individual 
aspects of trauma is one of the first steps towards individual and national reconciliation. 
There will be no path to comprehensive reconciliation in this country until there is more 
inner peace in the hearts of individuals, more conscious and relaxed communication 
between couples as well as among people in families, villages and towns (Center for 




‘becoming reconciled to the pain and loss of the past, and becoming reconciled with 
former enemies…’(2006b: 6).  
 Healing, especially in Cambodia is closely related to the concept of ‘the heart’.  
Healing of Hearts and Minds 
Kraybill suggests the healing process involves a ‘unity of head and heart’ 
(1988: 8). Halpern and Weinstein suggest that reconciliation is a two-part process ( 
intellectual (mind) and emotional (heart)): ‘If reconciliation is not merely an intellectual 
but also an emotional process (contritio cordis), then a major role in making 
reconciliation between peoples possible, in generating a capacity for reconciliation, will 
be played by the education of attitudes, or what used to be known by the old-fashioned 
term “cultivation of the heart”’ (2004: 568). This terminology of the heart is particularly 
applicable in Cambodia, as the concept of reconciliation is a compound word, one part 
of which can be translated as ‘healing’.20
Part of healing deals with the concept of memory and the process of making 
sense of the past.
 
21
                                               
20 Phsah phsaa is reconciliation: phsah mean pain, while phsaa means to heal. 
 The process of making meaning of the past and even finding 
something beneficial may also be an important way to overcome traumatic experience 
(Field and Chhim 2008: 355). This reinterpretation process may be facilitated through 
the Western model of ‘talking therapy’, but not necessarily – healing is a very individual 
process and is steeped in culture. Especially on an individual level, Cambodians work 
through their cultural traditions to find meaning for the future so as not to let the past 
overwhelm them. For example on a community level, approaches to healing and 
reconciliation include rituals and religious events, as well as other examples which we 
will explore in the next chapter. 
 
21 Minow suggested: ‘What’s needed, paradoxically, is a process for reinterpreting what cannot 
be made sensible, for assembling what cannot be put together, and for separating what cannot 




The next constituent process of reconciliation involves acknowledgement, 
confession, and expression of regret.  
4. Acknowledgement, Confession, and Regret 
Acknowledgement, confession, and regret are all related terms referring to 
perpetrators facing up to, and being honest about, acts they have committed in the 
past. Acknowledgement or confessions can occur in many contexts, such as in trials, 
truth commissions, public ceremonies, or in individual conversations. Confessions may 
release the perpetrator from feelings of guilt, especially if confessions lead to 
apologies, which then lead to forgiveness. However, confessions (and 
acknowledgement of past crimes) can be extremely difficult for the perpetrator to carry 
out, especially in Cambodia where there is such importance put on ‘saving face’, and 
public shame and embarrassment are to be avoided at all costs. Theissen described 
these enormous challenges: ‘Admitting guilt or acknowledging the futility of our 
experiences and actions is a fundamental threat to our self-esteem and personal 
integrity. Such self-realisation is contrary to many people‘s naturally delusional 
conviction that they are good and moral citizens’ (Theissen 2004: 13). However, when 
victims are denied acknowledgement, they may feel re-victimized (Huyse 2003: 61). 
Expressions of regret are perhaps easier than acknowledgement and 
confession, as they can be general and perpetrators may not have to admit specific 
wrongdoing. Regret is closely related to apology and, as we know from everyday 
experience, hearing an expression of regret on the part of the perpetrator (and 
especially an apology) can lessen the victim’s feelings of anger and resentment. 
5. Apology 
Some authors feel that regret is an important part of apology and, for a true 




of the biggest hurdles to surmount in giving an apology is the ability to be vulnerable, 
as apology admits wrongdoing and, ultimately, feelings of shame. As noted above 
there is a strong desire in Cambodian culture to ‘save face’ and avoid shame, and 
apologies go against this desire.  
Closely related to apologies, is the issue of forgiveness – when apologies are 
offered, forgiveness may more likely be granted. 
6. Forgiveness 
Forgiveness is a deeply personal decision and is related to many factors such 
as the gravity of the offense(s), feelings of safety and security, pressure from others, 
and the presence of apologies. Forgiveness cannot be forced or required – it must be 
an entirely voluntary act on the part of the victim – it cannot be done merely at the 
bequest of the perpetrator. Because it is so difficult and a deeply personal act, 
forgiveness can be an extremely powerful tool of reconciliation, a way to heal, and a 
strong influence on others. Forgiveness is not necessarily dependent upon the 
perpetrator’s acts, such as apology or acknowledgement – victims must make the 
decision to forgive (often in order to release themselves) and they can even do so in 
the absence of contrition of the perpetrators. However, the process of forgiveness is 
often influenced by, or dependent upon increased understanding by the victim, of the 
perpetrator (Fisher 2001: 41).  
7. Forgetting 
‘Forgetting’ what happened after mass violence goes against the grain of all the 
processes above, yet it is one of the processes that can take place during 
reconciliation. In Spain, after 1975 when Franco died, the process used by both the 
elites and the population was ‘collective amnesia’ (Rigby 2001: 2-3). Mozambique’s 




trials or truth commissions, and, while initial reconciliation processes involved many 
individual and community-level rituals, the country has essentially forgotten about the 
past. Forgetting may be the path of least resistance, especially for perpetrators who 
wish to escape the discomfort of acknowledgement, confession, or apology. Victims 
too may be overwhelmed by everyday life, by PTSD or merely bad memories from the 
past trauma, and may prefer to forget. Some pain may be just too great to remember, 
especially in times of insecurity and economic hardship. However, this process of 
reconciliation is actually not a process which can achieve deep reconciliation, as 
without the other processes described above, and some dealing with the past, people 
cannot achieve interdependence.  
This section has summarized seven different processes of reconciliation, some 
of which involved both victims and perpetrators, some just victims and some just 
perpetrators. We now turn to a review of the literature on reconciliation in Cambodia. 
 
Reconciliation in Cambodia 
This section on reconciliation in Cambodia begins with a review of 
reconciliation as it relates to Buddhism. As noted earlier ‘to be Khmer is to be 
Buddhist’ and thus Buddhist concepts are integral to the understanding of 
reconciliation in Cambodia. Secondly I review the various surveys that have focused 
on reconciliation in Cambodia (most of which have had justice and the ECCC as their 
primary variable, and trauma as a secondary variable). Thirdly, I provide a review of 
authors who have stated that Cambodia is already reconciled as a baseline for the rest 





Reconciliation and Buddhism 
Through the examination of the Buddhist canon and traditions, John D’Arcy 
May concludes that reconciliation is implicit in both ethical principles and in Buddhist 
practice, and includes mutual forgiveness (1994: 177-182). Behaviour is governed by 
the belief that one’s present life is just the latest in a long series of lives, shaped by the 
law of karma or the acts done in proceeding lives (Neumaier 2004: 70). As explained 
in Buddhism’s ‘Four Noble Truths’, all life is suffering (greed, hatred, and delusion), 
and detachment from the causes of suffering through meditation and making merit are 
the path to Nirvana. The root of all craving, and thus suffering, is ignorance, and the 
path to enlightenment is to know the truth of life’s impermanence. Buddhists are taught 
to live in the moment and to practice ‘mindfulness’ as well as a life of restraint, 
including non-violence and non-harm of animals. Five precepts must be followed, to 
refrain from killing, stealing, harmful sexual activities, lying, and intoxicating beverages. 
Buddhist principles of ‘no-self’, impermanence, and interdependence, and that all 
people are part of the human family can be interpreted as reconciliation: in the deepest 
sense of Buddhism, there is no ‘other’ with which to be in conflict and nothing to crave 
or no reason to kill (Phan 2006: 98). Buddhist principles of equality and reciprocity are 
also fundamental to reconciliation (do onto others as you would do unto yourself (Prum 
2006: 22). Buddhist prayers for loving kindness (or mercy) (metta) and compassion 
(karuna) apply to all human beings, including those who have harmed, and this can be 
interpreted as forgiveness. Prominent Buddhists teach non-violence (akhoengsa or 
sometimes known as ahimsa), interdependence, tolerance, love, compassion, 
empathy, and equanimity; these people and principles are also promoting peace and 
reconciliation.22
                                               
22 Prominent Buddhists conducting these teachings include the Dalai Lama, Sulak Sivaraksa, 
(Cambodian) Maha Ghosananda, and Thich Nhat Hahn. 
 Justice, on the other hand, is also important in Buddhism: in the rules 
of karma everything can be seen as cause and effect (or action and result) and people 




differences in mental frameworks between Christianity and Buddhism are so 
fundamental there are frequent misunderstandings between them in interpretation 
(1994: 177).  
In practice, however, the above principles are not fully practiced in any country; 
for example, not all Buddhists are vegetarians or pacifists. Morris suggests that the 
Buddhist religion in Cambodia has contributed to peacebuilding only when its leaders 
have adopted active nonpartisan roles in teaching, conflict resolution, and advocacy 
for public ethics and non-violence: Buddhism has been unconstructive when it 
becomes disengaged from social issues or is politically aligned or manipulated (2004: 
192). In everyday life in Cambodia, many of the above Buddhist principles are 
mentioned, and references to religion were often made by respondents in this study. 
The major Buddhist beliefs can be summarized into two simplistic concepts that 
Cambodians repeat as a mantra: (1) do good, receive good, do bad, receive bad 
(karma) and (2) hatred can never be appeased by hatred; hatred can only be 
appeased by love (McGrew 2000a: 28-29). In practice, Cambodians commonly do 
good deeds by making donations to the temples and monks in order to make merit and 
to be reborn into a better life. As noted in Chapter 2, Buddhism was destroyed and few 
learned Buddhist scholars survive today. Deep understanding of Buddhism is lacking 
in most Cambodians. Yet Cambodians’ interpretations of and reliance upon religious 
beliefs, remain important factors in their daily lives and in their processes of 
reconciliation. These various interpretations will be described in later chapters. 
In conclusion, Buddhism, the religion of the vast majority of Cambodians, 
supports reconciliation, forgiveness, truth, and amnesty, as well as some forms of 
justice. Later chapters explore the specific views of respondents on reconciliation and 
its elements in relation to religious and cultural beliefs. 
An important part of the literature review, and of understanding what the state 




Cambodia. Cambodian attitudes towards reconciliation and its related concepts are 
reviewed in the next sub-section.  
Cambodian Attitudes Towards Reconciliation 
Through 2006, there were several studies and surveys done in Cambodia to 
determine Cambodians’ views of justice, truth, reconciliation, and peace, most of which 
have been with fairly small samples, and based on questionnaires. Since 2006, 
several other major surveys were completed with larger sample sizes and random 
selection designs. I start first with a review of the older surveys. 
Summary of Main Survey Findings Before 2006 
This sub-section provides a general review of surveys done before 2006. It was 
difficult to compare the surveys, as their methods and samples varied widely. The 
references, sample sizes, and methodologies are reported in the footnote below.23
                                               
23 - Jaya Ramji working with the Documentation Center of Cambodia conducted a survey of 35 
Cambodians in June 1997 (Ramji 2000).  
 
Although, none of these surveys have been comprehensive or representative, nor 
were they controlled scientific studies, the responses on most subjects were 
remarkably similar. Because they are not comparable, statistical data is not presented. 
- Institute Français de la Statistique, de Sondage d’Opinion de Recherche sur le Cambodge 
(IFFRASORC), national survey of 1,503 Cambodians (1998). 
- Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, petition calling for KRT signed by more than 
90,000 Cambodians (United Nations Secretary-General 1999). 
- The Cambodia Daily informal survey of 24 rural Cambodians, on 12-13 January (Saing and 
Gardner 2000: 1).  
- The Center for Social Development (CSD) undertook three public forums to discuss the KRT 
in 2000 (CSD 2002).  
- Laura McGrew conducted a survey in 1999 with a written questionnaire completed by 48 
Cambodians and focus groups, and individual interviews of 50 additional Cambodians (McGrew 
2000a and 2000b). 
- Suzannah Linton reviewed the DC-Cam questionnaires and published a book on the findings 
(Linton 2004). The 27-question survey was distributed nationwide through the DC-Cam monthly 
magazine, between January and September 2002, to about 7,000 people: 712 answered the 
questionnaire.  




Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and Forgetting 
The concept of reconciliation, especially ‘national reconciliation’ has often been 
cited as a reason (especially by some government authorities and by the KR leaders) 
to forgive and sometimes forget. But most Cambodians were not willing to forget, 
though some felt they could forgive. Many still suffered from nightmares. Many 
Cambodians felt that reconciliation was an important goal for Cambodia, and some felt 
that the trials or other mechanisms could help the process. Rebuilding trust in the 
Cambodian society was seen as an important goal.  
Truth 
Almost every single person surveyed wanted to know the truth, why Khmer 
killed Khmer and how did this happen. Oftentimes they asked who was behind the 
Khmer Rouge, implying that China and/or Vietnam were the masterminds who 
manipulated the Khmer Rouge leaders into killing their own people.24
Peace 
 However, 
probably due to lack of exposure, few suggested a truth commission.  
Few (and fewer as time passes) Cambodians have been concerned that peace 
would be disturbed during transitional justice mechanisms; however, a notable 
exception occurred in former KR-controlled areas where some respondents stated 
they were afraid peace would be threatened if trials occurred (especially if lower-level 
perpetrators were to be tried).  
Amnesty, Civil Sanctions, and Reparations  
Amnesty was seen by the majority as unacceptable, while civil sanctions, 
though incompletely explored, were highly desirable. Many respondents were unhappy 
that former KR officials were part of the current government. Reparations had been 
                                               
24 This desire is echoed in the numerous meetings the Open Society Justice Initiative held in 





initially seen as unlikely, but when these studies were conducted there had been little 
public discussion and thus little knowledge about reparations.25
Apologies and Confessions  
  
Views on confessions and apologies were mixed, but most agreed that religion 
informs thinking about these concepts. Some Cambodians felt that apologies are 
important, but the majority preferred confessions and explanations rather than 
apologies.  
Justice  
The vast majority of Cambodians wanted trials for the Khmer Rouge leaders, 
and most preferred international trials. While most wanted to try the leaders, some 
wanted to try others besides the leaders, either the regional authorities, or the specific 
perpetrators who killed their individual family members.  
Recent Research Findings 
The next three studies are presented separately: the first is presented because 
it has been the only qualitative study looking at reconciliation in Cambodia prior to this 
research (Etcheson 2005b).26
                                               
25 Since the ECCC was created, meetings were held by human rights organizations to promote 
reparations and the ECCC has since addressed them.  
 The second two were quantitative surveys with random 
sampling and large numbers of respondents, so statistical data can be reviewed 
(Pham et al. 2009 and Sonis et al. 2009).  
 
26 Munyas also conducted qualitative research into youth and reconciliation, but her subjects 
were all youth, none of whom had been alive during the KR period (Munyas 2006). Thus those 
findings are not presented in the thesis, as space has not allowed for an analysis of youth and 
reconciliation. Wallgren conducted a study of 47 villagers and authorities in the northwest of 
Cambodia under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2000. 
The study examined the UNDP ‘Seila Reconciliation Program’ and to ‘present people’s 
perceptions of life and the changes they have experienced since their communities were 
brought under government control’ (2000: 2). There were some observations related to 





Firstly, a notable study was done by Etcheson, who conducted 48 interviews in 
three communes in Cambodia in 2001 and 2002 with a variety of informants – 
including both former KR ‘base’ people and ‘new’ people and victims and 
perpetrators.27
Secondly, Sonis et al. carried out a survey in 2006 of 1,017 randomly selected 
Cambodians, 813 of whom were older than 35 years (thus older than 3 years of age 
during the KR regime and thus of an age range similar to my study group) (2009: 527-
536). The primary objectives of the research were related to the prevalence of PTSD 
and the relationship of PTSD symptoms and disability to attitudes towards justice, but 
the study also examined the desire for revenge. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted using a standardized questionnaire, by two research teams in all provinces 
and municipalities in Cambodia. Although 75 percent of the respondents expected 
reconciliation to result from the ECCC (as well as to reveal the truth and prevent 
atrocities), 87 percent of those older than 35 years expected painful memories to arise 
in the process (Sonis et al. 2009: 533). Respondents indicated a ‘strong desire for 
revenge’ (Sonis et al. 2009: 532).
 He found that there was enduring trauma, a desire for revenge, limits to 
forgiveness, and that there existed a state of coexistence (but not reconciliation) 
(2005b: 201). As in my previous research on reconciliation (done in 1999), Etcheson 
also found that Cambodians supported a tribunal for KR leaders, and varying views on 
revenge, forgiveness, punishment, and reconciliation (2005b). 
28
                                               
27 There is however, no information about the methods used in the study, which was presented 
as a chapter in a book. The region of the study was not identified, nor the numbers of subjects 
in each region. Although their ages and names are cited when the respondents are quoted, 
there is no summary information about the sample group as a whole (i.e., ages, gender, etc.). 
 Scales devised to measure respondents’ views on 
justice found respondents to be dissatisfied with: punishment of perpetrators, 
restitution, apologies by perpetrators, and by justice in general in Cambodia (Sonis et 
 
28 A strong desire for revenge was defined as: ‘[s]ixty-three percent of respondents strongly 
agreed and 21 percent agreed with the statement: ‘I would like to make them suffer’ (Sonis et 





al. 2009: 532). Respondents with a high desire for revenge were found more likely to 
suffer from PTSD (Sonis et al. 2009: 534).29
Thirdly, a survey was conducted in 2008 of 1,000 Cambodians (69 percent of 
whom had lived during the KR regime) based on a structured questionnaire (Pham et 
al. 2009: 1-50). In the 24 provinces (or municipalities) of Cambodia 125 communes 
and 250 villages were randomly selected. Detailed results on exposure to violence, 
overall priorities, knowledge of the KR, living with former members of the KR, 
accountability, the ECCC, and the national criminal justice system were compared and 
contrasted. The most pertinent results relating to community reconciliation were that: 
interviewees wanted the KR to suffer (71 percent); wished they could take revenge (37 
percent); would take revenge if they could (41 percent); felt uncomfortable living in the 
same community with former KR (47 percent); while 36 percent said they had forgiven 
the KR (2009: 3). 
 
These three studies have provided important background information for this 
study on reconciliation in Cambodia. Specific details of their findings are compared to 
my findings in later chapters. None of them indicated that reconciliation had already 
been achieved. I now turn to some claims that reconciliation has been achieved in 
Cambodia. 
Already Reconciled?  
The statement that reconciliation has already occurred in Cambodia has been 
made by several people, especially members of the Royal Government of Cambodia 
(RGC). Successful reconciliation was seen as politically important for the government 
of Cambodia but was essentially equated to the overthrow of the KR. Foreign Minister 
Hor Nam Hong concluded that national reconciliation was the primary achievement of 
the RGC, attributed to the success of Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ‘Win-Win Policy’ in 
                                               
29 However, this relationship was only found in a bivariate analysis; when using multivariate 
model controlling for demographic variables, this relationship between revenge and PTSD was 




overthrowing the KR at a speech made in 2001 (Hor 2001: 2).30 This claim of national 
reconciliation was again made at a public speech by a government official (Deputy 
Prime Minister Sok An) in 2006, but this time, although they claimed reconciliation had 
been achieved, they acknowledged that justice (in the form of the ECCC) had not (Sok 
2006: 3).31
More recently, the former Special Representative of the United Nations 
Secretary General in Cambodia, Benny Widyono observed:  
  
Ordinary people, encouraged by the return to peace and progress - especially 
since the last remnants of the Khmer Rouge have been dissolved by 
government policy - have, of their own volition, forged reconciliation among all 
Khmers. No longer do people question whether their neighbour, or their office 
mate, or the bride of their son is ex-Khmer Rouge or the daughter of an ex-
Khmer Rouge. . . . Reconciliation has indeed been achieved by Cambodians, 
for Cambodians (Widyono 2009: 2).  
 
Urs also argued that there was no need for reconciliation in Cambodia, as people are 
living calmly without ‘community unrest’ and she did not note any problems with 
coexistence in her research (although she did note some lingering anger) (2007: 79). I 
argue in this thesis that, with continuing unresolved fear and anger, reconciliation has 
                                               
30 The relevant excerpts from Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong’s speech at a conference on 
peace, reconciliation, and democracy building in October 2001 are as follows:  
. . . I would identify only four categories of success that Cambodia has been able to 
achieve during the past decade. First and foremost is peace, political stability and 
national reconciliation . . . did not just come about or transformed overnight. It took this 
country years of hard work . . . became truly realized only when the Khmer Rouge fully 
collapsed. The demise of the Khmer Rouge was the hard work of Samdech Hun Sen, 
Prime Minister of Cambodia, who actively pursued a policy of defection and integration 
of the Khmer Rouge rank and file. With the complete disintegration of the Khmer 
Rouge and their integration into the national community, Cambodia for the first time 
achieved peace, stability and national reconciliation in decades (Hor 2001: 2). 
 
31 Deputy Prime Minister Sok An stated:  
In Cambodia this emphasis on national reconciliation has not meant that we have 
forgotten our past, and we have undertaken many efforts to document the record of 
what happened during Democratic Kampuchea. But what is still not yet achieved is 
rendering justice for the victims of that genocidal regime. . . . Now as we finally have 
established the ECCC, we keep in our minds firmly that this judicial process must not 
damage the process of reconciliation that I have described above. In Cambodia we 





definitely not yet been achieved, but probably instead Cambodia remains at a level of 
surface or shallow coexistence. 
 
This chapter has provided a review of the current literature on reconciliation to 
provide a basis for the examination of community reconciliation in Cambodia. Starting 
first with a definition of reconciliation, we then turned to its six basic assumptions. 
Secondly seven processes of reconciliation were reviewed. Finally, the situation of 
reconciliation in Cambodia was addressed, through a summary of the recent surveys 
of reconciliation and justice. While there have been some large-scale surveys about 
reconciliation, this thesis is the first in-depth qualitative examination of community 
reconciliation. Through the examination of how victims and perpetrators have been 
managing to live together in some select communities in Cambodia, light will be shed 
upon how the process of reconciliation has been experienced. Lessons learned from 
this process in the unique cultural setting of Cambodia over a period of more than 
thirty years can provide insights for other countries recovering from conflict. The next 






CHAPTER 4 – The Communities in Context 
 
The starting point for this analysis was initially ten research communities, which 
are described below in Table 4.1. In Chapter 1, I explained how the communities were 
initially selected on the basis of two main characteristics: a history of mass violence, 
and the presence of former KR victims and perpetrators. Of the ten communities, three 
were in the southwest and seven were in the northwest. The communities in the 
southwest were visited more frequently due to the closer proximity to the capital, so 
interview numbers were similar (45 in the southwest and 54 in the northwest). 
Although several of these communities initially had some promising indicators of the 
presence of both victims and perpetrators, in several cases, it was not possible to 
easily identify accused perpetrators, or to have them agree to be interviewed. In the 
case of the three former KR stronghold communities, there were several similar 
characteristics; Northwest-3 is representative of all three. Thus the original list of ten 
communities was eventually winnowed down to four. However, many of the 
community-level respondents (as well as the additional 35 Phnom Penh-based 
interviews) also provided valuable insights and observations about the process of 






Table 4.1. Community and Respondent Overview 
 
REGIONS AND CASE 
STUDY COMMUNITIES 




45 Interviews and Focus Groups in the Southwest 
Kampot Province and Kep Municipality 
Southwest-1 
(case study community) 
Cluster of several rural villages including: Village A - mixed Khmer and Cham 
village, primarily new people; and Village B - neighbouring village with a large 
number of former KR and base people, including several accused perpetrators 
Southwest-2 
(case study community) 
Cluster of several rural villages including: two relatively richer villages; Villages A 
and B with primarily ‘new’ people, and three relatively poorer villages (C, D, and 
E) which included more ‘base’ people; the cluster included several accused 
perpetrators and some former KR soldiers 
Southwest-3 Newly created rural village in 1994 by government to house former KR coming 
from the local KR stronghold, but since then other primarily non-KR joined to 
obtain land; land of fair quality and fair water supply; high percentage of military 




54 Interviews and Focus Groups in the Northwest 
Banteay Meanchey and Battambang Provinces, Pailin Municipality 
Northwest-1 Well developed semi-urban village and district headquarters with industrial base 
of small factories with fertile land and good water supply; mixed ‘new’ people 
and ‘base’ people but with a majority of ‘new’ people; did not locate accused 
perpetrators 
Northwest-2 Remote rural village of very low population with poor land, repopulated with KR 
in 1990s, now mixed with non-KR, 50 km from provincial city; many newcomers 
seeking land; majority of ‘base’ people and former KR, some ‘new’ people from 
the area, but no one accused of being a (direct) perpetrator 
Northwest-3 
(case study community) 
Former KR stronghold, with urban centre and many surrounding smaller 
villages; former KR forces integrated in 1996; high percentage of military 
families 
Northwest-4 
(case study community) 
Remote group of villages in highly contested war-torn areas close to Thai-
Cambodian border; has mediocre land, fair water supply and problem with land 
mines; highly mixed area of government, former KR, and non-communist 
resistance factions; high percentage of soldiers and their families; mixed ‘base’ 
and ‘new’ people including several accused perpetrators 
Northwest-5 Rural village close (10 kilometres) to provincial city; suffered attacks during civil 
war; mix of ‘base’ and ‘new’ people; self-professed former KR, but not enough 
interviews to find accused perpetrators 
Northwest-6 Urban village on edge of Battambang town with much fighting before, during and 
after the KR regime, but physically relatively unscathed by KR period or civil 
war; majority urban ‘new’ people, though with some ‘base’ people including the 
family of a senior KR leader; I did not identify accused perpetrators 
Northwest-7 Former KR stronghold; district includes semi-urban town with many remote 
villages surrounding; close to border with Thailand; multiple displacements and 





 35 Interviews and Focus Groups in Phnom Penh 
Interviews with Cambodian government officials, UN/NGO workers (Cambodian, 
overseas Khmer, and expatriates), and various other victims  
  
TOTAL 134 TOTAL INTERVIEWS 
                                               
1 This category is made up primarily of Phnom Penh-based interviewees, but also includes a 
few interviews with peacebuilders based in other provinces, as well as one focus group of 





Introduction to the Communities 
As discussed in the historical review in Chapter 2, from the 1960s, Cambodia 
and its people have been enmeshed in war for decades, from the war in Vietnam, the 
civil war between Lon Nol and the KR, the KR mass violence, and finally civil war 
(between the Cambodian government, the KR, and various resistance factions). A 
study of recovery after mass violence in Cambodia thus cannot be limited to only the 
violence of the years of the Khmer Rouge rule (1975-1978). The civil war lasted 
through 1994 in the southwest and 1998 in the northwest, finally ending in the north 
(Siem Reap Province) in 1999. The ten communities of this study included three of the 
approximately six major Khmer Rouge strongholds2
The people suffered great hardship during the entire forty years of civil war, 
from loss of life, injury, displacement, lack of food and services, and destruction of 
homes and infrastructure. Nothing however compared to the physical and 
psychological destruction of the KR regime, as noted in Chapter 2. During the KR 
regime, there was a great deal of variation in the conditions of the different regions, 
‘tolerable in the northeast and eastern zones, somewhat worse in the southwest and 
west, and worst of all in the northern and northwestern zones’ (Chandler 1993: 212).  
.  
The next sub-sections provide overviews of the two regions of this research 
study which were introduced in Table 4.1 above.3
                                               
2 The primary headquarters of the KR strongholds in Battambang include Pailin and Samlaut; in 
Siem Reap, Anlong Veng and O’Smaich; in Banteay Meanchay, Malai and Phnom Chat; and in 
Kampot, Phnom Voar, and Koh Sla.  
 The southwest region borders the 
ocean (Gulf of Thailand) and Vietnam. The northwest region lies on the border of 
Thailand (see map on page ix). The contact between peoples at these borders has 
 





had effects on the development of these regions: globalization and migration are also 
part of the changing landscape, which affect the whole of Cambodia, but in particular 
the study regions. The next sub-section summarizes the two regions of study: the 
southwest and the northwest. 
The Southwest 
In the southwest, the province of Kampot and the municipality of Kep were 
chosen as areas of study due to the presence of former KR strongholds, a history of 
civil war both before and after the KR period, and the fact that I had a large number of 
previous contacts there. The southwest is bordering the ocean and Vietnam, and 
houses the ocean fishing industry and salt fields. There were three communities of 
study chosen in the southwest, Southwest-1, -2, and -3. Kampot province lies 175 
kilometres from Phnom Penh and takes about 3 hours by road. As you drive from the 
busy sprawl of Phnom Penh, the landscape changes to rural rice fields and houses on 
stilts. Driving on the road one glimpses a view of daily life: children play in ponds, 
water buffalo wallow in mud, and families sit under the shade of their houses chatting 
and eating shared meals. Approaching Kampot, there are small hills, with small 
mountains in the distance. The terrain flattens out near the Kampot Province town, 
with vast expanses of salt fields south of the town. The southwest had an overall 
history of war and violence similar to the northwest, because there were several KR 
strongholds in the region (though only two in contrast to several in the northwest). 
However, a major difference is that the defections of the KR military forces occurred in 
1994 and 1995 (versus 1997 and 1998 in the northwest), greatly shortening the period 
of civil war. Also, the effects of the civil war in the 1990s were bad in certain pockets of 
the province, where former KR soldiers crossed government territory, but the entire 
province was not a war zone (in contrast to the northwest which was more severely 





Two provinces were chosen for study in the northwest of Cambodia 
(Battambang and Banteay Meanchey), and one municipality (Pailin), due to their 
relatively high numbers of mixed former KR and non-KR populations. The northwest 
region is a politically significant area of Cambodia, because it borders the important 
trading partner Thailand which sheltered various factions during the different conflict 
periods. During the KR period the northwest was the site of major purges, as the 
southwest KR faction came in 1977 to replace and destroy the northwest KR faction, 
so many of the original cadre who started in the area were killed and replaced by 
others. The northwest region was home to most of the major strongholds of the former 
KR4
Because the northwest borders Thailand, it is also the area from where the 
largest numbers of Cambodians fled after the KR (though notably there had been 
proportionally larger numbers of people brought in by the KR in order to till the fertile 
fields). Battambang, and to a lesser degree Banteay Meanchey are also areas where a 
proportionally larger number of refugees were repatriated due to their desire for fertile 
land, as well as their desire to be close to Thailand in case of further violence in 
Cambodia. It thus suffered the most from continuing warfare and displacement 
throughout the 1990s until the KR defected in 1997 and 1998.  
, and thus was the site of much of the war before, during and after the KR period.  
Battambang is 291 kilometres from Phnom Penh (about five hours to drive) and 
to reach Sisophon, the capital of Banteay Meanchey Province, is an additional hour 
and a half. National Route No 5 is one of the better roads in Cambodia, passing 
through several provincial capitals on the way to Battambang. Rice fields, houses on 
wooden stilts, and newly built cement villas of the nouveau riche, alternate with 
beautiful old trees and dusty plains. Battambang province is the most fertile in the 
                                               




country (known as the breadbasket), while Banteay Meanchey is much less fertile, 
though it has the largest border crossing point with Thailand.  
Current population movements have occurred throughout the region as in all 
the former KR areas there has been a large influx of people from all over Cambodia, 
searching for land and a better life. In addition, in the northwest there are migrants who 
cross the Thai border daily or monthly to work as labourers or in the border casinos.  
This sub-section has given a broad overview of the two study regions. One of 
the three communities in the southwest (Southwest-3) and two of the seven 
communities in the northwest (Northwest-3 and -7) were former KR stronghold 
districts. All three had been primarily former KR, but many newcomer non-KR started 
arriving in the late 1990s searching for land and jobs. Thus in many cases in these 
areas, the former KR cadre, soldiers and ‘base’ people, did not know the ‘new’ people 
arriving from other provinces. Both regions suffered from the wars and the KR regime, 
and the next section provides an analysis of those conflicts. 
 
Setting the Stage – Conflict Analysis 
 This section provides an overview of respondents’ views of the war, and how 
the war affected them. A more detailed review is provided in Appendix K. The leaders 
of Cambodia used their political means to gain and hold power, and, especially given 
Cambodia’s patron-client linkages and reliance on hierarchy, the population easily 
followed. However, all respondents looked back at the war period with regret and 
realized they had been used for the gains of the politicians. The conflict caused 
cleavages in society between KR and non-KR but these cleavages were essentially 
manufactured by the economic and political conditions, as 90 percent of Cambodians 
are of the same ethnicity. All areas of Cambodia suffered from a long history of war 




in the northwest suffered multiple displacements from the 1970s through the 1990s. In 
the southwest however, because the defections of the former KR occurred in 1994 
(rather than in 1998 as in the northwest), the stories of war and violence were less 
severe than those heard in the northwest region. A history of war and violence is an 
impediment to reconciliation, as the traumatic experiences cause insecurity and also 
may cause psychological and physical problems leading to negative emotions such as 
fear, hatred, and mistrust. These negative emotions are compounded by the multiple 
displacements that Cambodians have suffered. 
The above background helps the reader understand and empathize with the 
community members, so as to better understand the processes of reconciliation they 
describe later. As noted in the previous chapter, reconciliation depends upon firstly an 
analysis of the conflict, including historical and cultural factors. We now move to 
another important section of the conflict analysis, the description of the period of mass 
violence of the KR period. 
 
The Khmer Rouge Period 
This section reviews some typical stories of survivors of the KR regime 
interviewed for this research. Although my initial research plan had been to focus 
interviews on the post-mass-violence period of reconciliation and rebuilding after the 
KR period, I found a much larger portion of the interviews than I had anticipated 
focused upon the mass violence. It was impossible not to listen to the stories of 
survivors of the KR period, as that is what people wanted to speak about first, and 
because without the context of the background it was impossible to understand the 
rebuilding. There were multiple narratives, often to convince me of the hardship of the 




respondents asked several times if I believed them. Several respondents spoke of the 
humiliation they had suffered and their fear. 
Common Memories of Suffering During the KR Period and 
Afterwards 
Respondents’ stories contained many commonalities, as also seen in the many 
memoirs, reports, news stories, and films about the Khmer Rouge regime (Criddle and 
Mam 1987; Seng 2005; Ung 2000). Sanders’ study on memories of the KR period 
suggests the following memories of highest frequency: lack of food, executions, forced 
labour, plus an additional category of ‘investigation and punishment by Angkar’ (2006: 
27). Findings in this study were similar, and are described in respondents’ words 
below. 
Lack of Food 
One common denominator to almost all interviews was a discussion of the lack 
of food and the poor quality of food. Sanders suggested that KR period narratives 
revolve around the lack of food; as Cambodian life revolves around the cycle of the 
crops, the attacks on food sources were equated with attacks on the body and the core 
of Cambodian identity (Sanders 2006: 63). This respondent, now working for the 
ECCC in Phnom Penh, spoke repeatedly about the lack of food: 
At that time we had four brothers, down to three because one of my brothers 
was sick and died in 1975. Another brother died when we reached the village a 
few months later, because he had no food and no medicine, because he ate 
something that is very poisonous because he was so hungry . . . he was a big 
boy and there was nothing to eat so he died. . . . (IV # 133). 
Executions  
Not surprisingly throughout the interviews, I heard many stories of horror and 
suffering that those who made it through seemed to feel obliged to tell me to make 




group and he picked a papaya so he was taken to be killed’ (IV # 59). This middle-
aged Cham woman was filled with sadness and suffering: 
I have thirteen children, but most of them died so there are only four children 
left. . . . My first husband was killed by Pol Pot. The men in the village were 
almost all killed and just only one is alive. . . . It was Ta Theung who told them 
the number and took people away. And they had already dug the holes so they 
put people there. Their soldiers took them away. They came from outside (IV # 
95). 
 
This man in his forties was only ten years old when the KR took over, but he 
had some strong and painful memories:  
My father was taken to be killed in 1975 because he was a senior-level soldier 
in the Lon Nol period. They arrested many people, and especially those people 
who worked in this village and commune were all arrested. . . . I saw revenge 
against one spy who was very cruel. His parents were killed in 1977 or 1978. 
This spy was ordered to take his parents to kill them, and he killed them. At that 
time, things like that often happened. At that time, the person who stole 
something such as rice or fish was buried alive in a hole. They just put the body 
into the hole, only from the feet up to the chest, and the hands were left out of 
the hole. They put a pot in the thief’s hands to show that he had stolen 
something, and then the person died there. I ran back home, but the spy took a 
bloody knife to threaten me to not run home again. I was afraid of dying (IV # 
117). 
 
Expatriates were also scarred by bearing witness to the aftermath of mass 
violence, as this long-term UN/NGO aid worker spoke about memories soon after the 
KR period: 
At that time we also saw trees that were blood-caked because they smashed 
the heads of the children against them. I saw with my own eyes those trees, 
they were often at the bottom of a hill or a mound, with a pit at the bottom so 
they would just push the people in the holes . . . . I saw these trees everywhere 
and I am sure that this is what they were used for. I don’t know why the blood 
didn’t wash off the trees but you could still see it, and even tufts of hair (IV # 
127). 
 
 Such traumatic experiences have caused high rates of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) in the Cambodian population as discussed in previous chapters. 
When suffering from PTSD, some of the symptoms (anxiety, headaches, fear, 




suffering was made even worse during that period because the KR prohibited people 
to show their emotions, as described in the next sub-section. 
Inability to Mourn or Show Emotion 
 As is well documented in the literature, the KR in their attempts to cut all ties 
between family members did not allow people to mourn at the death of family or 
friends and even forced people to kill others (Chandler 1991: 241-242, 260-261; 
Kiernan 1996: 154). Several respondents spoke about the fact that they were not 
allowed to cry during the KR period, especially at the death of one of their loved ones 
and that this still bothered them. This prohibition of showing emotions and the severing 
of family ties was strongly resented by the victims, has contributed to the negative 
psychological effects of the trauma, and has made reconciliation more difficult. This 
woman describes how she and her neighbour witnessed the killing of the neighbour’s 
son: 
When they were arresting him, he was running around his house and asked his 
mother for help and cried that ‘please help me mum! Please help me mum!’ . . . 
.’They are going to arrest me’. He told them ‘I will not let you arrest me, please 
just shoot me to death’. . . . When they were chasing him, they shot his thigh 
and then he fell down to the ground and he said that they could do whatever 
they wanted because he had already injured his leg, and he asked them to 
please just kill him. So they shot him to death at that place. He was brought to 
be buried far from the village near the place where I grew vegetables and I was 
so afraid of him because I used to grow and watered vegetable everyday near 
his grave. His wife and mother cried very much, and his mother just cried in the 
house secretly because if they saw she cried, they would take her to be killed 
also. They did not allow us to cry (IV # 108). 
 
 This testimony is only one from amongst many of respondents who expressed 
their sadness and frustration over not being allowed to properly pay respects to the 






Prison experiences, described by victims, accused perpetrators and former KR 
were often reported as formative experiences. Those respondents who had been in 
prison all stated they had suffered more than other people, and these harsh 
experiences may be related to stronger cries for justice and fewer for forgiveness. In 
the study community Southwest-2, several respondents had been at the same prison, 
all former KR who were accused of being enemies in the early stage of the KR rule. 
This former KR cadre stated, ‘I was in that prison for three months but I nearly died. If I 
had stayed one more month I would have died. I was there until Phnom Penh fell, but 
after it fell, they sent engineers, educated people, students, royal people, and 
Excellencies. Maybe thousands of people died’ (IV # 93).  
This former non-KR prisoner was an avid observer of the ECCC and, although 
he expressed the pain and trauma of his suffering, was eager to tell people about his 
prison experiences – in fact it was difficult to get him to stop speaking about them: 
I was arrested; the KR arrested me in the beginning of 1977 until the beginning 
of 1979. When the Vietnamese soldiers came I was rescued. I was accused of 
being a 17 April person, a new person and I was the number one enemy of the 
KR because I had been living in the Lon Nol region. They accused me of being 
a Lon Nol soldier and a CIA of America but I was not. The suffering of those 
who lived outside the prison was less than those who lived inside. I am still 
afraid to meet any of those prison guards, that they would treat me badly again. 
All the guards took prisoners to be killed; none of them could reject this duty. 
None of the guards were good. If ripe fruit fell and we picked it up without 
asking permission, we would be taken to be killed. I do not want to hear and 
recall about the prison because when I do, I cannot sleep. I have never told my 
wife and child about it. But I am waiting for the international trial; I want to tell 
the judges. There are few of us prisoners alive as they have been affected with 
various diseases from that time and other suffering, as they were treated so 
badly. Their bodies were badly hurt inside and so were their minds (IV # 59). 
 
Although much of the KR regime experience was traumatic for most people, 
the prison experiences were particularly painful. An important part of the painful 
memories was related to the humiliation and dehumanization suffered, as discussed in 




Humiliation, Dehumanization and Loss of Identity  
As noted in Chapter 3, the KR dehumanized their enemies, humiliated them, 
and stripped them of their cultural identities (related to being Buddhist, Muslim, or 
following animist practices, as well as most Cambodian social intercourse such as 
showing respect to elders, being close to family members, etc.). Many respondents 
spoke of the humiliation and dehumanization they felt during the KR regime - threats to 
their identities and to their very existence as human beings: ‘They ordered us like 
animals. We came from the mountain then they ordered me to dig the dam at Koh Sla 
after I gave birth one month before. It was very hard, I had no food, I just got one piece 
of potato’ (IV # 46). Others were shaken by what they had witnessed:  
Ah! You never saw they killed the people directly but for me, I saw and my child 
was very shocked when she saw that, my child who died. I looked at them 
secretly and I saw they hit the people and those victims lamented like ‘eut eut’ 
and I heard the sound ‘peung’ so I thought that they had been hit on the head. 
Even if those people had not died yet, but when they fell down into the pit, they 
would die there. They put four or five people into each pit. After they [the KR] 
killed the people already, they went to wash their hands in the water and they 
said ‘We just killed dogs, and we are very happy!’ They called those people 
dogs (IV # 108). 
 
 This respondent talked about the discrimination he suffered as a Cham Muslim, 
as part of a power display by the KR: 
My child and also my grandmother were burned by Pol Pot. For Cham custom 
or religion, we do not cremate people when they die, we bury them, but they 
made us cremate her. They ordered the village chief and the group chief to cut 
the wood and they ordered us to burn the bodies in the wood pile. . . they hated 
us and made us go against our religion. They did not allow us to bury the 
bodies. They wanted to win (IV # 32). 
 
 These quotes indicate that survivors thirty years after the mass killings remain 
strongly affected by these traumatic experiences.  
Discrimination by ‘Base’ People against ‘New’ People 
 As the KR regime’s purpose was to create a new classless society, there was a 




people for execution and discrimination (Vickery 1984: 81-82).5
Khmer Killing Khmer? 
 Several respondents, 
especially those with higher education (including some former KR), spoke about the 
KR tactic to divide the society and the resulting discrimination: ‘They started making 
problems, to divide between old and new. . . They said the “new” people oppressed 
them, were leeches sucking their blood, and did bad things to them’ (IV # 33). The 
resentment felt from discrimination is an important factor that can lead to new cycles of 
discrimination. The presence of discrimination and resultant resentment are important 
factors that must be addressed in a reconciliation process, and are examined further in 
later chapters. 
 The KR regime tactic of pitting the ‘base’ people against the ‘new’ people 
resulted in a situation of mass killing whereby Khmer people killed Khmer people. A 
debate has been on-going amongst Cambodians as to how the KR mass killings could 
have happened – disbelief that Khmer could kill Khmer (Doung and Ear 2009: 7: Linton 
2004: 27). Khmer nationalism is strong, with proud memories of the majestic Angkor 
Wat and the twelfth century when the Khmer Empire controlled much of Thailand and 
Vietnam. As 90 percent of the Cambodian population has ethnic, religious, and cultural 
homogeneity, the KR period created massive suspicion, as the enemy had to be 
sought ‘within’ (Eisenbruch 2007: 94). But it is difficult for many Cambodians to admit 
that the destruction of society was carried out by their own people. In searching for 
causes of the violence, Cambodians have often blamed others: the Vietnamese and 
the Chinese in particular. The residue of this confusion has increased the lack of trust 
and has shattered the view of the Cambodia ‘self’. Only a few respondents were able 
to recognize this identity crisis, such as this respondent: ‘There was no war like the 
war in Cambodia because we killed ourselves. They took the ignorant people to be the 
                                               




leaders and then the knowledgeable people had to be killed’ (IV # 44). This identity 
crisis caused by the KR regime, has resulted in impediments to reconciliation. These 
impediments will be explored in later chapters, based upon the structure followed in 
the next section which presents four case studies as models of reconciliation. 
 
Models of Community Reconciliation  
 This section reviews four case study communities, two in each region 
(southwest and northwest) in which four different types of coexistence can be 
identified. See Table 4.2 below. As reviewed in Chapter 3, Rigby has described three 
different degrees of coexistence and reconciliation, surface, shallow, and deep (Rigby  
Table 4.2. Models of Community Reconciliation 
 
2006a and 2006b). My findings incorporate a fourth category of ‘moderate’  
coexistence, with two sub-categories (those who had previous contact, and those who 
did not). A condition of deep reconciliation was not found in any of the ten study sites.  
Region /  
Community 
Coexistence Description 
Southwest   
Southwest-1 Surface Village of non-KR direct victims, living next to a village of primarily 
former KR including some accused perpetrators 
Southwest-2 Shallow Cluster of villages of varied economic status which suffered differently 
during the KR regime; now, some isolated former KR soldiers and 
accused perpetrators living lonely lives in the midst of majority direct 
victims and some former KR ‘base’ people 







Former KR stronghold of mixed indirect victims, former KR, and 
perpetrators: victims came in the 1990s for work or land while the 
former KR (presumably including some perpetrators) had been here 
since the KR fell in 1979; few know each other from the past 
Northwest-4 Moderate  
(with previous 
contact) 
War-torn community close to the Thai border that had been under the 
control of the government in the day time, and former KR at night; 
includes rural people, some who fought for the KR, some for 





Southwest-1 – Victims Living in Fear – Surface Coexistence  
Southwest-1 was a cluster of several villages, one of which was of mixed 
Khmer and Cham Muslim ethnicity. Southwest-1 lay close to the main road and the 
houses were fairly accessible by road or foot. The area had been taken over by the KR 
in 1973. During the 1990s there was extensive fighting in the area as KR from 
strongholds in the region would descend and try to attack what were now government-
controlled areas. I visited this community several times and also attended several 
sessions when a local NGO provided training about the ECCC.  
There was little interaction between the various villages in Southwest-1. 
Though all the villages did farming, the Cham portion of one of the villages was located 
on the small river, and the Cham were the main members of this community involved 
in fishing. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a five percent Cham Muslim minority in 
Cambodia. Although this study does not allow detailed examination of the factors 
related to the treatment of various minority groups during the KR period, several 
groups, including Cham Muslims, Vietnamese, and Chinese city-dwellers, suffered 
disproportionally.6 From the sample of Cham respondents in one village, all the 
respondents spoke about the greater degree of persecution they suffered in 
comparison to the Khmer villagers. In the Cham section of Southwest-1 almost all the 
men from that village were killed, and many of the women and children died as well. 
For example, one respondent lost nine of her thirteen children.7
                                               
6 See Vickery 1984: 194-196; Kiernan 1996: 461-462; Osman 2002: 2-3. Oveson agrees with 
Kiernan that Cham people were persecuted to a greater degree than others during the KR 








 What was striking about this community was that the villagers in this mixed 
Khmer/Cham village (Village A) were still living in fear of their neighbours in the next 
village: a village with many former KR members, including several accused 
perpetrators (Village B). Several of the respondents in Village A said they were afraid 
to speak about what happened in the past and were afraid of their neighbours living in 
Village B. For example, this non-KR victim expressed his fear of the other village a few 
times during the interview: ‘I am afraid, I am afraid they might come back and do these 
bad things again’ (IV # 29). In another neighbouring village, this 75-year-old man had 
been part of the KR originally but was later removed from his post: ‘I get angry 
because they forced me to work very hard but now I dare not to show my feeling out 
because I am afraid of their co-workers, and that the lower KR will report about me to 
the top’ (IV # 46). 
 Only one of the non-KR villagers in Village A to whom I spoke was not fearful, 
and was in fact trying to find out more about the past history: key informant Mr. Sunh. 
Sunh remarked upon the discrimination and separation between ‘base’ people and 
‘new’ people during the KR regime in reference to one of the KR women cadres:  
She was the chief of the women’s mobile group (mei kang chalat neary) and 
she did bad things to women at that time such as she took the hot burned 
potato to push in the mouth of women who stole potatoes to eat. So that is why 
I tried to ask her husband in the coffee place but he did not say. Most people in 
[Village B] were ‘base’ people so they controlled the ‘new’ people (IV # 96).  
 
 Another example of the relatively richer and more educated ‘new’ people 
suffering disproportionately was provided by two non-KR victims who had been 
teachers before 1975. They were accused of being ‘new’ people and almost their 
entire families were killed (IV # 99).  
 Southwest-1 included village A, with many villagers living in fear, living side-by-
side with their former jailers from the KR period. They rarely communicated so there 





Southwest-2 – Islands Alone – Shallow Coexistence 
 I turn next to Southwest-2, now moving from surface 
coexistence to a deeper level of coexistence: shallow coexistence. 
In contrast to the mixed Khmer and Cham village Southwest-1, Southwest-2 
was 100 percent ethnic Khmer. This area had also been taken over by the KR in 1973. 
Two amongst the five villages (Villages A and B) were relatively wealthy before the war 
(they had raised wooden houses, small pieces of land, and some had livestock). The 
other three villages (Villages C, D, and E) were farther from the main road, and had 
less land and livestock. During initial visits to the area, inhabitants of the richer villages 
(A and B) explained that before the war the poorer villages sent labourers to work on 
the fields of those living in the richer villages. However, this did not stop some of the 
sons of these relatively richer villagers from joining the KR and becoming soldiers, 
lured by King Sihanouk’s call in the 1970s. During the KR period, the killings in the two 
richer villages (primarily ‘new’ people) were much more severe than in the three poorer 
villages (primarily ‘base’ people) and many people in Villages A and B were killed. A 
temple in one of the poorer villages (Village D) served as a prison and execution 
centre, and behind this temple thousands of bodies were unearthed after the KR 
regime. In the 1990s a monk and some other elders arranged for re-burial of the 
remains in the temple grounds in Village A, and a small memorial was built. There 
were approximately four accused perpetrators identified by various interviewees: one 
accused perpetrator who had been identified as particularly cruel had died a few years 
before, one accused perpetrator was interviewed and the other two could not be 
located. There were a handful of former KR soldiers living in the community, one who 
was available for interview. 
                                               
8 They have however moved beyond a state of raw revenge, and refrain from violence, though 




Southwest-2 included farmers, labourers, and some small business people. 
There was a great deal of interaction between the villages, as there was a common 
market in the district town nearby, and there were two Buddhist temples shared 
amongst the five villages. I had visited the village and met some of the villagers during 
my initial research in 1999, and had also met several of the villagers several times 
when they were invited by an NGO to visit the ECCC and to attend regional workshops 
on reconciliation and justice.  
One of the former KR soldiers and his wife (a former KR ‘base’ person) were 
living in Southwest-2, and this soldier served as a key informant to this research, Mr. 
‘Kuy’ whom I visited many times. Although he said he was never involved in any 
killings, that he only fought at the front lines, and that he had saved some villagers who 
were captured during the civil war period, he was treated with suspicion by other 
villagers. One former KR accused perpetrator and his family also lived in the 
community: their stories are told in the next chapter in the context of their communities. 
Southwest-2 is categorized as living in a state of shallow coexistence: in 
contrast to the surface coexistence of Southwest-1-TS, there was communication and 
exchanges between victims, former KR, and the perpetrator and his family. I did not 
hear widespread expressions of fear from victims; however, the accused perpetrator 
expressed anxiety and fearfulness, and was living in isolation.9 I now move to the 
northwest, where two communities exhibiting the next category of moderate 
coexistence are highlighted.10
                                               
9 Zucker described an accused perpetrator who lives in a similar situation of isolation, as he is 
shunned by other villagers due to his past acts (Zucker 2009). 
  
 
10 Although the two examples of coexistence in the northwest I chose were both reconciled to a 
greater degree (moderate) than those found in the southwest (surface and shallow), I cannot 
conclude that in general coexistence was higher in the northwest. Firstly, there were three 
examples of communities demonstrating moderate coexistence (with no prior contact); I chose 
one of the two from the northwest, rather than the one from the southwest so I could highlight 
two communities from each region. Secondly, because the southwest was closer and the roads 
were better, and because I had more long-term ties to some of the communities, it was easier 
to find communities where victims and perpetrators were living side by side, and it was easier 




Northwest-3 - The Melting Pot - Moderate Coexistence (Without 
Prior Contact)  
 Northwest-3 was one of the major former KR strongholds during the KR regime 
and thereafter, and its leaders had defected to the government side in 1996. Although 
the former KR areas in the northwest were experiencing a development boom in some 
areas, signs of the past war were everywhere: bombed out buildings, ‘Caution! Land 
Mines!’ signs, and desolate areas of scrub where development was not possible. In all 
of the former KR stronghold communities, there were a variety of populations, 
including former KR and non-KR, for the most part depending upon the land available. 
This woman deputy village chief explained:  
The former Khmer Rouge are 60 percent while the rest (40 percent) are 
newcomers. . . . They come from various provinces. . . .They come here to 
work and once they are prosperous, they buy land to live here; others come to 
work and some were immigrants from the border of Cambodia. Here is a place 
to earn money and to work so they can start a new life here (IV # 64). 
 
Researchers in former KR areas in the north and northwest, in 2000 noted that 
when former KR groups defected as a group with leadership intact, their recovery was 
more rapid than amongst scattered un-connected people fleeing from former KR areas 
(Cambodian Centre for Conflict Resolution and Cambodian Development Resource 
Institute 2000: 13-19). Three of the ten study sites were former KR areas, all of which 
had intact leadership. Interviews done in this case study community were done in a 
single visit, over a period of a few days, thus no repeat interviews were possible. 
Results of multiple focus group meetings, with a mixture of former KR and non-KR, 
showed some lingering fear and resentment on the part of the non-KR, most of whom 
admitted to feeling afraid when they first arrived (for the most part) in the late 1990s. 
Responses varied depending upon the make-up of the village (whether they were all 
former KR, or if it was a mixed area, as above) and the distance from the urban centre. 




views ranged from being still proud and loyal to the KR regime and its leaders, to 
feeling sad, angry, and resentful of lost time and opportunities during the war. There 
was a great focus on working hard to find a better life, an endeavour in which all were 
engaged. Respondents spoke about current stresses on community reconciliation as 
land prices rise, land grabbing occurs, and conflicts thus increase, but with the 
exception of one respondent all denied that such conflicts ever occurred along 
KR/non-KR lines. 
Several respondents spoke of close relationships between former KR and non-
KR, presumably because they did not know each others’ activities during the KR 
period. Since these interviews were relatively short, and were single rather than repeat 
interviews, none of the former KR respondents spoke about what they had done in the 
past except with the most general information. However, from listening to individual 
stories, especially the newcomers who were not KR, it was apparent that few of these 
people knew each other during the KR period (i.e., no prior contact). Thus their level of 
coexistence was not deep, and there was neither need for apologies nor forgiveness 
for specific acts. Yet of all the communities, this area showed a relatively higher 
degree of coexistence (moderate).  
Northwest-4 – We Are All in the Same Boat - Moderate 
Reconciliation (With Prior Contact) 
Another community of moderate coexistence was found in Northwest-4. In 
contrast to Northwest-3, this grouping of villages was not a former KR stronghold, 
though it had been taken over by the KR several times during the civil war (in the 
1980s and 1990s). It looked like a typical cluster of Cambodian villages, mainly 
wooden houses on stilts but with a few cement buildings of more wealthy individuals. It 
was an agricultural area and rice fields surrounded the dusty main road. There was 
little commerce, just some small village markets. Although the Thai border was not far, 




border. Signs of war abounded with the bombed buildings and land mine signs, and 
there was a general lack of development: the long road from the provincial capital was 
still of very poor quality and frequently impassable in the rainy season. Many of the 
villagers had lived here for generations, and had been caught up in different sides of 
the conflict – as KR and the ‘Para’ (or non-communist resistance forces) fought here 
both together and against each other. Government forces were constantly also 
competing for control, so it was described by the locals as a ‘tug of war’ region.  
Several individuals were interviewed who knew each other, as well as an 
accused perpetrator who had been in another region during the KR regime. This area 
was at a stage of moderate reconciliation, because victims and former KR sat side-by-
side and talked about the past, though there was still much resentment. Other topics of 
their coexistence are explored further in the next chapter, such as religion, guilt, and 
discrimination. 
In conclusion, this chapter has identified four communities that serve as four 
different models of community coexistence and reconciliation: (1) surface, (2) shallow, 
(3) moderate (with no prior contact), and (4) moderate (with prior contact). Firstly, the 
stage was set through background about the KR regime in the words of respondents. 
Secondly, details of the four communities were reviewed which exhibit characteristics 
of four different types of coexistence. In the next chapter, we turn to the individuals 
living in the case study communities in terms of how they are coping on an individual 






CHAPTER 5 – Victims and Perpetrators: Fine 
Lines, Factors, and Coping Strategies 
 
After a period of mass violence the goal of reconciliation in a reconstructed 
society is ultimately to reintegrate victims and perpetrators. If victims focus on their 
victimhood to the exclusion of all else, or if perpetrators live separate lives as pariahs, 
or trumpet their impunity, society cannot move forward and develop. This chapter 
introduces the three groups of people studied in this research: victims, former Khmer 
Rouge (many of whom were bystanders), and perpetrators.1
The categories of victim, perpetrator, and bystander are not always mutually 
exclusive and the lines between them are often blurred.
 First, the three groups will 
be described. Second, key factors that affect the degree of acceptance of perpetrators 
by victims are explored. Third, a theory of perpetrator coping strategies is presented.  
2 The conflict in Cambodia was 
Khmer against Khmer, and the majority of people were not separated by race, 
ethnicity, or religion.3
                                               
1 I decided to use the general term ‘former KR’ instead of specifying the detailed categories 
such as this classification used by the Documentation Center of Cambodia: cadres (those who 
had positions of authority); combatants (soldiers); security personnel (prison guards and other 
security staff); and base people (rural populations living in KR-controlled zones) (Cougill et al. 
2004: vi). Since my interview format did not focus on the KR period itself, and because asking 
former KR their specific roles would be seen as sensitive and invasive, I have identified people 
with the general term of former KR, unless an individual has explained their role voluntarily. 
 Thus it is not easy to determine who was who, and families were 
often divided by chance and politics. Even so, automatic moral judgments are inherent 
in the categories assigned to people after violence: victim (associated with innocence 
and purity) and perpetrator (associated with guilt and evil) (Baines 2008: 4). These 
 
2 Although the terms victim and perpetrator are both value-laden and imply clear delineation of 
guilt, I have used them throughout the text (in contrast to survivor and offender or harm-doer), 
because they are well known in Cambodia and clearly understood.  
 
3 The KR discriminated against three primary minority groups based on their ethnicity: the 
Chinese-Khmer, Vietnamese, and Muslim Cham. These groups of people were all considered 




automatic judgments often take place in Cambodia, at least between two groups: the 
leadership or cadre of KR leaders at various levels who as perpetrators committed 
crimes, and the ‘enemy’ population of the ‘new’ people victims, many of whom were 
persecuted and killed.  
The grey areas between the two extremes of victim and perpetrator have led 
Coloroso to identify a range of roles played by people in genocide. These include: (1) 
planners, instigators, and perpetrators; (2) henchmen; (3) active supporters; (4) 
passive supporters; (5) active bystanders; (6) passive bystanders; (7) witnesses; and 
(8) active witnesses, defenders, and resisters; and (9) victims (Coloroso 2007: 82-3, 
144-151). This framework is helpful in analysing the complex relationships between 
group and individuals, and will be applied below. 
As this chapter focuses on the micro-level of individuals, in order to describe 
the victims, accused perpetrators, and former KR interviewed in this research study, 
we start with a review of the respondents of the research study. 
Respondents 
After so many years of war, and the slow and halting defection, reintegration, 
and reconstruction processes, there are many groups and sub-groups within 
Cambodian society. Respondents for this research study were focused in two regions 
of Cambodia, which were described in the last chapter (the southwest and the 
northwest) with a third centrally located respondent group in the capital (Phnom Penh).  
I conducted a total of 134 interviews, 123 of which were individual interviews 
and 11 were focus groups. In the text, respondents are identified by their individual 
characteristics (e.g., KR soldier, or woman victim) and by their interview number: for 
example, the first interview (IV) is (IV # 1), the second is (IV # 2), etc. Some of the 
individual interviews included more than one person (101 one-person, 20 two-person, 




interviews (32 interviews): there were a total of 124 respondents interviewed. Of those 
124 respondents 33 were women and 91 were men.4
Both individual and focus group interviews were used to triangulate the data. 
For example, I visited the temple in Southwest-2 that had been a prison during the KR 
period, where Mr. Pel (the accused perpetrator mentioned in Chapter 4) had brought 
people to be executed. We requested to meet the head monk, who was meeting with 
the temple advisors and elders, so we held a spontaneous focus group discussion to 
ask the community members about the history of the area and their feelings about it. 
One of the respondents stated during the interview that we should ask Mr. Kuy (the 
key informant, former KR soldier) about that time period. Later, Kuy told me that he 
had felt insulted by this comment, as he had been at the military front, and had not 
been involved in the local atrocities, as the speaker had implied. Thus observing 
interactions between individuals, and gathering information from multiple sources, 
provided me additional inputs to better guide my later interviews.  
 See Appendix I for more details 
about the respondents. 
My goal was to include as many accused perpetrators as possible, but I found 
it difficult to firstly identify them within communities, secondly find someone who could 
lead me to homes of accused perpetrators and introduce me, and thirdly have the 
accused perpetrator agree to the interview. In the end, amongst the individual 
interviews, eight were accused perpetrators, and 21 were former KR members (the 
majority of whom were self-identified): some of the 21 former KR may have also been 
                                               
4 Admittedly a missing element in this study is the voice of women. As I was using a 
serendipitous method of sampling, when entering a village, men were usually the first to meet 
with visitors, especially since the first visit to the village has to be with the village chief to obtain 
permission, and village chiefs in Cambodia are overwhelmingly men. As I tried to sample older 
people who had lived through and could remember the KR regime, and to include respected 
elders, this included village chiefs, religious leaders (monks and Buddhist laymen or Achars), 





perpetrators, but I did not have information about their pasts. About half of the focus 
group interviewees were also former KR. 
 Of the 124 respondents, seven were monks or Achars, 53 were community 
members (10 of whom were teachers and three were Kru Khmer or traditional 
healers), 28 were NGO workers, eight were UN workers, 20 were government 
authorities (three at the national level, three at the provincial level, and the rest at the 
local level (district, commune, or village), two worked for the ECCC, and six were 
victims from the Phnom Penh area involved in ECCC or other NGO activities.5 As I 
tried to include respondents who had experience working on reconciliation activities, 
and/or with many years of experience working in Cambodia, 14 were expatriates.6
The majority of Cambodians interviewed had lived under the KR regime, but a 
few who had not. The ages of the respondents ranged from 18 to 88, but the vast 
majority of interviews were in their forties, fifties and sixties.  
 In 
order to protect the identity of respondents, I refer to all the UN and NGO staff workers 
as UN/NGO workers.  
Key Informants 
 Eight key informants were identified on the basis of their particularly significant 
inputs into my understanding:  
• Mr. Sunh, from Southwest-1, a KR victim, a government soldier, former village 
chief, and self-professed revenge-seeker whom I interviewed four times; 
                                               
5 These summary statistics numbers are approximate, as several interviewees had multiple 
identities, such as NGO workers who had been recently let go who were now speaking as 
community members, or community members who were also part-time volunteers with an 
NGO.  
 
6Although my focus was on rural Cambodians, I also spoke with some Cambodians who, 
although they had experience with reconciliation activities, either: had lived for many years 
outside of Cambodia (IV # 128 and 134); or had not lived through the KR period (IV# 41, 21, 
48, and 49). The expatriate interviewees were interview numbers: 12, 27, 28, 35, 36, 39, 58, 




• Mr. Tang, from Southwest-1, a former KR cadre and accused perpetrator 
whom I interviewed once; 
• Mr. Kuy from Southwest-2, a former KR soldier whom I interviewed five times 
and who assisted in setting up other interviews, and his wife Mrs. Lysa, a 
former KR member whom I interviewed formally once; 
• Mr. Pel and Mrs. Kong from Southwest-2: Mr. Pel was a former KR spy 
(chhlop) and accused perpetrator whom I interviewed once, and Mrs. Kong, his 
wife, a former KR member I interviewed twice; 
• Mr. Kin, from Northwest, a former UN/NGO worker on reconciliation projects, 
and former monk whom I interviewed twice. 
• Mr. Sary, from Phnom Penh, a victim, and former KR prison inmate whom I 
interviewed twice. 
We now turn to a review of the general characteristics of the victim group of 
respondents. 
The Victims 
Who were the Victims? 
In this study and in Cambodia in general, the term ‘victim’ refers to those who 
suffered human rights violations during the KR regime. Suffering of victims included 
violations of most human rights, including discrimination, hard labour, starvation, lack 
of medical care and education, physical abuse, torture and execution. ‘New’ people or 
17 April people (the educated, civil servants, and people living in cities – the 
‘bourgeois’) were subjected to much greater hardship than the ‘base’ people (rural 
Cambodians, often poor, or those who had joined the KR movement in its earlier 
stages – also known as ‘old’ people). The primary targets of the KR regime were these 




monks. For many victims, their role as victim was an important part of their identity, 
and many interviewees were eager to tell their stories of suffering.  
Amongst the victim group several distinctions can be made, depending upon 
victims’ roles and identities: ‘no victim is only a victim, but also an actor with many 
identities, roles and resources’ (Huyse 2003: 56). For example, victims will have 
suffered differentially depending on such factors as: the severity of the general 
economic conditions in the area (some regions had more starvation than others); if and 
how often the person was displaced; how far they were separated from their family, 
and the severity of the leadership (in imposing regulations related to food, labour, 
executions, imprisonment, etc.). The amount of family support, luck, personality, 
motivation, religious devotion, and belief in the importance of forgiveness also 
influences how the individual recovers from the trauma of the past, and thus how they 
are able to reconcile with former KR perpetrators and bystanders. These distinctions 
and variations played a role in how they remembered their experiences and how they 
viewed perpetrators. 
Almost all Cambodians consider themselves victims, as shown in a 2008 
survey on justice and reconciliation: 93 percent of the respondents (which included 
both victims and perpetrators) who had lived under the regime considered themselves 
victims (Pham et al. 2009: 2). Their experiences included starvation (82 percent), lack 
of shelter (71 percent), destroyed property (71 percent), forced evacuation (69 
percent), forced labour (53 percent), torture (27 percent), witness of torture (30 
percent), and witness of killing (22 percent) (Pham et al. 2009: 2). The term victim may 
also apply to former KR, as the KR turned upon themselves and targeted their own 




Sleng (S-21) prison the majority of those killed were former KR cadres weeded out in 
increasingly paranoid internal purges (Chandler 1999).7
Child Victims and Child Soldiers
 
8
 The KR actively and purposely recruited young children and youth as KR 
soldiers and cadres, and began indoctrination in children as young as six years of age 
(Etcheson 2005a: 5). The youth were seen as more malleable and as the purest 
revolutionaries. Most children were separated from their families even at very young 
ages and were subjected to indoctrination and constant propaganda. They were thus 
uneducated, often ignorant, and subject to influence and superstitions (Locard 2005). 
Some were forced to become child soldiers, spies, and even executioners. This KR 
victim noted: ‘The people in that time were cruel -- even the young people’ (IV # 16). 
All people, including children, had to work hard and were often threatened with 
punishment or death -- they also witnessed death or at least observed people led to 
their deaths, or people who disappeared. Few had any education except for all-night 
speeches about the virtues of the KR regime.  
 
There were many orphans after the KR regime, some of whom were kept in 
orphanages and others who were taken in by family members. Thus young people 
were used by the KR regime as a tool of their policies, and were also victims who 
suffered under the regime. When examining the period of mass violence in Cambodia 
and its aftermath, an important factor is the age of the parties, with youth as a possible 
mitigating factor. Child soldiers are a particularly vulnerable group and an example of 
the fine line between victim and perpetrator (Huyse 2003: 65). This former child soldier 
explained: ‘No, I was forced, I would say. I was forced by the KR to do killing before, 
                                               
7 In this infamous Phnom Penh prison (Tuol Sleng, or S-21) more than 14,000 ‘enemies’ of the 
KR regime were tortured and killed between 1976 and 1978 (Chandler 1999: viii). 
 
8 A prime example of a child victim/child soldier is Arn Chorn Pond, who was adopted by an 
American family, who now speaks openly about his mixed role as both victim and perpetrator, 





and all these things. So I speak more and more now about it; I just started to talk about 
ten years ago….how many children around have been forced?’ (IV # 134).  
The (Fine) Line between Perpetrators and Victims 
In the analysis of a post-mass-violence situation, it is important to disaggregate 
the category of perpetrators and acknowledge the complexity of guilt and innocence, 
and the blurriness of the victim and perpetrator categories (Lemarchand and Niwese 
2007: 168; Pouligny, Chesterman and Schnabel 2007: 11). This disaggregation is 
rarely done in Cambodia, as the term KR is often used interchangeably with 
perpetrator.  
Rigby cautions against facile distinctions between victims and perpetrators, as 
the agonizing decision to become a perpetrator (often under the threat of death) 
cannot be judged by outsiders who were not in that difficult situation (2001: 116). 
Indeed several of the respondents could understand and empathize with those difficult 
decisions. This expatriate UN/NGO worker recounted the words of his Cambodian 
colleague (who narrowly escaped being recruited as a KR cadre) to another colleague 
(who had self-identified as victim and only talked of her own suffering, never listening 
to the suffering of her colleagues): 
She said: ‘My father who had a high position in the Lon Nol government 
happened to survive the first two years because he had dark skin and could act 
like he was a cyclo driver. But then he was caught and he was killed before our 
very eyes, not taken away, he was killed right on the spot! And I was there, and 
then I was made the chief of a youth group, and that was three months before 
the Vietnamese came in. If it had been six months, or three months longer . . . I 
would have been like [the known perpetrator]. You should be happy that you 
were just too young!’ And finally she just stopped. . . . I wonder when do you 
stop being a victim and become a perpetrator? (IV # 58). 
 
Another expatriate UN/NGO worker recounted a story about the fine line 
between perpetrators and victims from the 1980s, when their government guide 




When she came back I said to her, ‘wow, who was that?’ She said that this was 
the female cadre who was responsible in her KR camp for her group who was 
responsible for the deaths of many people in the camp. I said ‘why did you hug 
her then?’ I will always remember, she said angrily, ‘Never judge others, 
because you never know what you would do to survive!’ I think then she must 
have also had to do such things that she might not have done in other 
circumstances (IV # 127). 
 
Waller described genocide as a situation of ordinary people in extraordinary 
circumstances in order to remind us that the capacity to commit such crimes lies in the 
majority of humanity (2002: 8). Thus we should be careful about judging others – what 
would we have done when put into those extraordinary circumstances? A way to avoid 
being judgmental is to increase understanding of the ‘other’. We now hear from some 
of those former KR (some of whom may have been perpetrators, some bystanders) as 
to how they became involved in the movement and how they saw this fine line 
between victim and perpetrator. 
 
Former Khmer Rouge and Bystanders 
The second group of respondents is labelled ‘former Khmer Rouge (KR)’, to 
include those who were self-identified, or identified by other villagers, as former KR, 
but not as having committed any crimes. Former KR soldiers were often placed by 
respondents in this category (rather than being labelled as perpetrators), as they were 
usually not seen as having committed crimes against the population. For the purposes 
of this study, this category also includes former KR who had relocated (usually to KR-
controlled areas in the northwest or north) and whose background remained unclear.9
The majority of the former KR who were not direct perpetrators might also be 
described as bystanders. Bystanders are those who stand by and do not act in the 
face of human rights violations, and, during the KR period, that would include the vast 
  
                                               
9 In the context of the study, in many cases I was only interviewing people one time and would 





majority of the former KR or base people. However, all groups including victims, former 
KR, and perpetrators were often forced to watch many human rights violations and 
were powerless to stop them. This powerlessness and memories of viewed atrocities 
contributes to trauma and to feelings of guilt (including guilt for merely surviving). No 
one dared speak; everyone risked becoming an immediate victim. As described by 
many survivors, they learned to be like the kapok tree (dam kor), a play on words as 
‘kor’ also means to be deaf and mute. Coloroso describes four valid reasons for 
bystanders not acting: (1) fear of injury or death; (2) fear of becoming a target; (3) fear 
of making the situation worse; (4) does not know what to do (2007: 99). These reasons 
have often been invoked by both former KR and non-KR when trying to understand 
and explain their experiences during the regime. These reasons for not acting can also 
be applied to survival strategies in the present day, as described in the section below 
on perpetrator coping strategies.  
Given the methodology of my research with primarily only one interview with an 
individual, it was difficult to know exactly the role of respondents during the KR period. 
Many stated they were rural inhabitants, ‘base’ people without any authority or other 
role in the regime. At the time of the KR regime it was estimated that approximately 15 
percent of the 5.3 million base people died (800,000) and 33 percent of the 2.4 million 
‘new’ people died (also about 800,000) (Kiernan 1996: 456). Thus there are millions of 
people (5.3) who enjoyed a relatively better standard of living than the minority group 
(2.4 million). Although much attention is focused on the planners and instigators of the 
most grievous crimes of the KR (such as killing and torture), the majority of ‘base’ 
people under the KR have committed moral and/or political offenses. These moral and 
political offenses included enjoying direct or indirect advantages at the expense of 
others, or inaction in the case of human rights abuses, including the above criminal 
offenses. However these moral and political offenses were not always committed by 




Why did People Join the KR? 
The gravity of the offenses and the motivation of the perpetrators are important 
factors in determining the ability of individuals to reconcile in the post-conflict phases 
(Huyse 2003: 67). Former KR respondents provided a variety of motivations for joining, 
examples of which are provided below. Many families were divided during the war 
period, as in some areas the KR would recruit one soldier from each family in a rural 
area, while the government also did the same. The effects of the war and the US 
bombing affected many areas as well. This former KR soldier speaking in a focus 
group explained how he had tried to explain to his family how he ended up with the KR 
in the turmoil of war, stating a common refrain that the KR had protected the 
Cambodian nation from being swallowed by the Vietnamese: 
After we stopped fighting with the Vietnamese I went to my home village in 
1993. The people asked me why were you on the KR side? I told them that I 
have been alright and have food and a home. . . . But amongst the people who 
studied with me in my village, only two among ten survived! The Americans 
bombed our area and so many people died at that time. When I returned home 
. . . amongst my sisters and brothers only four had survived. They asked me 
again how could I have been on the KR side? . . . I told them that if the 
Vietnamese had been successful in their invasion of Cambodia, we would have 
lost our territory so we joined in the struggle. . . . (IV # 61) 
 
 Not all KR were forced to join the movement; several respondents in the former 
KR areas were proud of the KR and joined willingly, such as one senior former KR 
soldier who denied his neighbour’s statement that he had joined under pressure ‘No, it 
is not. It was the politics which I loved myself’ (IV # 116). He also added that he had 
joined before the American bombing, but the bombing affected him greatly, with many 
of the people in his village killed. 
This respondent was recruited at a young age but also stated she went 
willingly: 
I have five siblings. I am the oldest daughter. I left my family in 1970 when I 
was 15 years old. I left by my choice; no parents forced me! I was highly 




[in 1975] I was sent to work in salt field in Kampot, and then I worked in a 
transport group (krom dek chenhchoun) until 1978 (IV # 65). 
 
On the other hand, this respondent was ‘‘recruited’ from her poor rural village 
unwillingly: 
 When I was 16 the Khmer Rouge asked to take me from my parents to be 
involved in the arts. They trained me in art for 3 months, but I was not allowed 
to return home. I tried to go back to my home three times but they followed me 
to bring me back. I did not want to stay with them. There were many taken by 
the KR in my village. If there was a son in a house, the son would come, but if 
there were two sons, they would come; if there were three, they would also 
come. Some of them would be alive and return, but others would not (IV # 64). 
 
This section provides viewpoints of several former KR in order to assist us in 
better understanding the competing pressures upon the individuals in the lead-up to 
the years of mass violence. This increased understanding is an important factor in re-
humanization and developing empathy, important dimensions of the process of 
reconciliation, which will be discussed more extensively in later chapters. As victims 
consider whether or not to accept former KR into their communities, understanding the 
factors that influenced people to join the KR can facilitate reconciliation. Part of this 
understanding is the ability of victims to see former KR also as victims. 
Khmer Rouge as Victims 
As noted above, KR were also victims of the regime, having lost family 
members and friends through increasingly vicious internal purges. Besides the killings 
and discrimination against the ‘new’ people by the KR, the majority of the violence 
reported by respondents was related to the KR southwest zone cadres killing the KR 
northwestern zone cadres. Gradually over time, there has been increased attention to 
the suffering of the perpetrators as well as the victims. In several news articles former 
KR perpetrators such as prison guards also refer to themselves as victims (Mydans 




perpetrators (Cougill et al. 2004). However, there is still little public debate in 
Cambodia today about former KR as victims. 
 I asked about half of the respondents if they felt they had suffered the same, 
more, or less than others during the KR regime. Most respondents said they suffered 
the same as others, although one accused perpetrator (as well as his wife) said he 
suffered more than others. He seemed to be intermingling his experiences during the 
KR and after the KR in the passage below. He, as most other former KR, including 
former KR accused perpetrators, felt as though he was a victim also: 
I hate it very much when I hear about Pol Pot. Nobody could call me to join 
now, I stopped following them and believing in them anymore. The KR time 
was very difficult. . . I have much more suffering than others and I stopped 
going or believing their calling. I don't like Pol Pot anymore (IV # 85). 
 
 Although the majority of the former KR respondents had lost relatively few 
family members compared to the non-KR victims whose families were for the most part 
decimated, this former KR soldier in the northwest reported many family members 
killed: 
I lost many relatives. I lost my siblings and parents. I lost about 10 or 13 
relatives including my uncles, aunts. My father was arrested during the three 
years and eight months [KR period]. Then, my uncle, aunt, and granduncle 
were arrested to be killed because they accused them of being enemies 
betraying Angkar. In the KR period, my father was the chief of a cooperative, 
but later on, the KR leaders were changed between the southwest (near’ordei) 
and northwest (peayoap). Since he was a northwest (peayoap) person, when 
the southwest came, they accused all the northwest as enemies and they killed 
many northwest people (IV # 78). 
 
 This former KR senior level cadre spoke about the many family members he 
also lost, and the anger surviving family members felt against him for not saving them.  
You know the sister, the older sister of the wife of Mrs. Ieng Thirith; she died 
during the administration of the KR. Also, the sister-in-law of Pol Pot, she died 
also. It [the killing] touched everyone. But one cannot say that Pol Pot decided 
to kill his sister. . . . My cousins were not happy with me. They said you were in 
the ranks of the KR, and you could not even defend the members of the family! 
And I told him, it was even difficult for me to defend my own head, so it would 
stay attached to my body [laughs]. You know at that time, it was like that, no 





Although it is clear that many former KR suffered as well as victims, there 
should not be too much emphasis on the role of former KR (especially known 
perpetrators) as victims, and this should not be their primary identity. As Huyse 
argues, when perpetrators claim they are victims to the point of avoiding any 
responsibility for their actions, reconciliation processes can be obstructed. ‘Such 
blurring of guilt can become an obstacle on the path to coexistence, trust and empathy 
from the point of view of many victims’ (Huyse 2003: 62). We now turn to the 
perpetrators: who were they and what are they accused of doing? 
 
The Perpetrators – The Accused 
Who Were the Perpetrators? 
In this thesis, the term ‘perpetrator’ includes former KR (base people, cadres, 
security personnel or soldiers) who identified themselves as former KR, and have been 
accused by others of harming or killing others during the KR period. Some were 
accused of planning, some of ordering, and some of directly killing others. This section 
reviews the perpetrators and their offenses. 
Factors such as the degree of guilt (numbers of people killed) or whether 
crimes were committed by choice or not may differentiate various types of 
perpetrators. Included in this category of perpetrators were some of the peasant ‘base’ 
people who misused their power against richer neighbours out of jealousy.10
                                               
10 This delineation of types of perpetrators is from Coloroso 2007: 82-3, 144-151. 
 A passive 
or active supporter may have merely pointed out or accused someone, but any type of 
accusation in the paranoid KR society could result in execution of the suspect. 
Children and youth recruited by the KR comprise a special category of victim 




Perpetrators can be direct perpetrators as per above, or indirect perpetrators who 
committed moral or political offenses.  
The perpetrators in Cambodia can be divided using Coloroso‘s scheme as 
described above: the DK Central committee (planners); KR cadres, soldiers, spies, 
and security personnel (henchmen and active participants) (Coloroso 2007: 82-3, 144-
151). Some former KR cadres, spies, and base people also acted as ‘active 
supporters’ by identifying others for execution. Many of the spies and the soldiers were 
children and youth. 
In the case of Cambodia, the KR transferred their cadre out of their home 
villages to lead in other villages and often moved cadre from place to place. But in 
some cases, some lower level perpetrators such as spies, or the henchmen who 
executed people or led them to their deaths, were from the same communities and 
were known by the victims. Mr. Pel, one of the key informants, was in this situation, 
because as a spy (chhlop) he was responsible for bringing victims to the prison to be 
executed. This ‘”intimate” crime leaves particularly deep marks, both individually and 
collectively, weakening the regulatory foundations of society’ (Pouligny, Chesterman 
and Schnabel 2007: 7).  
The Offenses  
The role of perpetrators, both in the past and present, and the context in which 
offenses occurred, are important factors in the process of and degree of reconciliation 
achieved. In order to develop a reconciliation policy or to deal with the process of 
reconciliation, these factors can be further subdivided as follows: the type and gravity 
of the offense, and the motives (Huyse 2003: 67, 72). Youk Chhang, the director of the 
DC-Cam, wrote in the preface of a book of stories of young KR perpetrators that they 
were willing to testify, and such truth-telling was the only way to achieve reconciliation 




discuss the past, especially their role in any atrocities. The notable exception is the KR 
leader known as Duch (whose full name is Kaing Guek Eav) who has revealed at least 
some of his role in the infamous S-21 prison and torture centre (Doherty 2009; Kea 
2009). While Duch has apologized several times for the deaths that occurred under his 
watch and taken responsibility for them, he has not admitted to direct killing. The three 
other senior leaders indicted by the tribunal, in spite of evidence to the contrary have 
not admitted to any direct involvement in crimes. Although they are not on trial, some 
of the surviving prison guards have been interviewed publically several times and have 
been interviewed in a film.11 Several have admitted to killing one or two persons or 
smaller numbers, rather than the hundreds of which they are accused (Sloan 2006). 
Some of the guards and staff of the prison have also spoken about their roles at the 
prison and killing fields.12
But in general, as the majority of former KR are reticent to speak publically 
about their role in any crimes, and there were few other witnesses to the crimes, it is 
difficult to link the gravity of offenses to individual perpetrators. Many former KR, 
including accused perpetrators, attempt to withdraw from society in order to hide their 
identities and any past deeds. Only one of the accused perpetrators I spoke to was 
willing to talk about his experiences during the KR regime.
  
13
                                               
11 See film by Rithy Panh S-21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine (2003). 
 The only other exception 
to the general reticence of perpetrators talking about past crimes was this indirect 
reference to bad deeds of the past made by the wife of an accused perpetrator: ‘I ask 
him to go to pagoda so he can release some bad deeds that he did before but he does 
 
12 I intentionally did not interview any of the famous Tuol Sleng prison guards who have 
confessed, partly because it was not the main purpose of my research, secondly because their 
story has been very widely reported, and thirdly because one often had to pay and to use 
various contacts to obtain such interviews which was not part of my research plan. 
 
13 This was Arn Chorn Pond, a Cambodian-American who often speaks publically about his 





not go. He does not go but he sometimes encourages his children to go to the pagoda’ 
(IV # 90).14
 A small minority of former KR respondents, primarily in the northwest 
provinces, still spoke proudly about the KR regime, its accomplishments, and 
nationalism, such as this former KR soldier:  
  
So, that is the good point of the KR that they could protect the Khmer people 
and keep the land of Khmer [from the Vietnamese]. So, the KR really could 
defend many thousands of people. Even they said that the KR is not good. In 
fact, they were good people that defended the native people and they cared 
about all things in Cambodia. So, the world also supported the KR at that time 
because the KR could defeat the strategy of Vietnamese. At that time, Thai 
begged the KR to help. If there were no KR, the Vietnamese would have fought 
over all the countries in Asia, especially with the Chinese (IV # 66). 
 
Although the respondent above did not admit to any particular individual 
offenses, he was proud of the regime and its accomplishments. He spoke loudly, in 
public (in a safe setting surrounded by his former KR colleagues) and flaunted his local 
power which was still intact. The two approaches taken by these above perpetrators 
(withdrawal versus the use of power) are described in the section below on perpetrator 
coping strategies. We now turn to individual crimes and the factors affecting victim and 
perpetrator relationships, starting with the type and gravity of individual offenses. 
 
Factors Affecting Victim-Perpetrator Relations  
This section reviews a variety of factors that can affect relationships between 
victims and perpetrators. The type and gravity of the offense as well as the motivation 
define different categories of perpetrators. Other factors include: classification as direct 
or indirect perpetrators, relationships before the KR period, frequency of contact, 
location and proximity, poverty, age, and ignorance. Both victims and perpetrators will 
                                               
14 However, in daily life in Cambodia, this statement is not necessarily an admission of guilt; it 




have to weigh these factors as they decide how to remember the past and frame the 
future.  
Type and Gravity of Offense 
Firstly, in considering the type and gravity of offenses, perpetrators can be 
grouped in various ways: is their guilt criminal, political, or moral? Let us consider the 
criminal versus moral question. There are thousands of perpetrators with criminal guilt 
in Cambodia who have committed crimes that could be brought in front of a court of 
law. The most clear criminal offenses include the planning or ordering of others to be 
killed, killing with their own hands, beating, torturing, or otherwise injuring others. A 
handful of senior leaders (four) are being tried in front of the ECCC, accused of 
planning these and other crimes. However, many people (former KR and victims alike) 
were put into the difficult situation of the moral offense of being asked to accuse others 
(often ‘new’ people) of various offenses (sometimes wrongly), and deaths and injuries 
have resulted. Many former KR were also involved in economic crimes of taking 
victims’ belongings and property. Other moral offenses occurred for large numbers of 
people who stood by (for various reasons) while others were killed or injured in front of 
them. 
The gravity of the offense is an important factor in how the victims view the 
perpetrators and this affects how the reconciliation process proceeds. In general most 
respondents divided former KR into categories depending upon the severity of the 
crimes they had committed and with how much cruelty – this resulted in a certain 
degree of guilt perceived: (1) serious - those who were very cruel and committed 
serious crimes, often killing large numbers of people; (2) moderate - those who 
committed crimes but only under orders or who were naively ignorant; (3) minor - 




Amongst perpetrators who committed serious crimes of the first category, many 
were killed in revenge immediately after the fall of the KR, or had fled to different parts 
of Cambodia. Perpetrators in the second grouping (those who were seen to commit 
‘moderate’ crimes) have been received with a variety of reactions from victims, ranging 
from revenge, to ostracism, to acceptance: these reactions will be described in the 
next chapter. Most of those in the third category of minor crimes have been 
reintegrated into their communities to a greater or lesser degree.15
1: The Khmer Rouge ran away, and then came back because they are the 
children of villagers in this village. They were Khmer Rouge but they are not 
cruel so the people did not get angry and the Vietnamese also forgave them 
too. 
 For example, in this 
small group discussion, the two participants (1 and 2) noted that perpetrators who 
were not ‘so cruel’, i.e., who had committed less serious offenses, could return to the 
village: 
2: They ran because they were afraid themselves. No one tried to kill them, 
such as Vietnamese and government soldiers who in fact called them to come 
back, but they were afraid so they ran away and, after they knew that we would 
not kill them, they came back and surrendered. 
1: They came back because Vietnamese soldiers called them back and they 
did not kill them so the lower Khmer Rouge came back and they gave them 
rice, farm, and land (IV # 16). 
Motivation  
As noted above, perpetrators can also be categorised according to their 
motivation for committing offences. Was it because they were ordered to do so and, if 
so, were they afraid for their own lives? Did they take initiative and enjoy killing others? 
Did they do it for community gain or self-interest? Although only a handful of former KR 
have admitted any direct guilt at all, most former KR who were involved in the 
movement have claimed that they were under orders and living in fear of their lives (Ea 
and Sim 2001). KR cadre and youth were often forced to kill others to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the revolution.  
                                               
15 These delineations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 on revenge, as victims went 
through a decision-making process as to whether or not to take revenge: see victim decision-




Many respondents spoke of how ‘cruel’ (kach or sahav) the perpetrators were, 
which was closely related to the motivation of the person, or whether the person was 
perceived as doing these acts by choice or not. Although this research did not 
specifically examine the motives of the perpetrators (few perpetrators admitted 
committing crimes at all much less speak about their motives), victims often interpreted 
motivations of former KR and could consider some motivations as mitigating factors 
(see below). Etcheson also noted that lower-level perpetrators were more easily 
accepted when victims could see they acted under coercion or ignorance (2005b: 
219). However, this understanding can go only so far. In situations of mass violence, 
many offenders deny any wrongdoing at all, and say they were only following orders. 
Huyse notes that perpetrators may also claim to be victims, blaming ideological 
indoctrination of ‘the system’, and this claim of victimhood can then be used as a way 
of ‘escaping guilt, shame, or responsibility’ (Huyse 2003: 62). This denial and 
avoidance is not usually a productive route to reconciliation.  
 In one community a victim stated that he was living in close proximity to former 
KR perpetrators who had done cruel things to him in his daily life. At the same time, he 
was able to acknowledge that those former KR did not join by choice, so he was able 
to justify their involvement. In this narrative the victim, a farmer (1) was sitting next to a 
UN/ NGO worker (2 - Mr. Khin, one of the key informants of this study), and they 
openly discussed a former KR perpetrator (and neighbour) who had been sitting 
nearby before the interview started.  
2: There are only the lower leaders around here; there are not any top leaders. 
These lower leaders had arrested and beat me, but later on, here [He pointed 
to a house near his house] we could not put the punishment to them because 
they were ordered from the top leaders. The top leaders ordered them to cut off 
the hands of the people who stole rice. Now, there are many cruel persons in 
this village. I was beaten and tied up by them. If children stole rice, the spies 
(chhlop) arrested them, and beat some of them until they were unconscious. 
One man [cruel perpetrator] lives to the south of my house. 
1: He did this because he was hungry. That man used to be the KR too. [He 




2: At that time, everybody was the Khmer Rouge because even if we did not 
want to be the KR, we would die . . . if we were against them, we would be 
killed (IV # 103). 
 
As this victim understood that the motivation of the perpetrator was to avoid 
being killed himself, the victim was better able to develop empathy and live peacefully 
with his neighbour. We turn next to the emotion of fear as another factor related to 
motivation. 
Fear 
The amount of fear felt by both the victim and the perpetrator can influence the 
type of relationship and the amount of reconciliation. The greater the fear (on the side 
of either victim or perpetrator) is, the less chance of a positive relationship. In a survey 
done by Jansen, many interviewees assumed that many former KR might be afraid to 
testify as witnesses before the ECCC, because they would be afraid that victims would 
resent and discriminate against them (2006: 32-33). Several respondents spoke of the 
fear that accused perpetrators and former KR must live with, and some of the accused 
perpetrators I spoke with expressed that fear. In order to move forward, safety and 
security are important factors such that the victims are not afraid of a return to the 
period of violence and perpetrators are not afraid of revenge. Once fear has lessened, 
then the task of reconciliation can occur: trauma healing, building trust and confidence, 
and finally development of empathy. This issue of fear is explored more deeply in the 
next chapter in the context of community reconciliation.  
Community Population 
 As will be explored further in the next chapter on community reconciliation, an 
important factor in victim-perpetrator relationships is the village population statistics – 
the percentage of victims, perpetrators, and former KR and ‘base’ people. Another 




involved in crimes. In most cases, minority populations (whether they were victims, 
perpetrators, or former KR) in general expressed more fear than majority populations. 
Frequency of Contact 
Frequency of contact between victim and perpetrator is an important factor in 
reconciliation. In some cases if people never meet, they can put the past out of mind. 
However, if often faced with a former perpetrator, visions of the past may interfere 
more often with daily life and may force people to deal with the past more than they 
wish. Many of the victim respondents stated they never saw the most serious 
perpetrators again, as some were killed by revenge killings, and the rest ran away. In 
the case of perpetrators who committed less serious crimes, several victims reported 
meeting them only occasionally, such as by chance on the road, or at social occasions 
in the village.16 Another small group of victims had by chance met a perpetrator (who 
had committed more serious crimes) in passing once or twice since the KR regime.17 
In only two of the 134 interviews did people report seeing perpetrators daily.18
Proximity 
 
Also impacting on processes of reconciliation in addition to frequency of 
contact is the degree of the physical distance between victims and perpetrators 
(Kriesberg 2001: 49–52). If parties never have any contact, how can they reconcile? 
On the other hand, if there are power differentials between them when they do meet, 
the victim can also feel doubly disempowered. Proximity and integration are also 
closely related to the factor of geography, as the physical contours of the environment 
and living conditions can serve either to separate or facilitate contact and reconciliation 
(Bloomfield 2003: 47). Other geographical concerns occur at the village level in 
                                               
16 This group included most of the victim inhabitants of Southwest-1 and Southwest-2, and 
many of those living in Northwest-4. 
 
17 Interview numbers 1, 31, 46, 59, 83, 98, 101, and 108.  
 




Cambodia, such as the location of houses in relationship to each other and who lives 
in them, and the location and proximity of community structures such as Buddhist 
temples.  
Many perpetrators fled their home villages where they carried out atrocities. 
Most victims interviewed assumed that the more responsible perpetrators who 
survived are living in distant areas controlled by the former KR. Thus the distance 
between these accused perpetrators and their former villages is very far, both 
physically and mentally. Victims assumed that the perpetrators are afraid to return.  
Poverty, Age, and Ignorance 
 Besides location, poverty, age, and ignorance are also important factors 
affecting victim-perpetrator relationships. Many of the informants spoke with regret and 
anger about the KR regime’s selection of ignorant uneducated people as local level 
leaders. However, this tactic of selection by the KR did not always extend to anger 
against individual perpetrators and instead became a mitigating factor. This 
respondent in a small group interview felt that the accused perpetrator’s lack of 
education was a mitigating factor in his crimes: ‘He lives near here, just two houses 
from here across the street. They have stopped saying anything bad against him. All 
those killers, they couldn’t read at all, so it was easy to make them kill people. And it 
was the rule of Pol Pot to only choose people who never went to school to be leaders’ 
(IV # 1). 
 Another mitigating factor is the age of the alleged perpetrator at the time of the 
past events. Many respondents still expressed resentment that their oppressors were 
often young people, which is not surprising given the great emphasis that is placed 
upon age, wisdom, and seniority in Cambodia’s hierarchical social structure. Although 
they were angry at the individual young perpetrators, they were primarily angry at the 




The next example illustrates the range of factors that can affect current 
relationships, including gravity of offense, motivation of perpetrator, frequency of 
contact, location and proximity, fear, and community population. Two women 
(respondents 1 and 2) stated they were still living amongst former KR and were still in 
fear of their lives, and felt resentment against the discrimination they had suffered as 
‘new’ people during the KR period. This exchange shows how, in some communities, 
anger and fear are close beneath the surface. They dared to speak out at a public 
forum, far from their homes, to a foreigner, but stated they were afraid to speak up at 
home. While respondent 1 seemed to understand that the perpetrator was following 
orders and would otherwise be killed, both respondents were still afraid of this 
perpetrator as he still used his local power effectively:  
2: I know that a perpetrator is in front of my house. But I dare not to do anything 
against him because I am afraid of the law. 
1: I don't want to do anything against him either, because at that time, he just 
followed the orders of the higher leaders. 
2: When my brother was angry, he said that he could not do anything even if 
the killer was in front of him. He lives alone; he always says that he lost not 
only the country, but also his parents and relatives.  
1: Here, most of the members of my family were killed because there were a lot 
of KR families at that place which my family was sent to during the KR regime.  
2: They [perpetrators in front of my house] did not ever apologize. The chief of 
the prison said that if such a regime happens again, he will destroy all of us. He 
really said that. I never tell a lie, I dare to swear in front of the guardian spirit 
(neak ta).  
1: He is now just a normal person without any high position, but at that time he 
was a perpetrator and he said that if the regime happened again, he would kill 
all of us. He said like that and he is not afraid of the law. They are not afraid 
because they give them the rights now. Even today, when I go back to my 
village, I dare not to say anything about the ECCC because most of my 
villagers are the former KR and we fear that the former KR will hurt us (IV # 
19).  
 
 This quote shows how victims weigh different factors in considering the past 
and how to deal with the future. We now turn to how perpetrators deal with their past, 





Coping Strategies of Perpetrators 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the range of coping strategies that 
perpetrators demonstrate as they attempt to integrate back into their communities. 
Through observations made by victims, or from direct observations of accused 
perpetrators, eight coping strategies were identified: (1) flight; (2) withdrawal; (3) 
denial; (4) use power; (5) rationalization; (6) do good deeds; (7) show respect and 
remorse; and (8) apology. These strategies are illustrated in figure 5.1., as they 
correspond to and overlap with the various categories of coexistence. The Figure 
shows the progression of reconciliation and relationship, from conflict and revenge on 
the left, where flight is the predominant coping strategy, towards deep reconciliation on 
the far right, where perpetrators cope by doing good deeds, expressing remorse, and 
apologizing. The first five strategies are more negative strategies, not necessarily 
leading towards reconciliation or peaceful relationships, while the last three strategies 
are more positive, and can lead towards reconciliation. The next section below reviews 
the details of the eight coping strategies. 
 
 





 The first strategy is flight, which in the case of Cambodia has probably often 
included a change of identity. Many respondents felt that if perpetrators had committed 
numerous bad deeds they would feel obliged to run away, and most assumed (or knew 
through relatives) that they had run to either former KR areas (in the northwest or 
north) or overseas. This survivor knew the exact location of several of the former KR 
perpetrators, as he had met them when the military forces integrated: ‘The chief of the 
commune was not good at all. He was from far away, Kampong Speu . . . I met him, 
while he surrendered’ (IV # 31). In many cases when the accused perpetrator had run 
away, they would sometimes come back some time later with varying results. 
Depending upon such factors as the severity of the crimes committed and other 
mitigating factors, the return would have resulted in a revenge killing, or various forms 
of coexistence – these issues are explored in the next chapters. We now turn to the 
tactic of withdrawal as a coping strategy used by perpetrators. 
2. Withdrawal  
 Withdrawal is a common method of conflict avoidance used in Cambodian 
society described in Chapter 2. For accused perpetrators living amongst their former 
victims, this was found to be a common mode of survival (though often in conjunction 
with good deeds and religious acts). For example, the accused perpetrators in 
Southwest-2 who were described as ‘islands alone’, living in a state of shallow 
coexistence, were in a minority amongst a majority of victims, and withdrew from the 
rest of the community.19
                                               
19 See Chapter 4, pages 95-96. 
 For example, key informant Kong stated that her husband, 
accused perpetrator Pel, did not attend ceremonies at the temple because he needed 
to tend the cows. She said she encouraged him to go to the temple but he refused (IV 




 Amongst those perpetrators who have stayed in their communities, withdrawal 
may take the form of hiding their identities – or at least not publicizing their pasts. The 
identity change can come in the form of a name change and not talking about the past, 
to a change of personality (for example from a strong, powerful KR commander to a 
poor, subdued farmer). For example Pel, widely accused by members of his 
community of bringing people to the local killing field, seemed to have become a quiet, 
shy, humble, and scared person. Several villagers seemed to pity him, partly because 
he was seen as doing these things to survive, and partly because he was poor, 
withdrawn, and depressed. 
 One young UN/NGO worker who was born in the refugee camps suggested 
that the wealth of the former KR had allowed them to withdraw, hiding behind their 
wealth: 
Close to my house there is one KR family living. I don’t know any others who 
have come to live in my village. They are rich, have a big house, and a lot of 
land. We don’t have much contact with them. The husband is a military officer 
and he married a woman I knew, after his first wife died. She was divorced and 
had a small business in [one village] and they met there. It is possible that 
others are around here too, but they hide their identity. These neighbours hide 
themselves; maybe they feel they are outsiders. But their kids go to school, and 
mix normally with the others. I don’t think the other kids at school know about 
their parents though (IV # 7). 
 
 Closely related to withdrawal is denial, as those who withdraw often also deny 
any wrongdoing.  
3. Denial 
 Denial is a common coping strategy in many post-mass violence situations, 
and most of the accused perpetrators in this study denied directly, or indirectly any 
involvement in crimes. An example of a former KR soldier using denial to deal with 
victims’ (indirect) accusations of his role in the KR came up during a focus group 




want to know about the KR then ask Mr. Kuy’ (IV # 88). Later during our discussion 
with this KR soldier he said: 
When they were talking today at the temple and they said that if you want to 
know who killed who, ask me. But for me, I never did anything bad against the 
people because I was fighting against the Vietnamese at the border so the 
people in this commune love me and pity me. They do not hate me. I have one 
habit that I did not kill hostages when we arrested them during the war. I often 
released them secretly, and those men still live in this village now’ (IV # 89).  
 
 Since there was no investigation of this former KR soldier’s situation, and no 
validation of his statements, it is not possible to speak about the ‘truth’ of what 
happened in the past. If it were true that he was not involved in killing of civilians 
during the KR regime (versus killing Vietnamese soldiers which he had admitted), then 
this sort of stereotyping would undoubtedly be very frustrating. Many former KR suffer 
from discrimination due to their involvement with the KR in the past. In addition, this 
former KR soldier also considered himself a victim due to a physical disability that 
occurred during the war. On the other hand if he did commit crimes, then he would no 
doubt be eager to proclaim his innocence and deny his past. 
 A more indirect form of denial occurs when perpetrators try to fit into a 
community without acknowledging their past. This husband and wife, former KR 
cadres who had become victims of the regime, observed how the accused 
perpetrators did not fully withdraw from society but indirectly denied involvement: 
‘Husband: Both good and bad people go to the pagoda. But I rarely see them when I 
go to the pagoda. Wife: They go the pagoda to fit in with the other villagers and to hide 
their bad deeds’ (IV # 46).  
 The use of denial is forceful coping strategy, as it must take courage to face 
one’s victims and deny that one has committed any crimes. Another forceful (and also 




4. Use Power 
 Perpetrators may use their power and influence in the community to keep a 
distance from other community members and maintain a low profile. Or, they may use 
their power and influence in more public ways. I found both examples amongst the 
respondents’ accounts. One of the accused perpetrators seemed to bask in his 
reflected power from relatives who were important commune officials and moved 
around the community with relative impunity (IV # 92). Another example of the use of 
power and politics was described by this former KR cadre respondent who spoke 
about a well-known accused perpetrator who had resettled in the US: ‘He just came 
back. He dares to go anywhere and contacts with the police and authority, with big 
powerful people’ (IV # 93). 
 A UN/NGO worker related a story of two major perpetrators in his village. One 
perpetrator (who had been an Achar, or Buddhist layman, before the war) had been 
killed by a mob of sixty women during the fall of the KR regime. On the other hand, 
another perpetrator was still alive and involved with local politics – this he found 
inexplicable: ‘The CPP tried to nominate this person as the commune council 
candidate. My brother tried very hard to convince others that it should be impossible 
for this man to be a commune council leader, because of his background as a KR 
perpetrator, but my brother was very surprised that [the perpetrator] had strong 
support from the people’ (IV # 126). 
 As can be seen from these illustrations, the use of power can be quite effective 
in protecting accused perpetrators so that they are able to re-enter society. This 
strategy may allow an interim period for victims and perpetrators to face each other 
after mass violence, so that other processes of reconciliation to build relationship could 




ways for accused perpetrators to reduce their own and other people’s sense of their 
culpability. 
5. Rationalization 
 Few of the accused perpetrators or former KR respondents tried to rationalize 
their past actions directly, but when they did they usually invoked reasons of fear of 
being killed, or their need to save Cambodia from being overtaken by the Vietnamese. 
One example is in this quote from a former KR cadre who was explaining to his 
relatives why he did not help them: ‘And I told him, it was even difficult for me to 
defend my own head, so it would stay attached to my body. You know at that time, it 
was like that: no one could protect anyone else’ (IV # 63). In another interview a former 
KR soldier rationalized his involvement in the regime: ‘I told them if the Vietnamese 
were invading us, we would maybe lose our territory so we joined the struggle. . . (IV # 
61). Rationalization could be interpreted as a neutral coping strategy, as real 
pressures did lie upon perpetrators insofar as they did risk being killed if they failed to 
follow orders. However, that does not absolve them from responsibility. We now move 
to more positive coping strategies of good deeds, showing respect and remorse, and 
apology. 
6. Good Deeds 
 As a way to silently acknowledge past misdeeds, accused or known 
perpetrators may attempt to perform good deeds in order to increase their chances of 
acceptance into the community, as well as attempting to obtain an improved karma 
and better status in the next life. Good deeds can come in many forms, but are often 
done through religious actions in an attempt to make merit at the temple. Another way 
of doing good deeds is through helping others in the community. First we will examine 




 Making merit can be done in many ways: attending the religious days at 
Buddhist temples, donating money or goods to the temple, or serving as a Buddhist 
layman (Achar). Becoming a monk is the most significant act one can do in order to 
obtain the highest merit (Komai 1997: 161; O’Leary 2006: 20). Several respondents 
brought up the way some perpetrators had become religious figures in part to atone for 
their sins. One of the producers of the film Deacon of Death (van den Berg and van de 
Put 2004) commented about the accused perpetrator highlighted in the film, Mr. 
Karoby who became an Achar dealing with death rituals:  
 For us as outsiders, we thought this was something that we would have 
invented or was a bit over the top, or ridiculous. Mr. Karoby at the time of the 
KR, was the security chief, he was the literal deacon of death, now he was the 
ceremonial deacon of death. For us as Westerners this was very hard to 
understand, the same guy who had sent so many people to their deaths was 
now responsible for their cremation to make sure that everything goes right. 
The response was exactly that this was his way for therapy, this is the way he 
tries to repent (IV # 59). 
 
One foreign-educated UN/NGO worker brought up the issue of gaining respect 
and thereby gaining acceptance or integration through religious good deeds: 
You know during the Cambodian traditional ceremonies, especially when 
people meet together like Bun Pchum Ben or Khmer New Year, I observed in 
my villages, I always observe there are many different Buddhist laymen that 
come from other villages and some of them testify that they were quite strong 
people in the KR period. And they became a Buddhist layman and they 
become a very good person in the temple and they work as the layman so 
other people respect them a lot (IV # 126).20
 
 
Another foreign-educated UN/NGO worker also spoke of this phenomenon of 
using religion to repent for one’s sins, but in this case it was a father who brought his 
son to become a monk:  
In preparation for a proposal we were writing, we convened a group of monks. 
Monks who came, when they trust you, they can really talk. What in Buddhism 
can we use to deal with reconciliation, to give perpetrators a chance? Buddhist 
teachings say if you do wrong you must pay for it. There is one story in 
Buddhism about a family with a father who commits crimes. His son becomes a 
monk, in dedicating this work he can relieve the sins of the father. One monk 
then told us that his father was a KR leader. After the peace accords, the first 
                                               
20 Bun Pchum Ben is the Ceremony of the Ancestors when Cambodians travel to temples to 




thing, the father took his son to be a monk - the monk then had a mission to 
relieve the father from his sins (IV # 21). 
 
 Another example that was raised by several respondents was former 
perpetrators who became Christians, presumably in an attempt to escape their bad 
karma and to be forgiven by a Christian god. When the accused former KR leader 
Duch was found living near the Thai-Cambodian border, there were several news 
articles claiming that he had become a Christian in order to escape punishment in the 
next life for bad deeds in the past (Smith 2007). Several respondents spoke about this 
view of religion also: ‘This guy killed not only my father but also a lot of people and that 
is why he became Christian, I think’ (IV # 6).  
 Besides religious acts, other ways to do good deeds is to help the community 
at large. Many of the religious acts above, such as becoming an Achar or donating to 
the local temple, also often assist the community at large. One respondent seemed to 
be trying to assist the community as a means of acceptance, without religious 
overtones: this former KR soldier asked me repeatedly for assistance to lobby on his 
behalf with a local NGO to include community members from his village in various 
training sessions run by local NGOs. He tried to use power and respect gained from 
his association with the NGOs to help others in his community and thus improve his 
standing and prestige. This means of seeking acceptance in the community is also 
related to the next category, of showing respect. 
7. Show Respect, Show Remorse, and Accept 
Responsibility 
 In an ideal process of reconciliation, perpetrators would tell the truth; engage 
directly with and listen to victims; acknowledge harm done; show sorrow, guilt, 
remorse, and shame; and ultimately feel empathy (Huyse 2003: 76-7). Etcheson found 




were welcomed (2005b: 217-8). This UN/NGO worker had lived in the northwest in a 
war-stricken area and spoke about a perpetrator who showed his respect and remorse 
through his behaviour:  
In 1979 and 1980 it was still fresh just after the liberation and he dared not go 
anywhere. And he bowed to everybody! Including to people like me or others 
who knew he had caused several people to be killed. He just stayed quiet and 
made no reaction. He became a totally different person. During the KR time he 
was a very active, powerful person. But when the Vietnamese came he 
became a rabbit (IV # 118). 
 
 This description of becoming like a rabbit is similar to the way that Mr. Pel, the 
accused perpetrator from Southwest-2 acted as well. The bowed head and quiet 
demeanour is typical of Cambodians paying obeisance to those in higher social 
positions. This type of exaggerated behaviour may serve to mollify angry victims in 
early stages of post-mass violence.  
 Another accused perpetrator, Mr. Tang, spoke frankly about his early surrender 
to the Vietnamese authorities after the KR period. He seemed to feel that since he 
voluntarily surrendered and had not run away this was evidence of his remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility: ‘In late 1978 and early 1979, the other KR cadre ran to 
the forest but I did not. I was in the village and I surrendered to the Vietnamese 
soldiers. I surrendered to the Vietnamese but others ran away, but I did not. They said 
then that I was no longer accused!’ (IV # 92). 
8. Apology 
 While few of this study’s respondents reported confessions, apologies, or 
accepting apologies directly between victims and perpetrators, apologies are important 
ways for perpetrators to cope with their pasts. These will be discussed in Chapter 8, as 





This section on coping strategies has explored eight strategies that may be 
used by perpetrators to deal with the post-conflict period. The five more negative 
strategies of flight, withdrawal, denial, use of power and politics, and rationalization 
were seen more commonly in this research. Strategies six and seven, the positive 
methods of doing good deeds and showing respect, were also seen, but less 
frequently. The last strategy, of apology, was relatively rare and will be discussed in 
the next chapter, when we move to examine in more detail the nature of relationships 
within the communities studied. The next chapter moves from the individual 






CHAPTER 6 – Return to Community 
 
As a perpetrator returns home after committing crimes, how do victims 
respond? The last chapter reviewed factors affecting victim-perpetrator relations and 
perpetrator coping strategies: we now turn to victims’ reactions to receiving those 
perpetrators back into communities. Firstly, a scheme is presented to describe victims’ 
varying degrees of acceptance of the perpetrators (ranging from revenge to non-
acceptance, partial acceptance, and then full acceptance). These degrees of 
acceptance correspond to different levels of community reconciliation (surface, 
shallow, moderate, and deep) that were presented in brief in Chapter 4 and are 
illustrated in figure 6.1. below. Secondly, factors related to victims’ acceptance of 
perpetrators are reviewed. Thirdly, the model of coexistence first introduced in Chapter 
4 is expanded upon, through examples from the four case study communities, giving 
voice to Cambodians in rural areas who are faced with the issues of reconciliation 
every day.  
The degree of acceptance, and thus also reconciliation, is influenced by the 
behaviour of the perpetrator in the form of the coping strategies chosen by the 
perpetrator as discussed in the last chapter.1 For example, when a perpetrator does 
good deeds or shows respect, the victim may be more likely to accept them. As 
discussed in the last chapter, there are additional factors affecting victim and 
perpetrator relations, which also relate to the degrees of acceptance.2
                                               
1 The perpetrator coping strategies include: (1) flight, (2) withdrawal, (3) denial, (4) use power 
and politics, (5) rationalization, (6) good deeds, (7) show respect, and (8) apology. 
 Additional 
factors are discussed in a later section of this chapter, as factors which affect the 
 
2 The factors affecting victim and perpetrator relations include: type and gravity of offense; 
motivation; fear; community population; frequency of contact; location and proximity; and 





degree of acceptance of perpetrators by victims. The interplay between different 
factors can result in different outcomes of coexistence. For example, victims’ acts of 
welcome and their ability to empathize with the perpetrator’s situation and understand 
mitigating factors may influence the coping strategies of perpetrators: as former KR 
are welcomed into the community, they may be more inclined to talk about and explain 
the past. This section on a model of acceptance concludes with a decision-making tree 
that summarizes the process a victim might use to decide to seek revenge, or decide 
to accept a perpetrator, and to what degree. 
 
A Model of Acceptance 
In a reconciliation process, the end goal is mutual trust and mutual 
acceptance.3 Kelman suggested that ‘mutual acceptance of the other’s identity and 
humanity’ is the key element of reconciliation (2008: 16).4 In this chapter I focus upon 
the victim’s journey from revenge towards full acceptance of the perpetrator. The 
victim makes decisions along the way, depending upon various factors including the 
behaviour of the perpetrators. This section presents a model of acceptance with four 
stages of acceptance from the viewpoint of the victim, as they move from revenge, 
towards reconciliation. (1) Firstly, the extreme negative reaction is revenge, where 
victims seek to eliminate the perpetrator by killing them.5
                                               
3 Acceptance played a role in Lederach’s model of reconciliation, as he described mercy as 
including: compassion, acceptance and a new start, as well as forgiveness, support, and 
healing (1997: 31).  
 The next three reactions of 
victims towards perpetrators are then described: (2) non-acceptance, (3) partial 
acceptance and finally (4) full acceptance. These degrees of acceptance correlate to 
 
4 Due to time limitations, and a lack of data on the personal views of accused perpetrators, I am 
limiting my analysis to the acceptance of perpetrators by victims, and not the issues of mutual 
acceptance, or acceptance from the view of the perpetrator. 
 




degrees of coexistence from surface to shallow to moderate to deep. These 
relationships are illustrated in the diagram in figure 6.1. below. 
 
Figure 6.1. Model of Acceptance 
Although the last chapter discusses extensively the coping strategies adopted 
by perpetrators in their efforts to regain traction in society, these coping strategies 
must also be explicitly mentioned as important factors that victims weigh when 
determining whether or not they will accept the perpetrator back into society. When 
perpetrators make efforts to appease their former victims, such as doing good deeds, 
showing respect or remorse to the victims (or even accepting responsibility) victims will 
be more inclined to accept them. Or, if perpetrators use power or politics, they may 
also be accepted by victims, but not willingly nor fully, only partially and with 
resentment, out of necessity.  
Another factor related to the behaviour of perpetrators includes the presence 
and status of surviving family members who had not been involved in crimes. In 
Southwest-1 several community members stated the perpetrator was accepted back to 
visit in spite of the fact that he killed many people, because his father was an Achar 
and a well-respected community member. Although his behaviour did not change, he 




demeanour of the individual perpetrators (humble, remorseful, or modest) could also 
be important factors. 
Although this chapter focuses primarily on how victims accept (or do not 
accept) perpetrators living back in their communities, as background I shall present a 
review of former KR memories of their initial return to their communities after the war.  
Welcoming Former KR into Community  
In general, former KR stated they were warmly welcomed home by their family 
members when they finally returned after the years of war and separation; the majority 
of them became nostalgic and smiling, recounting their emotional family reunions. All 
the former KR spoke of their happiness to be reunited with family members (who had 
often assumed they were dead). Some spoke about sharing experiences about their 
own suffering. Only a few admitted that they had been discriminated against because 
they had been with the KR.6
3: We had missed our parents because we had been separated for many 
years, some of us for ten years and some 20 years. So they did not hope that 
we would come back home. They thought that we were dead already. They 
had done burial ceremonies for us already! 
 This focus group discussion by former KR military and 
cadre (identified as respondents 1, 2, 3, and 5) provides some typical stories about 
how former KR were welcomed back into their home communities:  
1: We did not talk about the KR. We talked about our regret that we had been 
separated a long time, and we were happy that we could met family and 
friends. The soldiers from the government side welcomed us also, like we were 
in one family. They did not say that you were the KR or threaten us. They tried 
to protect us also. 
2: I left home when I was 12 years old. I was in the district children’s office in 
1974 and in 1975 they sent me to Phnom Penh to work as worker. When the 
Vietnamese troops fought in Phnom Penh, I did not know the way to go home 
so I ran with the KR here. I went home in 1996 and in 1993. They welcomed 
me like uncle just said, but some people did not like me because they had 
relatives who had died in the KR regime. But I had relatives who died during 
that time also because they accused me of living with the KR. I said that I did 
not know who killed who, but I did not know the way to go home and that is why 
                                               
6 Although, since most of these interviews were single interviews in shorter visits to the 






I was on the KR side. I told them that I did not know that the KR were killing 
people. I came to know about the killing of the KR period, only when we were 
fighting each other afterwards in the 1980s. I did not know, and I had no food 
and faced a lot of difficulties also!  
5: I went home in 1996, both the government and the people welcomed me 
because we had reintegrated already. They did not discriminate (reus aeng) 
against me. We have equal rights.  
1: I came here alone and my five brothers and sisters are living at my 
homeland so when I visited there we were happy and my neighbours also 
came to visit me also. I did not lose any relatives during the KR period. We had 
just been separated from each other for a very long time, so when we met, we 
hugged and cried. We were very excited. 
2: We had been separated for a long time. They got news that some people 
were living in USA. When they heard that I came back home, they came to visit 
me and they asked me about my experience in the KR time. I could not even 
sleep for the first week because they came to ask me both day and night. They 
thought that I already died because they put my name in the dead list. They 
asked me that Pol Pot did bad things to me or not? (IV # 61)7
 
 
The above focus group discussion provides several examples of how former 
KR perceived their return to home community -- with a mixture of joy, relief, and 
sadness, and also some discrimination. Now we turn to the viewpoint of the victims 
and the first step of the model of acceptance, where the most negative reaction to 
perpetrators is described: revenge. 
1. Revenge (Perpetrators Killed by Victims) 
In order to fully explore the process whereby a victim moves from revenge 
towards acceptance of perpetrators, I start with the most negative act possible – 
revenge. Although the details of revenge are the topic of the next chapter, to discuss a 
complete model of acceptance, revenge is also mentioned here. The following text box 





                                               











None of the respondents mentioned mitigating factors when it came to 
perpetrators who were seen as particularly cruel. Nor were perpetrator coping 
strategies such as the use of power or apology mentioned. Apparently, some crimes 
were seen as so heinous, certain perpetrators could not escape from revenge killings. 
Such factors as degree of suffering, trauma, religious beliefs, and those related to their 
desire for revenge will be addressed in the next chapter. I now turn to the second 
degree of non-acceptance.  
2. Non-Acceptance (Perpetrators Ostracized from Community) 
Non-acceptance can take several forms: ostracism, avoidance, disrespect, 
shaming, and denial. In the initial period immediately after the KR regime, revenge 
killings were common, but today, with the passage of time and a national-level 
integration process (Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ‘Win-Win’ Policy), this research found 
both revenge and total non-acceptance to be relatively rare. Few respondents 
described their attitudes towards former KR as entirely non-accepting. However, there 
were some exceptions described below. The way that victims dealt with this category 
of serious perpetrator as above, was by ostracizing and avoiding them. Victims went 
out of their way to avoid situations where they would meet perpetrators, or ignored 




(The ‘Who’)  
Former KR cadres or soldiers who were involved in killings and who were seen as 
particularly cruel or who had killed a large number of people 
  
(The Situation) 
 were usually described as being killed in revenge immediately during the 
fall of the KR, or 
 were sometimes reportedly killed when they dared return to the community 






Non-acceptance can also take the form of a victim withholding signs of respect 
that would normally be expected in the hierarchical Cambodian culture, or by publically 
shaming the perpetrator as a sign the perpetrator was not being accepted. The 
following is an example of non-acceptance of a perpetrator by a victim in the case of 
the film Deacon of Death (van den Berg and van de Put 2004) where a young woman 
was filmed meeting the former KR cadre she accused of killing her uncle. The 
following quote is from a person involved in the film production who described the non-
acceptance of a perpetrator as the victim shouting at him, accusing him of lying, and 
humiliating him in public (which is rarely observed in Cambodian society): 
During the filming, we were afraid of hand grenades [thrown by victims against 
the accused perpetrators] . . . .The concern that I had, looking at her face . . . I 
thought anything could happen! . . . At that very moment when he [Karoby, the 
accused perpetrator] keeps denying and then he says, ‘well okay, these were 
my subordinates who did it, not that I was doing it . . . they were doing it’ . . . 
Then she said ‘You are lying, you are a liar, you are in charge you were in 
charge, you are responsible!’... What she has done at that moment in her 
position as a younger woman, to an older man, who still is an Achar [Buddhist 
layman], she is telling him out loud in front of the cameras that he is a liar, and 
he has accepted that she is calling him a liar… You can’t go much further than 
this . . . it could lead to physical violence . . . and we did not want this. Karoby 
had been humiliated by her, and she knew it (IV # 58). 
 
In the above passage, the respondent pointed out the importance of status or 
hierarchical differences between victim and perpetrator, as the victim was younger 
than the accused perpetrator, and he had been working as an Achar in his community 
– these differences made her public accusations of him quite significant in the context 
of Cambodian society. Humiliation (as she and her family were humiliated by the KR) 
Non-Acceptance 
Former KR cadres or soldiers who were involved in killings or selection, and may 
have killed large numbers of people, but were ostracized (non-acceptance) rather 
than subjected to revenge killing: 
 
 but not seen as entirely cruel or evil, often through mitigating factors or 
personality 
 but have some form of protection through power or politics 




also played a role, as she now in turn tried to humiliate the accused perpetrator in 
public. The use of public shaming and humiliation are examples of non-acceptance, 
and non-reconciliation. 
Another example of non-acceptance is amongst those victims who were still 
living in fear, exemplified in the community case study Southwest-1 (surface 
coexistence). Two communities (one of victims and one of former KR) were living side 
by side in neighbouring villages, but had minimal contact and expressed a great deal 
of fear, anger, and even a desire for revenge. Hinton spoke about victims being ‘tied in 
a knot of malice’ to perpetrators (2005: 94-95). It is these victims in Southwest-1 who 
remained totally estranged, mistrustful, and in total non-acceptance of the perpetrators 
in the next village.  
Although the majority of respondents did not admit to continuing wishes for 
revenge, and only a small minority were non-accepting of accused perpetrators, a 
2009 survey of Cambodian attitudes found that the majority of interviewees still felt 
hatred towards the KR: 71 percent wanted to see the KR suffer; 37 percent wished to 
take revenge, and 40 percent said they would do so if they had the opportunity. Forty-
seven percent said they were uncomfortable living in the community with former KR; 
while 36 percent had forgiven them (Pham et al. 2009: 3). These statistics show quite 
high percentages of the Cambodian population still feeling anger and hatred towards 
former KR.  
3. Partial Acceptance (Perpetrators Living Separate Lives in 
Communities) 
In this category of partial acceptance, a wide variety of modalities of living may 
occur. These correspond with three types of coexistence: surface, shallow, and 
moderate. Partial acceptance could occur in many forms, from minimal social 




category of ‘partial acceptance’ is mainly defined by what it is not – it is not revenge or 







First I will describe some situations of partial acceptance through victims’ 
words, such as when victims are afraid, or when they perceive perpetrators as being 
respectful. I then elaborate on this category of ‘partial acceptance’ through the views of 
perpetrators, who described their feelings of being only partially accepted because 
they felt they are discriminated against in society. The first situation explains why 
victims are partially accepting of accused perpetrators, is when the victims are afraid.  
Victims Afraid 
 One of the main reasons there was partial acceptance of perpetrators by 
victims was fear. Sometimes this fear was related to past events (during the KR 
period), but sometimes the past events translated into current events. Current events 
related to politics can be used as a tool of power by either victims, perpetrators, or 
both. This respondent talked about the person who killed his father, and how that 
person now lords over the population, as he still has power. He talked of him as a 
‘scary person’, in other words he is still afraid of him: 
Now if I have to go back there I don’t want to see him [the former KR accused 
perpetrator]. Now he is still alive, he is a member of the commune council for 
the Sam Rainsy Party. I never went to meet him. He would broadcast to 
everyone that they are threatening him. No one likes him but they voted for his 
party. He is a very stupid KR. He escaped though, he was very lucky, many 
were chopped up in 1979. He was moving around, and I don’t know exactly 
when he came back. I was very surprised though when he inaugurated a 
medical centre. No, he never apologized. He doesn’t want to talk to anyone; he 
Partial Acceptance 
Former KR cadres or soldiers who may have been involved in killings, selection, or 
other crimes both minor and major but: 
 
 were clearly seen to be reluctant to carry out the duties 
 were seen as heroes for fighting against the Vietnamese 
  had demonstrated remorse through becoming active in temples, or 
through other actions and good deeds 
 were in positions of power (through personal wealth, family ties, or ties to 




is a very scary person. Nobody ever dares to talk about him because he is 
involved in politics (IV # 84). 
 
Perpetrators Use Avoidance and Live in Fear 
Several victim respondents assumed that perpetrators used the coping strategy 
of avoidance and lived in fear, which also defines a state of partial acceptance. As the 
victim and perpetrator do not meet or discuss the past, the assumption that the 
perpetrator is living in fear may make the victim feel that the perpetrator regrets his 
past acts, but the situation is still not conducive to interaction. This passage quoting 
two friends who are victims, speaking about the perpetrators in the neighbouring 
village who have never acknowledged, confessed, or apologized and who they 
assume live in fear: ‘No, they never confessed or apologized. They are trying to avoid 
us, even their children. They avoid us because our country has laws now and they are 
afraid in the future there is somebody [who] will search for them’ (IV # 99). 
Perpetrators Show Respect and Do Good Deeds  
 On the other hand, perpetrators can use positive coping strategies of doing 
good deeds and showing respect, which are reviewed in Chapter 5 (see page 129-
132). The process of an offender giving respect to a former victim, as well as 
promising non-repetition is an important part of reconciliation and restoring 
relationships (Huyse 2003: 24; Kriesberg 2001: 48; Rigby 2006b: 8). Very few 
respondents mentioned explicitly perpetrators showing respect; for example this 
villager from Southwest-2: ‘No, no perpetrators ever confessed. I used to be angry but 
I see that perpetrator did not do bad things anymore and he respects me. That is why I 
don't get angry now’ (IV # 91). 
 In Southwest-1, quotes from an elderly couple show the nuances of community 
reconciliation. The husband had been a KR cadre in the early ‘liberation’ period (before 




disrobe). The wife felt angry at the KR leaders who made her and her husband suffer. 
At the same time the couple could understand the KR leader was under orders, and 
they felt he had reformed, did good things, and had ‘changed his heart’: 
Wife: His house is over there and near here. I meet him when they invite me to 
a village ceremony. I never go to visit him. Or I meet him when I go to the 
pagoda. Yes, I talk with him normally. I don't know what else to do because [his 
abuse of me] happened already. 
Husband: I just talk with him normally because they ordered him at that time 
but now he stopped his bad behaviour already. 
Wife: He changed his heart now. He does good things so I do good things back 
to him (IV # 46). 
 
In deciding how to relate to perpetrators, victims take various factors into 
account, including the severity of the perpetrators’ guilt. 
Victims’ Perceptions of Perpetrators’ Guilt 
One factor influencing the degree to which perpetrators are accepted into their 
communities is how the victims perceive the guilt of the perpetrators, including the type 
and gravity of the offense.8
We don't blame them [the former KR cadre] because some of them are victims 
too; they are not all bad people. Because when we lived in this village, they 
shared with me their views, and sometimes they talked to me and told me that I 
had to be careful. They said ‘you have to wait one day and you had to remain 
hopeful.’ He talked to me and told me that I should not rely on anybody, and 
that I should pay attention and respect Angkar (IV # 132). 
 A village chief from Southwest-1 related perpetrators’ 
cruelty as directly related to the degree of acceptance by victims: ‘Those perpetrators 
who were not so cruel, they can live together still. In our village there are no 
perpetrators, but some former KR are staying close to here in Village [B]. Those who 
were not so cruel have been able to live there until today’ (IV # 29). Another victim 
recalled how one former KR cadre advised him how to behave so that he would not be 
killed and thus felt accepting towards him: 
                                               




So even though this former KR cadre had committed crimes, the victim was 
able to show empathy towards him as he had been kind.9
A group that appeared to be more easily accepted back into community than 
former KR cadres was former KR soldiers. They were often perceived as being in a 
special category of either committing lesser crimes, or in some cases as being heroes 
for defending the nation. For example this non-KR village chief living in a mixed former 
KR area stated: 
  
In fact, the reintegrated people did not know about the bad situation in the KR 
time. I always asked them about this. ‘We were fighting in the front line but our 
relatives in the back line were killed too,’ they said. They did not know at all 
until later when they saw the real picture, and found out that they had been 
involved in a struggle to kill their own relatives! They told me this when I asked 
them (IV # 113).  
 
 Several other respondents said the same thing about their views of the KR 
soldiers, that they were fighting far away, or were just following orders so they were 
not to blame. This government official who had been a victim and lost his parents in 
Southwest-2 said about another informant: 
[Kuy] did not do bad things to the people. Because he was a soldier, he was far 
way and so the people do not hold any grudge against him and they let him live 
easily. Another reason is that he was a soldier and he did not have power to 
make decisions, it was up to their chiefs so we don’t blame him (IV # 33). 
 
 The above factors (fear, respect, and weighing of guilt) are all considerations 
taken by the victims, as they decide whether or not to accept a perpetrator back into 
community. We now turn to the views of perpetrators, and their feelings of being 
discriminated against. 
Discrimination 
Discrimination is an important facet of how the category of ‘partial acceptance’ 
is played out in the community. In the section above on welcoming former KR into 
                                               





community, many respondents living in the northwest areas denied any discrimination. 
However, the former KR and accused perpetrators in two case studies (Southwest-1 
and Southwest-2) felt discriminated against (although this discrimination was not 
recognized nor acknowledged by victims).10
Although initially this former KR soldier had downplayed the discrimination he 
suffered, his wife (also former KR, but a ‘base’ person and key informant, ‘Lysa’) spoke 
openly about how difficult the early reintegration period was. She spoke of the 
importance of an NGO in saving her life, and her husband extrapolated this to include 
all NGOs: 
  
Lysa: I still love [the NGO] even though it does not support my family now. If there 
was no [NGO], I would not have survived. We would not have this house and even 
a half of a can of rice was not given to us because they [neighbours] thought that 
he lost his leg because he was former KR. They did not give us anything. [She 
nearly cries and her face becomes red.] 
Kuy: At that time, there was some discrimination because they did not understand 
unless some organizations came to explain. I think that reconciliation and national 
reconciliation could happen because those organizations observed the 
communities. However, if there were not human rights and development 
organizations, Khmer would continue to kill because of discrimination (IV # 50). 
 
 Lysa went on to speak very enthusiastically about the relationship between her 
change of status through development assistance, and reconciliation. Once she had 
links to an NGO and had employment, she was more accepted by the community:  
 Besides that [NGO], there was no organization which helped me even though 
others received things in the village. I saw that they did very well because they 
had helped disabled people to get some work skills. After the [NGO] helped 
me, the neighbours did not discriminate against me at all, but they loved me 
very much when I had my own work (IV # 50). 
 
 Although I asked many respondents about the existence of conflicts between 
former KR and non-KR, all denied it except this NGO worker: 
Such conflict rarely happens; I don't mean that there is no such conflict at all 
but it is in a very low degree. People rarely mention it. When they get drunk 
however, they might have said that if you were so strong, why don’t you go to 
the forest to be with the Khmer Rouge? But about this problem, we daily try our 
                                               
10 As noted in Chapter 4, there was great discrimination against ‘new’ people by ‘base’ people – 




best such as in radio program, TV, and newspapers to educate them about 
spiritual education (abrum phlov chet) in a hope of eliminating the accusations 
that you are from here or there (IV # 60). 
 
Although discrimination against former KR occurred in the case study villages 
in which they were a minority, there is a confusing link between being former KR and 
current politics.11
Kuy: Yes, at the beginning, it was difficult because they always threatened both 
my body and my mind. 
 The former KR soldier (Kuy) and his wife (Lysa), quoted above, 
blamed current politics for some of the discrimination:  
Lysa: They did not give us anything to eat even when the salary was supposed 
to be given. They said that he was KR. 
Kuy: From that time until now, I never got any salary from the government at 
all. They had discriminated against me because they thought that I was a 
disabled KR soldier. I had known them before; some of them were my relatives, 
but because the politician took my name to say that I was the KR or Khmer 
Blue12
Lysa: They did not give us rice since my husband went to learn at [NGO] until 
now even the second-hand clothes were not given to us because they blame 
us [for belonging] to another party (IV # 50). 
 in order to make the villagers hate me because they were afraid that I 
would become politicized and try to take the power. For me, I never wanted any 
power at all; I just wanted Khmer to have peace and development as in the 
other neighbouring countries. As an individual, I think that my life had no 
meaning at all besides birth, old age, illness, and death and I thought that I 
would die, but I just continued to survive because of my children. 
 
A former KR ‘base’ person living in a mixed community spoke about how she 
welcomed non-KR families to join her in the early years, but felt a lack of solidarity in 
the current time. She used important indicators of reconciliation in Cambodia: giving 
food and medicine, and lending money. This passage exhibits how partial acceptance 
occurs in small rural communities as people interact, lend money, pay for neighbours’ 
funerals, but underneath there are currents of dissatisfaction:  
There are some small differences between the former KR families and non-KR. 
For example, they have been in the free society and I had been in the 
Communist society; the people who had been in the communist society have 
                                               
11 As noted in Chapter 5, perpetrators may use politics to their advantage. 
 
12 The ‘Khmer Blue’ here refers to the opposition political parties. In some areas in the late 
1990s and early 2000, the Sam Rainsy opposition party recruited many former KR to vote for 
them, but then those who did were punished by the ruling party, as described in this passage, 




good principles and good solidarity because we used to share food and help 
each other when someone [had a] problem. But when we live in this society, it 
is different and they do not have the same solidarity. When they first arrived, I 
sometimes gave them a net, blanket, cloth, salt, fish paste, even medicine 
when their house burned. I have lived with them since 1997 until 2005, 2006, I 
understand about them now. I was cheated and how did they cheat? First, I 
was cheated by their words and secondly by materials. They borrowed my 
money and they said that they would return it back tomorrow but they did not. I 
was cheated by them many times until I now have nothing . . . I stopped 
[lending money] but I still help them when somebody dies. Even though they 
did not help me, because I want solidarity between my neighbours . . . I don't 
discriminate because I allowed my daughter to get married to the son of the 
villager here. I observed that he has good character, kindness, and honesty (IV 
# 17). 
 
A teacher at the school of this former KR ‘base’ person’s daughter observed 
some discrimination: ‘I think she [the mother] had trouble with her neighbours because 
she was cheated, she doesn't earn much money, and I think her neighbours 
discriminate a bit against her. These points result in her being separate from the 
community’.13
 Several of the former KR and accused perpetrators living in mixed communities 
noted discrimination they faced in their daily lives, and one noted the distance in 
society between herself and her non-KR neighbours. This discrimination did not seem 
to extend to their children, as discussed in Appendix L (Children of former KR).
  
14
In conclusion, the majority of all victim respondents interviewed were partially 
accepting of former KR living in their communities, for a variety of reasons. Sometimes 
the victims felt afraid of the accused perpetrators; sometimes they felt angry or were 
traumatized. In many cases they would state they had no problem with the accused 
perpetrators, and they lived together peacefully, but in fact had very little interaction 
with them, and/or expressed underlying resentment. Statements and actions were 
sometimes different in that victims reported that they had reconciled, but, when I asked 
  
                                               
13 Informal interview with teacher, in reference to IV #17, 10 August 2008. 
 
14 Several more instances of discrimination against former KR (even those not accused of any 
particular crimes, but a former KR soldier who had been fighting at the border) are discussed in 




if they ever met the accused perpetrators or former KR, they acknowledged that they 
only interacted to say hello, if that. The behaviour of the perpetrators and which coping 
strategies they had chosen also influenced the victims’ responses. This broad-ranging 
spectrum of behaviours in this section corresponds to the different levels of 
coexistence as shown in the model of acceptance above (figure 6.1.). For example the 
fear expressed by both victims and perpetrators is more characteristic of surface and 
shallow coexistence, while showing respect, doing good deeds, and victims’ 
expressions of empathetic responses towards perpetrators move towards the category 
of moderate coexistence. As expressions of respect, good deeds, and empathy 
increase, the relationships move towards a condition of deep reconciliation, and full 
acceptance, which is discussed in the next sub-section. 
4. Full Acceptance (Perpetrators Living Freely in Communities) 
None of the informants demonstrated that they had fully accepted any former 
KR accused perpetrators. However, on the basis of my observations and of existing 









In Southwest-2, a former KR soldier seemed to be fully accepted by his niece 
and nephew-in-law, but treated as an outsider by other villagers. Although this soldier’s 
activities were never specifically discussed in interviews, the niece and nephew 
Full Acceptance 
 
 Former KR cadres who had not been involved in any killings or selection of 
others to be killed, were not cruel could integrate easily into the communities  
 Former KR soldiers who were often in a special category of being accepted if 
their posting was far away on the front and they had no visible role in the 
community during the KR period 
 Former KR cadres or soldiers who are accepted unconditionally by family 
members 
 Former KR cadres or soldiers who are accepted unconditionally by certain 




reiterated the view that KR soldiers were relatively ‘innocent’ having mainly worked at 
the front lines against the Vietnamese, not against the people. 
To summarize this section, figure 6.2. below reviews the process whereby 
victims seemed to weigh various factors when deciding how to respond to accused 
perpetrators coming back into their communities, and whether or not they would be 









This diagram (figure 6.2.) shows the ideal-typical process whereby a victim first 
decides whether or not the perpetrator was ‘cruel’ or not (which was the terminology 
used by most respondents). This cruelty was related to the motivation of the 
perpetrators, as well as to the type and the gravity of the offenses. The various 
decision-making processes in the diagram have been discussed throughout this 
section, as well as in the last two chapters. 
We now turn to some additional factors that impact on victims’ responses that 
are not conscious decisions on the part of the victim, nor based upon specific 
behaviours of the perpetrators. Instead, these factors are underlying characteristics of 
the victims and/or perpetrators. 
 
Factors Affecting Victims’ Acceptance of Perpetrators 
This section identifies certain personal and cultural factors that can affect 
victims’ responses to perpetrators. These include: education, relations before the KR 
period, trauma; culture; violence and conflict; and hierarchy and patronage. First we 
examine education. 
Education 
The relationship between level of education and desire for reconciliation has 
only recently been studied.1
                                               
1 In research about Rwandans’ attitudes towards reconciliation, higher levels of education were 
associated with less support for three measures of reconciliation -- interdependence, 
community, and social justice (Longman, Pham, and Weinstein 2004: 219-221).  
 As will be discussed in the next chapter, several 
individuals eager for revenge have had high levels of education. In contrast, this 
educated teacher living in an isolated village close to the Thai border spoke about his 
memory of being severely beaten by a former KR spy during the KR period when he 
was seven years old. The former KR spy was now the director of the school where the 




his educational level: ‘I was very angry at that time, but now I feel relieved and calmer 
in my mind. Because I have a high education, I started thinking that not everything that 
they did was their own idea, but they just received orders from the higher leaders’ (IV # 
104). Other respondents did not discuss their levels of education in relationship to 
reconciliation. In summary, my findings on the relationship between education and 
desire for revenge (or the ability to reconcile) are inconclusive: other factors, such as 
the frequency of contact and degree of suffering, may be more directly related, though 
more study is needed.  
Relations before the KR period 
One factor that does have a clear influence upon reconciliation is the 
relationship between the parties before the conflict: a distant economic relationship 
would require a more narrow restoration, while more complex or richer relationships 
are more problematic to restore (Rigby 2006b: 2). People who had little reason to 
interact in the past might need less work to reconcile. Relations between communities 
as a whole can also be a factor in individuals’ relationships: for example, in Southwest-
2, two neighbouring villages before the KR conflict were separated by economic status 
(one village of richer farm-owners, and one village of poorer labourers on those farms). 
This relationship was reversed during the KR period – the former higher status, richer 
people, became oppressed ‘new’ people, while the lower status labourers became 
more privileged ‘base’ people. Underlying resentments between the people from the 
two villages were evident during interviews, and the separation before the war still 
existed after the war: the two villages continued to have little interaction between them.  
Trauma 
Trauma was discussed as an important element of Cambodia’s historical 
background in Chapter 2, and it is a factor that affects how victims relate to 




shown that the victims with a higher degree of trauma have less interest in 
reconciliation (Longman, Pham, and Weinstein 2004: 219-221; Pham, Weinstein, and 
Longman 2004: 602). Several examples where trauma affects reconciliation arose 
from the data. Two respondents, whom I had known for many years, would talk at 
length about the accused perpetrators they blamed for killing their fathers, and talked 
about the trauma, becoming emotional as they did so. In another case, a woman living 
in Southwest-2 lost eight children as well as her husband and, although she was eager 
to be interviewed and tell her story, she got upset when talking of the accused 
perpetrators.  
The behaviour of perpetrators is strongly related to general cultural factors, 
which we turn to next. 
Culture 
The coping strategies that perpetrators develop to re-enter into community 
(such as good deeds or showing respect) are strongly influenced by culture. For 
example, a UN/NGO worker suggested that Cambodian society is predisposed 
towards reconciliation because positive and respectful actions towards people in the 
present are seen as more important than negative actions in the past. He described 
many aspects of Cambodian culture that are related to reconciliation: 
I think reconciliation occurs as some people relate between themselves 
through their culture. Also, culture is the means through which sometimes 
people are able to help each other. I think it is called cultural practices . . . no 
matter how cruel you were but as long you help others in your daily life you are 
accepted. The [perpetrators] try to be nice. For those who felt that they did 
something bad but now try to do something good, they will be very well 
respected by the people. This is reconciliation . . . I think in [Cambodian] 
society, solidarity and trust are built around the ability to trust one another, and 
the ability to relate to one another. There have been a lot of social activities 
between people . . . so I think reconciliation just emerges as people build trust 





Besides this cultural attribute of acceptance occurring over time when the 
perpetrator acts positively, another important cultural factor is how societies are 
predisposed to deal with conflict and violence, which is the subject of the next section. 
Violence and the Denial of Conflict 
As noted in previous chapters, there remains much debate on the nature of 
Cambodian society – conflict avoiding or warriors. This study has found both of these 
conflict styles in the various communities of study. Even if there is underlying or latent 
anger and frustration, especially when known perpetrators are living in the villages, the 
surface situation is usually calm. Another example of this dichotomy was found in the 
immediate post-KR period (1979-1981) when there were many episodes of violent 
revenge taken by victims, but then soon thereafter there was remarkable acceptance 
of (many) perpetrators returning to live back in society. However at the same time, in 
many cases the so-called reconciled perpetrators are living very separate lives. I raise 
this issue of violence and conflict as an important factor to consider when looking at 
the context of community-level reconciliation, although the findings are contradictory.  
Hierarchy and Patronage  
Chapter 2 identified the importance of hierarchy and patronage in Cambodian 
society, including the ties (kse) that bind people together in relationships of debt and 
allegiance. This can impact on how people respond to perpetrators in their midst 
insofar as the relative status of victims and perpetrators, both past and present, can 
influence the victims’ acceptance of perpetrators. For example, when perpetrators in 
present-day Cambodia are very poor, they may be more easily accepted by victims, as 
they are pitied and not seen as a possible threat. On the other hand, when 
perpetrators are more powerful, and flaunt their power or wealth, victims may be 




The four categories of acceptance described above on the individual level are 
next put into context through an examination of four models of coexistence. In the next 
section I examine how victims’ acceptance of perpetrators relates to different levels of 
coexistence at the community level.  
 
Four Communities – Four Types of Coexistence  
Ten research communities were introduced in Chapter 4: amongst the ten 
communities, four were chosen to illustrate typical types of coexistence in Cambodia. 
‘Victims Living in Fear’ in Southwest-1 (surface coexistence), ‘Islands Alone’ in 
Southwest-2 (shallow coexistence), ‘The Melting Pot’ in Northwest-3 (moderate without 
prior contact), and ‘We are all in the Same Boat’ in Northwest-4 (moderate with prior 
contact). In all ten of the case studies, the degree of coexistence has varied from 
surface to shallow to moderate, never reaching the deep coexistence or reconciliation 
of assimilated community. Respondents expressed only views and behaviours that 
indicated partial acceptance, such as fear, avoidance, withdrawal, and some minimal 
signs of respect and empathy in early stages. The four types of coexistence include: 
(1) surface coexistence – non-lethal détente of separate lives; (2) shallow coexistence 
– minimal cooperation of parallel lives; (3) moderate coexistence – cooperation, 
collaboration and building mutual respect of shared community; and finally (4) deep 
reconciliation – interdependence, reciprocity, rich and multi-textured horizontal and 
vertical ties, of reciprocal and assimilated community. 
A model to illustrate the transitions occurring through the stages of coexistence 
and reconciliation is presented below (Figure 6.3). It attempts to show how 
communities might move from conflict to peace, from surface coexistence to deep 
reconciliation, and from revenge and non-acceptance to reconciliation and full 




coexistence lies on the surface of the water, and shallow and deep reconciliation move 
gradually into deeper water, and deeper relationship. As victims begin to develop 
understanding of the situation of perpetrators, and perpetrators begin to show remorse 
and do good deeds, then communities can gradually move towards deeper 
reconciliation.  
 
Figure 6.3. Model of Reconciliation 
The four case studies are now reviewed to illustrate communities with different 
degrees of coexistence, ranging from surface to shallow to moderate (but never 
achieving the deep reconciliation of interdependence).  
1. Southwest-1 ‘Victims Living in Fear’ ( Surface Coexistence) 
Although a brief description of Southwest-1 is included in Chapter 4 (see pages 
93-95), additional details provided below add to our understanding of surface 
coexistence. This surface coexistence is characterized by minimal contact between 
victims and perpetrators and a great deal of fear. The community was made up of 




Village A were heartbreaking. The mixed Cambodian and Cham Muslim2
In Village B, although most of the mid- and upper-level KR leaders had been 
killed in internal purges, or fled in 1979 when the KR regime fell to Vietnamese troops, 
some low-level cadres remained. I interviewed some of these former KR cadres, 
including two who had been sent to prison for a few months in early 1979 and one 
person who was identified by many villagers in Village A as an alleged perpetrator – 
accused of selecting and then leading many to their deaths. I also interviewed another 
accused perpetrator (accused by some former KR cadre of killing more than a 
thousand people) who was now living in the US but was visiting his father. As the 
information in the interviews was compared and contrasted, especially the differing 
perceptions found in villages A and B, a picture of the delicate nature of the 
coexistence emerged.  
 village was 
physically demolished, poverty-stricken, and populated with ‘victim survivors’. Village A 
was still haunted by a nearby village (B) which consisted primarily of former Khmer 
Rouge ‘base people’, some of them (accused) perpetrators. Village C was a mixed 
village of both former KR and non-KR. It housed just a few former KR cadres, including 
one prominent man who no one would talk about or introduce me to, and a former KR 
elderly couple who provided many insights.  
This case study also showed how surface coexistence can be very close to the 
edge of revenge. The only case of revenge admitted by any of the respondents in this 
entire research study was in this community, in Village A, as a former government 
soldier admitted to joining with two other villagers to kill three particularly cruel KR 
perpetrators.3
                                               
2 About 96 percent of the Cambodian population is Buddhist; about 2 percent are Cham 
Muslim, and less than 1 percent Christian.  
 While this occurred in the past, some of the victims indicated they might 
still like to take revenge. This case study also illustrates the importance of the factor of 
 
3 The story of this revenge-taker, key informant Mr. Sunh, is explained in the next chapter, as 




location and proximity, and power relationships. In Village A, many victim respondents 
expressed their fear and spoke with lowered voices, due to the close proximity of 
former KR cadres in the neighbouring village (B). The former KR cadres seemed to 
have retained their power, as some of the commune officials were relatives and 
protected them. The former KR cadres also wielded power due to the close proximity 
of a former KR stronghold where many high-ranking former KR still lived.  
From this community of surface coexistence, Southwest-1, where relationships 
are minimal, contact is avoided, and levels of fear and anger are high, we move to a 
community displaying a slightly deeper level of coexistence: shallow. 
2. Southwest-2 ‘Islands Alone’ (Shallow Coexistence)  
Southwest-2 was a cluster of villages consisting primarily of victims, with some 
base people and a few isolated direct perpetrators and former KR soldiers living lonely 
lives. The shallow coexistence observed in this community was characterized by 
cordial relationships between victims and perpetrators, but underlying this was anger 
and sorrow on the part of victims, and fear, anger, and feelings of discrimination on the 
part of accused perpetrators and former KR. Of all the research communities, I had the 
most interviews here – it was more accessible, I had a close key informant, a former 
KR soldier (Kuy), and I was able to obtain access to a former KR cadre who was 
widely recognized in the community as a perpetrator. Almost every respondent I spoke 
with claimed that their community had already reconciled and they had no problems. 
However, their reports of how often victims and perpetrators interacted, their 
interviews, and my observations led to the conclusion that this community was actually 
living in a state of shallow coexistence, far from deep reconciliation. It was obvious that 
the victims did not fully accept the former KR members into their community, and did 




The following focus group discussion illustrated how victims were often reticent 
to speak directly about accused perpetrators; victims did not dare to look at those who 
had been the executioners during the KR period. Also, the respondents spoke about 
the cycles of purges conducted by the KR against their own cadre – many KR suffered 
as well.4
LM: Are there any perpetrators who killed the people in the temple living 
around this area? 
 Finally this passage indicates how victims discriminated against former KR in 
the present day (LM indicates my questions, while the numbers indicate the individual 
focus groups members): 
7: The perpetrators also died in the Pol Pot regime; they were killed the same 
as other people. But there are a few left now. But we dare not say who. 
LM: Are the perpetrators living with the people normally? 
5: Yes, they are living normally. 
6: We do not hold a grudge because the perpetrators were afraid of the KR 
leaders too. 
LM: Nobody wanted to take revenge for the death of their family members? 
5: No, no . . . [Laughing] 
LM: How many are still around? 
[Everybody talking to push each other to speak out] 
6: I did not know the killer because they did not allow us to see. 
7: Yes, they did not allow us to see. 
4: She doesn't want to ask for whom specifically; she just wants to know how 
many are still around? 
6: We don't know how many perpetrators but we just know that they took our 
parents away. 
5: Please ask Mr. Red shirt [referring to the key informant, Kuy], he knows!  
3: The person who took the people away was the village or group chief or . . .  
7: As I see those people [perpetrators] were killed by each other from one 
generation to the next. They were all killed because when the new group came, 
they said that they sent those people to another place; but in fact, they were 
killed at the dam. The people were killed, even the people who were in their 
village, so all the people were killed the same. I think maybe ten persons 
[perpetrators] are alive now but we don't know where they are. If we know 
where they are, we won't take revenge because we will not get the dead 
people (our relatives) back (IV # 88). 
 
Although this passage above does not identify individual perpetrators, because 
I visited this village so many times and interviewed so many people, I was able to find 
out later the names of two accused perpetrators, one of whom I was able to interview.  
                                               
4 Due to the highly paranoid nature of the KR regime, internal purges were carried out by the 
KR, increasingly frequently in 1977 and 1978. The majority of the killings carried out at the 




A Lonely Accused Perpetrator – Living in Fear 
 I had tried to meet this accused perpetrator (Pel) in Southwest-2 several times 
through an interlocutor over a period of months.5
LM: I see that it was difficult when you were in the prison and that you 
remember this and feel sorry about it. So how do you feel now when you are 
talking about these stories in the past? 
 Both he and his wife mentioned 
several times his anxiety and fear, though his fear gradually reduced over the period of 
my visits to the village, as Pel began to trust me (LM below):  
Pel: I don't feeling now . . .I feel . . . umm . . .[Laughing]  
LM: Is it better or worse than before? 
Pel: I feel better, yes better. I don't have chest tightness (tung) anymore but I 
feel relieved (thuo). 
LM: Why? 
Pel: Because you don't make me feel difficult. It means that you don't make me 
feel afraid’ (IV # 85). 
 
Fear is a common response amongst victims of mass violence after the 
events.6
Anger was another emotion expressed in the narrative of this accused 
perpetrator. Kong was still upset and angry about Pel’s arrest after the KR fell, and the 
 But perpetrators also feel fearful – that their pasts may be exposed, or they 
may be brought to justice, or even killed for revenge. As noted above Pel was clearly 
anxious and nervous about meeting people. He appeared to be suffering from mental 
health problems including anxiety and fearfulness, and both he and his wife Kong 
spoke about those symptoms (headaches, chest pain, and rapid heartbeat) when 
others asked him about the past. Kong also spoke about an attack on their home 
several years ago that resulted in the death of her father, which they feared was an 
attempted act of revenge, a view shared by several other respondents. 
                                               
5 Pel’s name had been given to me by several respondents, including key informants and the 
commune chief. By the time I finally had an appointment to see him, a local NGO film crew had 
just been there the day before and had directly questioned him, on film, about what he had 
done during the KR regime. Thus he was not home at the time of our appointment and his wife 
told us that he was not feeling well because of the visit of the film crew. Over time, after several 
overtures by intermediaries, and an explanation that I would ask questions about the PRK 
period, not the KR period, he finally agreed to meet.  
 





year he spent in jail (1980). She went to bring him home from jail and was very 
disturbed at how thin he was and how he had been maltreated. She also spoke about 
herself being beaten by the police and accused of being a former KR traitor while her 
husband was in jail. Although the commune chief and other neighbours stated that Pel 
was included in the community activities normally, my interviews and observations 
indicated that in fact he rarely left his house and then, only to tend his cows. He did not 
go to the temple, though he encouraged his wife and children to do so.  
 Because of this anger and bitterness still held by Pel’s wife, she had no wish to 
reconcile. In her explanation, her husband was only a spy for a few months, so did not 
deserve to be in prison for a whole year, and she said she was also beaten by the 
authorities.7
No, I never saw the men who arrested him [Pel] since then because they died 
already. They were from this commune. But I don't want to see them because 
they think we are bad people so we don't want to see them. . . . Perhaps we 
saw them on the road by accident, but we did not talk with them and we turned 
back. Both my husband and I, we did not ask them when we met them because 
they ill-treated (thveu bap) us so why we should talk with them?’ (IV # 51). 
 She also illustrated how they used the perpetrator coping strategy of 
withdrawal and avoidance: 
 
Huyse describes a two-step process whereby firstly fear and anger are 
replaced by non-violent coexistence, and then secondly confidence and trust are built 
(Huyse 2003: 20). In the case of Pel and Kong, these steps were far from achieved. 
Since Pel was a lone perpetrator in a community of victims, and there had been one 
attack on his life, he was living in a constant state of fear. Since he lived an isolated 
life, he only occasionally interacted with people in the community. Thus there was little 
reason nor opportunity to build trust or confidence. Since the Cambodian model of 
conflict avoidance had led few people to ever speak openly about what happened in 
the past, both sides were living in a state of heightened anxiety and mistrust. However, 
the conditions for the development of empathy may be present, as several villagers 
                                               
7 However, three other villagers stated they were eyewitnesses to Pel’s activities working in the 




stated they understood that Pel had to follow orders or he would have been killed. If 
Pel knew of their understanding, it might lead him to acknowledge what he had done 
and that in turn would possibly promote healing for both him and his victims. The trust 
that apparently exists between Pel and his former KR neighbour could be an important 
starting point for development of future relationships.  
Another isolated individual was Kuy, a former KR soldier who used 
development aid to buy acceptance. 
A Lonely Former KR soldier – Using Development Aid to Buy 
Acceptance 
Although educated and from the richer village of wealthier landowners, Kuy had 
joined the KR voluntarily to follow the call of King Sihanouk. When he first came back 
to his village when the KR fell in 1979, he was not accepted by the authorities, so he 
returned to fight the Vietnamese, leaving his wife and family behind. He finally returned 
to the community in the 1990s after he was injured and became an amputee.8
Kuy had spent a great deal of time trying to build relationships with his 
community by attempting to bring development through an NGO, but he still lived in a 
depressed state and in relative isolation. I observed several remarks made about him 
in public identifying him as former KR (see above on page 160), which he admitted 
later had bothered him. Although he several times denied any problem with 
reconciliation, his wife became tearful while he answered my question about how they 
were received into the community when they first returned after the KR years: 
  
Around me, there were many people, who lived in the PRK or SOC [People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea or State of Cambodia] and there were many soldiers. I 
was the only one former KR army that lived in the village. Many years ago, 
even though they troubled me in both the mind and body, I still was determined 
that I would try until all the Khmer people understood about me. What way 
could I try? I tried to develop the roads and the ponds or other things in order to 
clarify that I did have the nationalist ideals. Moreover, I wanted to live together 
(ruop ruom) and rebuild and do development. After I had requested this project 
                                               





already, I gave it to the commune chief in order to show my good points that I 
did have the nationalist ideals and everything that I did was for the Khmer and 
for only the Khmer. I dug that pond because of our Khmer race and for the 
needs of the people, because before they needed to go far away to get water. 
Since that time, there were no longer any problems because they knew that we 
were working for the advantage for the Khmer society and we were not the 
destroyers nor tried to do bad things. They always saw our good deeds (IV # 
50). 
 
Southwest-2 exhibited several attributes indicating its state of shallow coexistence. 
Firstly, victims feared to speak openly about perpetrators. Secondly a lonely 
perpetrator (Pel) lived in fear while his wife (Kong) felt angry. Finally, a lonely former 
KR soldier (Kuy) and his wife (Lysa) felt discriminated against but used development to 
buy acceptance. Victims only partially accepted the former KR members of their 
community, while the accused perpetrators tended to use coping strategies of 
withdrawal and denial. We now turn to the third type of coexistence: moderate 
coexistence without prior contact.  
3. Northwest-3 ‘The Melting Pot’ ( Moderate Coexistence – 
without prior contact)  
A stage of moderate coexistence is characterized by greater levels of 
acceptance and interaction than in a condition of shallow coexistence. In moderate 
coexistence, relationships are deeper, interdependence increases, and the (negative) 
emotions of fear and anger decrease. Two types of moderate coexistence are 
described: one in which people have had no prior contact, and the second in which 
people have known each other for years and know which have been victims and which 
have been perpetrators.  
Northwest-3 was one example of several former KR strongholds that 
maintained control of their populations into the 1990s. These communities then 
experienced inflows of Cambodians from all over the country that came seeking the 
relatively free land as it was gradually cleared of land mines (thus, the ‘Melting Pot’). 




although they were aware of two distinct social groups (victims versus former KR) 
there were no instances of direct victim- perpetrator relationships found amongst 
respondents. Northwest-3 is an example of moderate reconciliation, as former KR and 
KR victims lived in close proximity, with good, close social relationships. They were 
highly accepting of each other, and some victims expressed empathy towards the 
situation of former KR during the regime. However, since they were not direct victims 
and perpetrators, neither knew about the others’ pasts, and there were no problems 
with anger towards, or fear of, specific individuals.  
4. Northwest-4 ‘We Are All in the Same Boat’ (Moderate 
Coexistence – with prior contact) 
The second example of moderate coexistence (with prior contact) is another 
community in the northwest of Cambodia, though it had not been a KR stronghold. As 
in Northwest-3, victims and former KR had a great deal of contact, had deep 
relationships, and exhibited interdependence in religious and economic life – thus 
characterized as moderate coexistence. However, villagers in Northwest-4 had known 
each other for decades, many since birth, so this community exhibited the dynamics of 
moderate coexistence with prior contact. The area was called by many a ‘tug of war’ 
region as it was a major crossroads for the various factions during the war years (from 
1979 through 1998): sometimes the KR controlled it, sometimes the government 
forces, and sometimes the non-communist resistance (known as ‘Para’). Young men 
were recruited from this area to be in all three military forces and, even before the first 
year of formal KR rule in 1975, many men had joined the KR, some voluntarily and 
some not. After the KR regime, many of the inhabitants fled to refugee camps in 
Thailand, but had since returned. Because of the on-going war and the mixed 
allegiances, and the common suffering (‘We are all in the same boat’), the community 




who were living peacefully together, in moderate coexistence, with a high degree of 
acceptance of perpetrators by victims.  
A key informant (Khin), a former UN/NGO worker and formerly a refugee who 
had escaped during the KR regime and was now resident in the village, observed the 
changing allegiances made out of necessity as noted in the section on hierarchy 
above: 
If we were living with the communists, we would have to join with them, but our 
hearts still wanted democracy. That is why we wanted to escape to Thailand or 
the US. We could say that our bodies had to be with the KR so when they 
ordered us to kill somebody, we would have to follow them. When the peace 
came, we had no conflict any longer. Many people here are now my relatives. 
Even when we just talked about that perpetrator, he was also our relative.9
 
 We 
are all living near here so we could not kill each other, but we were forced to do 
things under their threats. Nowadays, we don’t need to find the KR because 
many of the villagers are KR (IV # 103). 
The brother-in-law of the key informant spoke about a direct perpetrator and 
neighbour who had beaten him as a child during the KR. He is quoted in Chapter 5 on 
the section on motivation (see page 119) where he explained that in spite of the 
mistreatment, he was able to understand the mitigating factors – that the perpetrator 
would have been killed had he disobeyed.  
The fact that this community was able to reconstitute itself, and direct 
perpetrators were able to sit next to direct victims was an example of the greatest 
degree of coexistence found in this research study (moderate coexistence with prior 
contact). However, there was not yet deep coexistence as there was not deep 
communication between victims and perpetrators, little discussion of the past, and no 
expressions of remorse, acknowledgement, or apology made. But since all 
communities had strong experiences of common suffering, their being in the ‘same 
boat’ allowed them to better develop empathy. 
 
                                               




This chapter has provided an overview of factors affecting victims’ acceptance 
of perpetrators, a model of victim acceptance of perpetrators (from revenge to full 
acceptance), and finally an elaboration of case studies of community coexistence 
(from surface to shallow to moderate coexistence).  
• Surface Coexistence - In Southwest-1, one village of former KR and one of 
approximately equal numbers of victims were separated by approximately one 
kilometre, so people did not want to or did not have to interact – coexistence 
was merely on the surface with a lot of fear and almost no communication. 
• Shallow Coexistence - In Southwest-2 a majority of direct victims and a 
minority of perpetrators lived in very close proximity to each other and thus 
have had opportunities for social interaction. Yet, they only lived in a state of 
shallow coexistence, as perpetrators lived in fear and isolation. 
• Moderate Coexistence (without prior contact) - In Northwest-3 a melting pot 
of victims and former KR (many of whom may be hiding their pasts) live in 
relative harmony and moderate coexistence. 
• Moderate Coexistence (with prior contact) - Finally, in Northwest-4 several 
villages in a war-torn area included a mixture of former KR, victims, and former 
resistance groups who are all living in moderate coexistence – better able to 
communicate and understand each other due to their common suffering. 
 The next chapter focuses on the important issue of revenge, much of which 
occurred in the early years after the KR regime, but the impact of which still affects 






CHAPTER 7 – Revenge – Blood Debts 
 
Revenge is an evocative word: in Cambodia it is related to blood debts, hot 
anger, and cycles of killings through generations. Revenge (or vengeance) and 
reconciliation (and sometimes forgiveness) lie on opposite ends of a continuum 
moving from conflict towards peace. This chapter discusses the specifics of revenge: 
what it is, how it happened in Cambodia, how it is seen by Cambodians, what factors 
affect it, and how it relates to justice and reconciliation. A revenge killing in the case 
study community Southwest-1 serves as a central narrative to unpack this complex 
topic, including many revealing observations by the man who confessed. I draw upon 
this example and other interview material to describe the situation of revenge in the 
communities. In addition, I examine the factors that led to revenge killings as well as 
the factors that led to perpetrators being spared. Factors such as the passage of time, 
religious views, and the motivation of the perpetrators were found to influence the 
incidence of revenge: they and other factors are discussed below. As the literature is 
sparse on the topic of revenge in Cambodia, this thesis adds detailed analysis of this 
important issue.  
What is Revenge? 
Vengeance is a normal human reaction: a response to humiliation and to 
threats against self-esteem, perceived control, and power (Herman 1992: 104 and 
189; Minow 1998: 10; Nadler and Shnabel 2008: 46-7). Revenge is primarily seen as a 
negative act. However, when a victim takes revenge, the balance of power changes as 
victims try to regain control over their lives damaged by conflict. In some cases 
revenge can improve the psychological health of the victim, as they feel that what 




46-47). Victims may also seek revenge in an attempt to force perpetrators to 
acknowledge their actions and the harm they have done (Herman 1992: 189). 
However a desire for revenge, especially if too strong or overwhelming, can be a 
negative force: victims may wallow in the past, ignite cycles of violence, or not be able 
to focus on the future (Field and Chhim 2008: 353).  
Vengeance or acts of revenge can be seen as private acts between individuals, 
or official acts such as political reprisals or courts (Crocker 2004: 6). The private acts 
can be in the form of ‘soft revenge’ such as victims shaming perpetrators, or the 
extreme acts of revenge killings. Official acts of retribution in the form of trials are 
discussed below. When the scale and scope of revenge is excessive or uncontrolled, it 
can lead to unending cycles of revenge. The ability to forsake vengeance and focus on 
the future is the very essence of reconciliation and the transformation of relationship 
(Rigby 2001: 12).1
 Hinton differentiates between two concepts in Cambodia: revenge (sangsoek 
or ‘pay back the enemy’) and holding a grudge (kumnum) (Hinton 2001: 25-6).
 
2
                                               
1 In a survey in Rwanda (and some other surveys) a lack of desire for vengeance has been 
described as an indicator of reconciliation (Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004: 604-5). 
 Hinton 
suggests that acts of revenge may result from insults or loss of face, while some forms 
of grudges could be from much more serious violations. Hinton describes the more 
serious grudge as resulting in ‘disproportionate revenge’ with never-ending cycles of 
violence: a ‘long-standing grudge leading to revenge [is] much more damaging than 
the original injury’, (Hinton 2000: 32-34; Hinton 2001: 25-6). There has been little direct 
research on the degree to which revenge has occurred in Cambodia, except for 
observations from some researchers that revenge is presumed to have been fairly 
 
2 These concepts are related to being ‘tied to anger’ (chang kumhoeng), or malice: A national 
‘Day of Anger’ was an annual ceremony in Cambodia which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Hinton notes that ‘the root of the word sângsoek is sâng. It refers to the moral 
obligation ‘to return (an object), to pay back (debt), to pay for damage’ (Hinton 2001: 26). This 
word ‘sang’ (or sâng using Hinton’s transliteration system) is also used as the root for 






common and widespread (Gottesman 2003: 37-38; Hinton 2001: 25; Linton 2004: 
150).3
Research on Attitudes of Cambodians towards Revenge 
  
In the 1970s many Cambodians joined the KR movement due to anger against 
the war and to avenge the suffering caused by bombings by the US military (Hinton 
2000: 32-3; Zucker 2009: 39). During the KR period the leaders developed drastic 
policies whereby the entire family and network of suspected traitors were exterminated 
along with the traitor (‘pulling up the roots’). Oveson suggested that revenge occurred 
during the KR period because the regime viewed itself and its leadership as a semi-
divine power, so that elimination of the ‘enemy’ had to be complete and had to include 
all of the kinship links (Oveson 2005: 40).4
Research studies have revealed some contradictory findings about revenge, 
partly due to the way that revenge has been defined in the studies. While most studies 
suggest that a minority of Cambodians want revenge against the former KR, a majority 
want them to suffer in some way.
 This ‘scorched earth’ policy colours how 
Cambodians feel about the KR, and about revenge, today. 
5 Etcheson did interviews in three villages and quoted 
several respondents who still desired revenge, leading him to conclude that strong 
feelings of anger and a desire for revenge were still widespread (2005b: 206-8)6
                                               
3 Several Cambodian survivors mentioned revenge killings in their memoires. See May 1986: 
239-246, 254; Ung 2000: 206; and Ngor 1987: 353, 362. 
. A 
study by Linton of 712 Cambodians indicated that a majority (69 percent) of 
 
4 S-21 Prison Chief Duch explained the KR policy about children during his testimony at the KR 
tribunal: ‘There is no gain to keep them, and they might take revenge on you’ (Cheang 2009: 
1). It is under these policies that entire families were killed with KR cadre guided by this KR 
slogan: ‘When pulling out weeds, remove them roots and all’ (Locard 2004: 77; IV# 6 KL). 
 
5 A desire to make someone suffer is also used as an indicator of a desire for revenge in 
several studies (Pham et al. 2009; Sonis et al. 2009). 
 
6 The study does not indicate how many people were interviewed, nor when, and did not 
describe the various percentages of respondents’ opinions. In addition, Etcheson indicated that 
the strong feelings of revenge held by most respondents were evident in their support for the 





respondents was not seeking revenge, while a minority (24 percent) was seeking 
revenge (2004: 9). An informal study I conducted in 1999 indicated that 10 out of 48 
respondents wanted revenge, while 30 did not7 (McGrew 2000b: 35). A study 
conducted in 2008 of 1,621 randomly selected Cambodians showed that interviewees 
wanted the KR to suffer (71 percent), wished they could take revenge (37 percent), 
and would take revenge if they could (41 percent) (Pham et al. 2009: 3). A study of 
1,000 Cambodians conducted also in 2008 indicated a strong desire for revenge 
(average of 19.7 on a scale of 25): 63 percent of the 1,017 respondents strongly 
agreed, and 21 percent agreed with the statement ‘I would like to make them [the KR 
perpetrators] suffer’ (Sonis et al. 2009: 532).8
We now turn to the voices of respondents in this study, to explore how revenge 
happened in their communities.  
 Thus, in general, recent studies agree 
that although the majority of Cambodians do not wish to take revenge themselves, 
there are still unresolved feelings towards perpetrators, some want revenge, and many 
victims still want perpetrators to suffer. 
 
Revenge in Cambodia 
How did Revenge Happen? 
As noted above, there has been almost no research or investigations in the 
literature or press about the incidence of revenge killings in the aftermath of the KR 
regime. Although revenge is a natural reaction to mass violence, many respondents 
were reticent to speak of it. However through the interviews, a picture emerged of the 
                                               
7 Seven respondents did not know or did not answer the question. 
 
8 A desire to make someone suffer was one of the five measures used by Sonis to assess the 
desire for revenge, as was the desire to ‘get back at them’. But the Sonis study did not report 





little-discussed or written about period just after the KR were overthrown. The majority 
of respondents had at least heard of revenge killings, some had witnessed them, and a 
few had taken part in them. Several respondents, such as this KR prison survivor, had 
seen the dead bodies of presumed KR perpetrators along the roadways as they 
staggered home after the KR regime:  
I know revenge happened after 1979 or early 1980. For example my 
cooperative chief (prathean sahakar) was chased to be killed by the people but 
they could not reach him because he had run away two days before. On 
National Road Six, on the way to Siem Reap, there were many stories. The 
people killed the chiefs of the KR who were cruel or killed the people. Then 
they took their dead bodies to hang on the road; I saw them with my own eyes 
(IV # 42). 
 
 Another prison survivor also observed many dead bodies though, as with many 
respondents, he said he did not see the actual revenge killing: 
 I heard people say there were KR who had been killed for revenge. The 
streets were full of dead people. Both the people and the Vietnamese killed the 
KR. The Vietnamese shot the KR to death when they were fighting to liberate 
the country. And because of their cruelty, people were suffering when the KR 
were occupying the country. The people’s anger was stronger than the 
Vietnamese’s anger. The people dared to knife the KR to death in either 
daytime or night-time. I saw some people who went into houses trying to kill 
some KR in the afternoon (IV # 59). 
 
This former KR ‘base’ person, who then became a victim of the KR as his 
family members were killed by the second wave of former KR leaders (from the 
southwest) spoke frankly about all the revenge he had seen. While the majority of 
respondents said they had only seen one or two killings, he was one of the few who 
had seen many. He invoked a proverb about revenge based on Buddhist beliefs:  
It was very difficult in 1979 because as a Khmer proverb says ‘hatred will not 
cease with hatred’: for example, if we saw somebody kill another person, we 
should not kill that killer; we should just keep silent because it is too late. We 
should not do the same mistake as he did. There was a lot of revenge in 1978-
1979 when the Vietnamese came. At that time, when I escaped I saw people 
take revenge immediately. If some perpetrators did not run away in time, they 
would be killed with knives, not guns. From the time that I was born, I never 
saw so many flies as during that time; the flies perched everywhere on the 
dead people. It was terrible because the victims were very hurt so they had to 
take the revenge. Some KR escaped to live at the border and they never went 




revenge killing in a rice field; I was very afraid. After the war ended, a 
cooperative chief who had a big ox drove his cart along a small path, and there, 
the people stopped him. They had been waiting there to kill him because he 
used to punish their relatives to deprive them of food. I saw revenge many 
times. I did not just see it when the Vietnamese came (IV # 78). 
 
 Although in most cases people reported that the cruellest perpetrators ran 
away in fear for their lives, this former KR victim respondent (in Northwest-4) spoke 
about a case where a relatively less cruel KR cadre dared to stay in the community – 
but was later killed:9
In our village there was only one person killed because he believed himself that 
he was not so cruel and he did not kill or that he had troubled many people. He 
could not escape in time, but as for the others, who were very cruel, they 
escaped. They ran to be soldiers so they could escape. They ran away like 
flies. As for him, he did not know how to escape. He was not so cruel; he 
trusted the people very deeply. Even though he trusted the people, but they still 
arrested him to kill him. During the KR period, he did not kill by himself, but 
when anybody in the mobile work group made the mistake, he ordered his 
soldiers such as militia (chhlop) to arrest them (IV # 104). 
 
 
The above examples are of revenge killings observed in the immediate 
aftermath of the KR regime, when the majority of killings took place. However, some 
killings also occurred later on in the 1980s, including some in the refugee camps along 
the Thai-Cambodian border: ‘Sometimes there was revenge in the camps if people 
recognized KR people in Thailand’ (IV # 118).  
Only a few people admitted they would still take revenge now. One man living 
in the southwest stated: ‘We still have pain in our hearts, they were so cruel. If I were 
young, I will take revenge’ (IV # 32). And this respondent living in the northwest stated:  
Yes, I still think about revenge, even right now. My mother forgets some things 
in the past and about [the accused perpetrator] but for me I cannot forget. I 
cannot forget because they killed my father and they are still alive and free. 
Like I told you before if someone killed people, they must be put in jail but now 
they live freely. And if we don't sentence them, other people will follow them 
and also kill people without punishment (IV # 6).  
 
                                               
9 The passage of time served to decrease feelings of revenge and allowed some perpetrators 




Some perpetrators seem well aware of the possibility of revenge, and live in 
fear. For example, one perpetrator was said to be acting like a ‘rabbit’ prostrating 
himself in front of his victims (see page 132); accused perpetrator (Pel) is afraid to go 
out of his house (see pages 125 and 162); and Pel’s former KR co-worker fled his 
community without his belongings after Pel’s father-in-law was killed (see page 176). 
In the case below, two former KR cadres (1 and 2) spoke about a former KR 
perpetrator who ‘died’ of fear of revenge: 
1: He did not kill himself. He got sick because he was so frightened himself; he 
dared not to go anywhere. 
2: He was afraid somebody would take revenge.  
1: If he walked around, he was afraid he would be hit by people because they 
knew that he killed their relatives. . . . He was alive for one year after he 
returned from the prison. He returned home and no one ill-treated him, but he 
dared not to go out or do anything. He felt afraid.  
2: He dared not to go to Kampot because there are a lot of ‘new’ people in 
Kampot. The people around here were his relatives so that’s another reason 
they didn’t take revenge. 
1: It was because he controlled 17 April people [‘new’ people]; he was the chief 
of 17 April people group and he did bad things to them and starved them. He 
was the chief of a group (IV # 93). 
 
Now, the discussion moves from a continuing desire for revenge, to the 
situation when respondents spoke about preventing revenge killings. 
Revenge Killings Prevented 
While most respondents reported incidents of revenge killings, people also 
reported instances when acts of revenge were prevented. For example, these two 
former KR ‘base’ people (respondents 1 and 2) had worked in the PRK commune 
headquarters, and as spies for the PRK. One of them had been sent to prison as a 
suspected KR cadre. Respondent 2 stated he had acted to save some former KR from 
being killed by the PRK authorities:  
1: Yes, some former KR were killed after 1979. 
2: But I worked in the commune headquarter so they came to tell me when they 
wanted to kill someone in the village.  
1: Yes, they told us before they killed someone because we worked in the 




2: [During the PRK regime] I was a spy (chhlop) in this commune and they 
were spies in another commune so we knew each other and they came to 
inform me that they were going to kill two guys in this commune but I said that I 
did not allow them to kill those men. But they still went to kill those guys. They 
told me that those men were not my father, so they would kill them even if I did 
not allow them. 
1: At that time, you took revenge against me and I took revenge against you.  
2: I saved many people (IV # 93). 
 
Key informant Sunh and his brother spoke about revenge killings prevented, as 
the brother’s military commander prevented him from taking revenge against an 
accused perpetrator (key informant Tang). They also noted that this accused 
perpetrator was spared because of links to relatives with political power, and because 
of the passage of time. In this case the reference to forgiving Tang seems to be the 
minimalist definition, in that they are no longer seeking revenge: 
Brother: [Tang - accused perpetrator and key informant] killed A Sen's mother. 
When I was a soldier, originally we wanted to kill him, I went to find him with A 
Sen, but he ran away.  
Sunh: [Tang] burned my relative to death. 
Brother: I took a sword and went to kill him but he ran away. It was in 1980.  
LM: Now do you still want revenge? 
Brother: No, I stopped and [Tang] now is old too. But when I was a soldier I did 
politics and I called my colleagues to surround [Tang]'s house, but my boss 
was afraid I would shoot [Tang] so he stopped me. 
Sunh: After that he ran away for about one year, and then he came back. 
Brother: [Tang] was cruel, He burned people alive. The children of the victims 
came to tell me.  
Sunh: [Tang] dares to live in the village because he has relatives (of his wife) 
who work in the commune office. 
Brother: His relatives take responsibility for him and we also forgave him (IV # 
32). 
 
In conclusion, we see that revenge was quite widespread with many people 
reporting its occurrence, though at times revenge was prevented by others. 
Perpetrators were sometimes protected by those with political power, which is related 
to one of the perpetrator coping strategies discussed in Chapter 5 (see pages 128-




Perpetrators Coping with Revenge  
There were some cases where perpetrators escaped revenge killings through 
the mechanisms described in Chapter 5, specifically flight and use of power and 
politics.10
In Thmar Pouk and Banteay Chmar there was not much revenge – there would 
have been more revenge, as we wanted to, but the KR escaped to the Thai-
Cambodian border. Most perpetrators fled Cambodia to go to a third country 
and are there now. Many fled with the KR or the non-KR to Thailand and the 
refugee camps because at that time everybody ran and life was all mixed up. 
Sometimes there was revenge in the camps if people recognized KR people in 
Thailand (IV # 118). 
 This UN/NGO worker who had worked in the border camps observed a high 
incidence of flight (as well as noting revenge killings taking place in the refugee 
camps):  
 
Another example of flight is demonstrated in this discussion between Mrs. 
Kong (the wife of a former KR spy (chhlop)) and her sister, also a KR ‘base’ person, 
about what happened to various KR perpetrators in their village. They discussed the 
effects of the killing of their father in 1997, which was either an attempted robbery or a 
revenge killing aimed at her husband. The wife freely confessed that her husband 
brought people to the prison during the KR time, and she and her sister spoke openly 
of other accused perpetrators in the area:  
Kong: The KR leaders responsible for the bad things done in this area have 
died already, Ta Chuon was north of here, and Ta Chorn ran away and we 
don't know where he is now. He ran a long time ago. 
Sister: He ran away around 1993 or 1994. 
Kong: No, no! Our father died in 1997, so they all ran away around 1998 or 
1999. When my father died, the other KR were afraid so they ran away. My 
husband was a person who took the people to put them in prison. The one who 
ran away was the village chief during the KR time. So when my husband had a 
problem, this other man ran away. He had lived peacefully but in 1997 there 
was a problem at my house so he disappeared. The people knew that he 
worked in the KR prison so the people got angry with him. Because the people 
were angry, he had some problems with the people but I dared not to say 
anything because I was afraid also.  
Sister: He sold his land and farm and everything here. 
                                               
10 The other perpetrator coping strategies of withdrawal, denial, rationalization, good deeds and 
showing respect were discussed in Chapter 5, while the strategies of apology will be discussed 




Kong: He ran without even getting all the money for his farm, and he took his 
whole family with him. He did not even do a ceremony when his wife died. His 
wife had died before my father was shot (IV # 51). 
 
As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, although particularly cruel perpetrators were 
killed more often than those who were less cruel, even very cruel accused perpetrators 
could live freely in the village, if they were protected by powerful people. For example, 
the accused perpetrator (Tang) living in Southwest-1 was protected by the close 
proximity of several other former KR cadres, and a powerful family member in the local 
commune office (see page 175 above). A victim who had lived under the control of 
Tang when he was a group leader observed about the former KR cadres: ‘They live 
amongst their group members, so they can live together easily. That area was a well-
known KR area in the past’ (IV # 97). In another example, an accused perpetrator was 
reported to have returned freely to his community in spite of allegedly killing thousands 
– because he was now protected by powerful local politicians and by the good 
reputation of his religious father (IV # 94). 
Thus, amongst the communities of this study, we see that revenge killings 
happened frequently in post-KR Cambodia, usually immediately after the fall of the KR, 
but sometimes the killings were delayed by years. The likelihood of a revenge killing 
occurring was also dependent upon the coping strategies of the perpetrators – if they 
fled in time they could escape being killed, or if they relied upon power or politics. In 
order to illustrate the more specific dynamics of a revenge killing, we next examine the 
case of Sunh, who confessed to killing for revenge. 
 
Confession to a Revenge Killing 
When cycles of revenge begin, and acts of vengeance are committed by 




perpetrator then becomes a victim. One of my key informants, Sunh was a KR victim, 
a current and former soldier, and a former village chief. He provided several 
interviews, including one of the most informative narratives in this research study, as 
he and other villagers spoke openly about several revenge killings in Southwest-1. I 
had heard about the revenge killings from several other respondents in the village prior 
to meeting Sunh. For example, a former village chief (victim) spoke first about the 
perpetrator that had been killed, and then about Sunh, who had taken revenge:  
That perpetrator had killed so many people! But in 1979, they killed him back. 
They told me that the KR who had killed my brother-in-law was killed in 
revenge because he had killed a lot of people. Oh he killed hundreds and 
hundreds and he was very, very cruel. I don't know exactly where he was 
killed, I just heard that they took revenge and they took him away. They don't 
like to talk about this too much, as they are afraid there will be revenge back 
against them so they keep the story secret (IV # 29). 
 
In my first interview with Sunh, not intending to ask directly about the sensitive 
topic of the revenge killing, I asked him about the trials for the KR – but he answered 
by talking about a revenge killing: ‘I killed the bad people already; those others are no 
problem. Let the court try them. I killed the mobile group chief (mei kang chelat) 
because he was the one who beat us at that time. I killed only one because the others 
ran away (IV # 31). Later however, after several interviews, he spoke about other 
revenge killings he had done in the village of his wife, where he returned after the KR 
period. Because Sunh was in a position of power as the village chief after the KR 
period, who in the early 1980s also controlled the village militia, these acts of revenge 
against former KR could be seen as a form of state-sanctioned summary execution.11
In my fifth and final interview with Sunh, in a joint interview with a victim who 
had lost her entire family, Sunh first spoke about the revenge killing he had prevented, 
  
                                               
11 As noted by Rigby, the confusion and lack of institutions in the aftermath of massive violence 
(such as that in the KR period), can allow for revenge killings, and even condone them: ‘In the 
absence of any due process, of course, people have no formal means of clearing the family 
name, no right of appeal, no recourse to law, and can be driven to seek their own vengeance’ 





and his current relationship with the accused perpetrator Tang, and then he began to 
speak about the revenge he had taken: 
I first met [Tang] in 1980. When [Tang] transported sugar cane by ox cart, my 
brother took a machete and went to kill him. But I prevented him from killing 
[Tang], even though he had killed lots of people. At that time, [Tang] untied his 
cows and ran away. Because our friend had told my brother that [Tang] had 
killed his mother and caused his father to become crazy. I prevented my 
brother from taking revenge, because I thought that we should not take 
revenge ourselves. I thought to let someone else do it, as I didn’t want my 
brother to kill him. But later I did it myself, not to [Tang], but to others. I killed A 
Den, A Neat, A Uon, A Phem: about five or six people who were chiefs of the 
district.12
 
 I killed them all. There were lots of people who I couldn’t remember. 
We did it one by one. We arrested them and kept them in the school. There 
were three of us who worked together. This happened in 1980, because they 
had run away, but then they came back to the village. We didn’t know where 
they ran to, but when they came back to the village the villagers told me. So we 
let [Tang] escape and then we arrested the others and put them in the school 
and then we killed them one by one. They did not admit their guilt, but we knew 
they were chiefs in the district so we arrested them (IV # 97). 
A bit later in the conversation, we returned to the topic of the accused 
perpetrator Tang, and Sunh stated that he had not seen Tang for 20 years, since the 
time when he had saved him from being killed, even though they live less than a 
kilometre apart. But Sunh said he still felt anger towards him, implying he would still 
like to take revenge: 
[Tang] saw me at that time in 1980 when I saved him. At seven in the morning, 
he took sugar cane from his house. At that time, my older brother carried a long 
machete in order to kill him but I was holding a gun and saw him so I prevented 
my brother from doing it. When I saw [Tang] yesterday, I did not recognize him 
because he is so old, but I could still recognize his face a bit. I had not seen 
him for almost 20 years. I still feel angry (khoeng) also right now but I am lazy 
to do anything against him (IV # 97). 
 
In this next passage, I asked Sunh what his religion taught him about revenge. 
Although he stated that his religion does not allow revenge, when I asked how he felt 
about his past act of revenge, he answered that he was still angry about the acts of the 
perpetrator. I had expected him to express perhaps remorse, or at least acknowledge 
                                               
12 The prefix ‘A’ in Khmer can indicate familiarity such as when referring to a close friend, or 





that his acts of revenge went against his religious training, but he talked about the 
relief he felt from taking revenge: 
 My religion says we should not kill others. They teach us to do good, not to 
take revenge. And Islam also preaches like Buddhism, if we do good, we get 
good. If we do bad, we get bad. Nowadays, the Imam calls us for meetings in 
the mosque and tells us to live together (ruop ruom), to not fight, to be friends 
with all people: not only with Khmer but people in all nations. After I took 
revenge, I still felt angry, but now the country has laws so we must respect the 
laws; we can’t do anything outside the law. We respect the religion, and the 
religion tells us to stop killing. . . But I feel a bit relieved because I took revenge 
already against the person who did bad things to me (IV # 32).  
 
In contrast to these comments which indicated he was proud of the revenge he 
had taken, and that it had provided him some relief, Sunh also spoke about his mental 
health and acknowledged the internal toll the revenge killing had taken on him and his 
need to go to a traditional healer: 
 After I did the revenge killings, I was about to go crazy. When my father was 
alive he took me to meet a traditional healer (Kru Khmer). He said that when I 
killed many people, the spirit of the ghosts would come to live inside my body. 
So as a traditional healer he was able to release the evil from me. As I 
remember he didn’t use medicine; he just touched my hands and used magical 
words, so he was a magical healer (kru mon akum). He just caught my hands 
and I was very scared. Now I am fully recovered. The healing took about one 
week (IV # 97).  
 
Sunh spoke on the topic of reconciliation: ‘Now we have all stopped being 
angry. Everything is finished. There is no grudge. In the past, I couldn’t walk alone in 
this area and I had to carry a gun if I went out. But now I can go anywhere alone; I am 
not afraid. We don’t ill-treat them and they don’t ill-treat us. Even ten years ago I still 
had to carry a gun with me’ (IV # 97). As also described in the last chapter, he, as did 
many others, stated he had reconciled, but he still spoke about ‘them’ and ‘us’, 
indicating the deep divisions that persist in his community.  
 Sunh also admitted that the families of the people he had killed for revenge had 
raised law suits against him, but that the district level authorities did not follow up on 
these complaints (at the time of the killings he was a village chief). Apparently, at least 




lived close to a KR stronghold and the area was constantly being attacked through the 
1980s until the mid-1990s. Sunh also presumed that these perpetrators were living in 
fear, as the balance of power had shifted to give the former victim more power than the 
perpetrator. 
After I took revenge, I heard about their families, who are still living in that 
former KR village nearby. The families of those people are afraid; even though 
they made a complaint against me once. They asked me for compensation, but 
I didn’t pay them. They once complained to the district office but later it was 
quiet; the district office didn’t work on this. This was in 1981 or so, two years 
after the revenge killing (IV # 97). 
 
I then asked how the families of the perpetrators who had been killed in 
revenge killings felt now, and a family member of Sunh replied: ‘Their families don't 
hold a grudge because they know also that their brother was cruel when he was the 
village chief. They also don’t dare to take any more revenge against us. The anger at 
that time was very hot’ (IV # 32). This discussion of hot and cold is a common way to 
describe emotions, to which we turn in the next section on blood debts and hot anger. 
 
Blood Debts, Hot Anger, and Revenge 
 The concepts of ‘blood debts’, hot anger, and revenge are closely linked 
(Gottesman 2003: 37-38). During the KR period, the word ‘blood’ was used 
dramatically in two revolutionary songs: ‘Glittering red blood blankets the earth, 
Sacrificial blood to liberate the people: . . . Seething with anger, let us move into the 
attack’ (Locard 2004: 39 – 43).13
                                               
13 ‘The Red Flag of the Revolution’ and the ‘Dazzling Victory of 17 April!’ (Locard 2004: 39-43). 
Hinton suggested that the KR’s frequent use of the word ‘blood’ was a ‘metaphoric call for 
revenge’ (Hinton 2000: 34). Blood and blood debts are also another way Cambodians describe 
reparations or revenge – for example, if a car hits and kills a child, the community members 
may chase after the driver and kill him to pay the blood debt.  
 In this research, some respondents brought up the 
topic of blood debts. For example, this commune councillor and KR victim suggested 




For me, the important idea is to be granted reparations from the criminals’ top 
leaders. If we make them re-pay by blood, this will not work out. I have no 
intention of being paid back by blood or taking revenge any more. My hopes 
are economic stability and happiness, and that Cambodian people could live 
happily and they gradually be filled with prosperity, to make their living (IV # 
100). 
 
In another example, this former KR ‘base’ person and wife of a former KR 
village chief stated she had lost many family members during the KR regime. When 
asked about reparations for her relatives who had been killed, she answered in terms 
of blood: ‘I do not know what to do because they have died already, and if we want the 
compensation by blood [blood debt or revenge], it would not be possible. So, they 
have died already, it is over’ (IV # 54). 
This UN/NGO worker spoke about the strong anger in the years after the KR 
fell, which gradually decreased through the mid-1980s. He had been a young boy 
living near the Thai-Cambodian border during the KR regime. He was later involved in 
the resistance movement and had fled to the Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand. 
Here he speaks about anger and hot revenge: 
At the time of the liberation in 1979, through 1982, we were all full of anger and 
revenge inside the heart. I knew one person who took revenge. One KR group 
chief had beaten the victim Mr. Smei in my village often, who suffered greatly 
under the torture. In the Khmer resistance time, the perpetrator went to the 
refugee camp. Then the perpetrator was killed in a revenge killing there. In the 
resistance time there were many, many killings: lots of fighting and lots of 
revenge, murder and robbery. So, the action of the revenge killing was 
tolerated by all. In 1979, 1980, and 1981 it was still fresh. If anyone talked 
about the KR they became very emotional. Violence could happen very easily, 
leading to revenge, up until about 1985, when people began to think about a 
new life, and a new way. We started to have reconciliation, and we began to 
have a concept of solidarity and brotherhood. The revenge idea was less by 
1985. And now, there is no more ‘hot’ revenge’ (IV # 118). 
 
 This young village chief spoke about revenge in terms of ‘hot blood’, though in 
reference to others and not himself.  
Of the people who took my parents away to be killed, some of them ran away 
and some of them are still living in this commune. I meet them normally and I 
don’t get angry. The chief of [a neighbouring] village knew the perpetrator and 
he came to take revenge here in 1979 but later he was killed too. I think it was 




I forgot already. I know who took my parents and I have suffering in my heart 
but I take the dhamma [Buddhist teachings] to put in my heart. I think that they 
did these things because somebody ordered them to do so (IV # 91). 
 
 Finally, some respondents were still full of anger, and had to actively look for 
ways to reduce that anger and consciously try to release their desire for revenge. This 
commune chief (victim) explained: ‘Although I am full of anger, I can gradually reduce 
it after chatting with you both or with my friends. I sometimes walk around and see 
something good or that makes me happy so I can reduce my anger. It doesn’t allow 
me to still hold the grudge forever’ (IV # 100).14
 In Cambodia, hot anger is used to describe situations of extreme anger, and is 
often linked with revenge as the respondents above have demonstrated. This hot 
anger, as well as revenge in general, can be decreased by various factors which are 
the subject of the next section.  
 
 
Factors Influencing Revenge: To seek or not to seek. . .  
The amount and type of vengeance taken depends upon many factors, several 
of which were amongst the factors related to acceptance and community (which were 
discussed in the last two chapters), while some new factors were identified particular 
to revenge. In Chapter 5, factors affecting victim-perpetrator relations included: type 
and gravity of offense; motivation, fear, community population, frequency of contact, 
location and proximity; and poverty, age, and ignorance. In addition, the coping 
strategies used by the perpetrator were important as to whether they denied or 
rationalized their crimes, or on the other hand expressed remorse, respect, or apology. 
Additional factors were identified in Chapter 6 that affected victims’ acceptance of 
perpetrators, including: education; relations before the KR period; trauma; behaviour of 
                                               
14 Additional ways to reduce anger and promote healing are discussed in Chapter 8, on the 




perpetrators, culture; violence and the denial of conflict; hierarchy; and patronage. In 
this first sub-section I discuss particular factors influencing victims’ decisions to take 
revenge 
Particular Factors Influencing Victims’ Decisions to Take 
Revenge 
We first turn to ways in which respondents brought up the issue of the rule of 
law when they were discussing revenge.  
Rule of Law 
Several respondents spoke about the importance of the rule of law as a 
moderating force when victims consider acts of revenge. Some respondents stated 
they wished to take revenge, but were unable to do so because of current laws 
(implying if there were no laws, such as in the immediate aftermath of the KR period, 
they would have been tempted to take revenge). For example, this (victim) commune 
chief had just told us several stories about violence during the KR period and, when 
asked how he felt talking about the difficult past, he brought up the issue of rule of law 
and revenge:  
Revenge is full in my brain, but it cannot be practiced because there are rules 
in our society, so we could not use our emotion to commit any crimes 
intentionally. If we commit revenge, we will be sentenced so that we cannot do 
anything. If revenge happened during periods of upheaval, just after the KR 
period, it could be put into practice. If we saw a person who was cruel to us, we 
could beat them. But now, we cannot do this. We are still full of anger, but 
nothing could be implemented and we could not kill them because our country 
has rules. So we could not (IV # 100).  
 
 Another commune chief reinforced this view, explaining that the rule of law 
allowed perpetrators to live more comfortably in society.  
The perpetrators ran away in 1979 because they were afraid of people taking 
revenge against them. There were about four perpetrators here, but they were 
just lower level spies (chhlop). But now there is only one left who still stays 
here. He does not feel afraid because he knows that the policy of the 




members were angry but we could not do anything because of the policy. They 
are still angry, but they must follow the law, and they are also waiting to see the 
trial (IV # 2).  
 
Thus a reliance on the rule of law can increase survivors’ comfort levels and 
can provide them with the feelings of security that are an important basis for 
reconciliation. Another important influence is that of relatives and friends. 
Influence of Relatives and Friends 
Relatives, friends, and neighbours can influence whether or not acts of revenge 
will occur. For example, as noted in the section on confession above, Sunh recounted 
a story in which he prevented his brother from taking revenge. In a different 
conversation, Sunh stated that his brother’s commander had also prevented his 
brother from taking revenge. In another example, two former KR cadres in Southwest-
1 spoke almost boastfully about their actions to prevent other villagers from taking 
revenge against a known and serious perpetrator.15 Some comments from 
respondents who prevented others from taking revenge were related to saving them 
from the sin of the bad deeds in their next lives.16
Revenge and Buddhism 
 The relationship between revenge 
and Buddhism is elaborated upon in the next section. 
Some Cambodians have refrained from acts of revenge based on their 
religious beliefs.17
                                               
15 See references about preventing others from taking revenge, on pages 174-175. 
 In Buddhism, the belief in karma (action of cause and effect) 
reassures some victims that perpetrators will be punished (or will receive a [negative] 
 
16 This situation of friends preventing others from taking revenge in order to save them from 
bad karma was also reported in the film ‘Deacon of Death’ (van den Berg and van de Put 
2004). 
 
17 As noted previously, although Christian, Cham, and animist beliefs are also important in 
Cambodia, I have had to limit my discussion to Buddhist beliefs since 96 percent of the 





effect from their past bad actions) in either this life or a later life – thus freeing some of 
them from feelings of revenge in this life.18
Buddhist beliefs also encourage Cambodians not to take revenge, as it leads to 
never-ending cycles of revenge and bad karma. This UN/NGO worker observed: 
  
There was a revenge killing there by Smei against that perpetrator. Smei had 
been a good person before; he dared not even to kill a chicken. He is now back 
in the village, but now he is paralyzed, he had a stroke and he is nearly 50. 
Maybe because he committed this sin, this is his karma? But no one blamed 
him, that was the war (IV # 118). 
 
Several respondents spoke of the laws of karma as a sort of revenge, in that 
people who had done bad deeds during the KR period had already died. For example, 
this UN/NGO worker observed:  
I do not know about all those perpetrators, maybe the gods killed them already. 
[Laughing] Since the KR time, the people who tried to kill me, I don't know 
maybe I have some spirit thing in me or something, but those who did bad 
things to me, they have all died. Such as the chief of my group who beat me 
with a stick, people told me she died. And the teacher who was the big boss of 
my other second team who had tied me up, she has also died, after the KR 
period. All the people who treated me very badly, they died already, all of them! 
(IV # 40) 
 
 This young Buddhist monk in Southwest-2 (where several accused 
perpetrators lived) attributed the lack of revenge in his community to the population’s 
commitment to Buddhism, in that they feared problems in the next life if they took 
revenge. The monk had heard about the KR period from his parents and other elders 
and had known the accused perpetrator as they had both lived in the same Buddhist 
temple:  
Yes this village has reconciled since the war. Before [the accused perpetrator] 
was an Achar [Buddhist layman] here. He killed many people. In 1979 people 
                                               
18 However, this belief in karma can in itself be a form of revenge, and does not necessarily 
bring relief or calm; the white, hot anger of revenge can still be present, as in this quote from a 
Cambodian-American author: ‘Pol Pot and other dead Khmer Rouge are now suffering severely 
in burning hell for every single Khmer life they had destroyed during their reign of terror. They 
will be there for millions of lifetimes yet to come, one lifetime for every life they took. I felt 





had a lot of anger against him, and they went to kill him but he ran away. Now 
they see if they take revenge, if they see killing, this will continue forever. Now 
we can do ceremonies together, speak, eat rice, and smile at each other, it 
means they reconciled (phsah phsaa). Achar Khun was forced to kill others. He 
had gone to live in another province, but his home village is near here. When 
he came back from here in 1980 to do a ceremony they tried to ambush him to 
kill him for revenge because they were very angry, but they failed. Later on, up 
until he died last year, he could come freely and not be afraid they would want 
to kill him because they stopped taking revenge, because they had been 
educated about the dhamma. They listen to the radio show by Venerable But 
Sovang so they understand about the dhamma. Their parents who are 
Buddhists tell them do not take revenge because it will lead to a bad fate for 
them now or in the next life. So they stopped; and they forgave (ak hao se 
kam) him (IV # 24). 
 
The Buddhist belief in compassion was also raised by some respondents. An 
Achar (Buddhist layman) said that he no longer held a grudge against former KR 
perpetrators and even prays for them: ‘We don’t hold a grudge. I also dedicate some 
offering to them because many of them died also. I prayed for them to have a good 
next life and not to do bad things like they did in this life’ (IV # 10). This elderly woman 
victim stated: ‘I think that because both I and [accused perpetrator] are Khmer, the 
Buddha said that people should not take revenge. Moreover, everything happened a 
long time ago. Every day, I just listen to the dhamma so I could finish everything in my 
life. If we killed him, how about his children; what do they eat? So it is better not to kill, 
but we just bring the peace to finish everything’ (IV # 108). 
 As the above respondent was expressing compassion for the perpetrator’s 
family if someone were to take revenge upon him, she also mentioned that the 
influence of time can also reduce the chance of revenge, which is discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
Time 
 As noted in several quotes in this chapter above, the passage of time can 




important factor in reconciliation.19
There was one famous killer in the village, who used to be an Achar and who 
was very well respected but who then became a killer. At the end of the KR 
regime, when there were just a few days after the Vietnamese invasion, there 
were about 60 women whose husbands were killed by him or under his orders, 
they were chasing him and they killed him. They surrounded him while he tried 
to run away to the rice field to go home. Two of the widows, one with a big knife 
climbed up. He was killed instantly by 60 women, like an upsurge of anger. But 
after that, another famous guy was not killed, he was much more famous than 
the one who was killed, and he now is the commune council leader. Soon after 
the Vietnamese came in, people in the whole village were searching for him. 
He was the chief of collective (mei sahakar) and was a very bad man. But four 
years later he came home and he lived very peacefully. Now he has become a 
commune council leader! (IV # 125) 
 A commune chief agreed that time reduced 
grudges: ‘The longer years have passed, the more the grudge is removed! So 
nowadays we do not think much about it. It is gradually removed’ (IV # 86). Although 
several respondents reported that very cruel perpetrators were either killed 
immediately after the KR fell, or were killed when they returned to their home villages, 
some respondents reported cases when perpetrators were spared when they returned 
a few years later, as in this incident reported by a UN/NGO worker:  
 
 The passage of time also serves to heal some types of mental health distress 
(van de Put and Eisenbruch 2002: 151-152); trauma is the subject of the next section.  
Trauma 
In a study on the impact of cognitive behaviour therapy on 60 Cambodian 
clients of counselling, the majority of whom had PTSD symptoms, Lo found that as 
PTSD symptoms decreased, so did the desire for revenge20
                                               
19 See page 55. Time was found to be an important factor in the reduction of anger and 
revenge by Etcheson in his interviews of rural Cambodians (Etcheson 2005b: 214-5). 
 (2005: 14). Similarly, in a 
nationwide survey of 1,000 randomly selected Cambodians, Sonis et al. found that 
respondents older than 35 years of age, who had higher desire for revenge, were more 
 





likely to have PTSD than those with a lower desire for revenge (2009: 534).21 In their 
study of a group of 130 Cambodians, Field and Chhim found revenge was positively 
related to PTSD symptoms (2008: 363-4).22
Although I did not specifically study in isolation these two variables (revenge 
and trauma), and because my study was qualitative, I cannot draw definitive 
conclusions on this topic. However anecdotally, amongst the five victim respondents 
who showed symptoms of mental health disorder or PTSD (they ruminated on 
narratives of KR suffering, and spoke about anxiety and nightmares) all of them also 
had a strong desire for revenge – if not through a revenge killing, then by strong 
interest in punishment through the trials.
 In addition they found that feelings of 
revenge were also related to the following factors: less social support during the KR 
regime; lower educational levels and occupational status; and higher disclosure 
(speaking about the past). However the factors of trauma exposure and current social 
support were found not to be related to a desire for revenge (Field and Chhim 2008: 
362-6). A lower desire for revenge was found amongst those who were able to find 
some positive benefit or learning from the past violent events, and a large percentage 
(72 percent) of the study group were able to find such benefit from the KR period (Field 
and Chhim 2008: 364).  
23
                                               
21 This finding only applied when using a bivariate model; differences found in a multivariate 
model were not found to be statistically significant (Sonis et al. 2009: 534). 
 Field and Chhim suggested that victims with 
a continued desire for disclosure (talking about the past trauma of mass violence) had 
a greater desire for revenge: this desire could be due to a failure to gain closure of the 
events (2008: 368). Strong desires for revenge were linked also to how cruel the 
perpetrator was perceived to have been, as victims assessed the type and gravity of 
 
22 But the relationship between PTSD and revenge occurred only when comparing the two 
variables alone. 
 




the offense which I will discuss next in the context of factors affecting victim-
perpetrator relations. 
Factors Affecting Victim-Perpetrator Relations and Revenge 
This sub-section reviews factors affecting victim-perpetrator relations that were 
brought up in Chapters 5 and 6 – but here with an emphasis on how they relate to 
revenge. These factors include: the type and gravity of the offense; motivation of the 
perpetrator; community population, and proximity (of victims and perpetrators). 
Type and Gravity of Offense 
 As explained in the last chapter and illustrated in the victim decision-making 
tree24
1: We arrested some of the [KR] spies, village chiefs, and chiefs of the groups 
because we were afraid that people would take revenge. We took them to 
educate them. We did not keep them for a specific period and sometimes we 
sent them to live far away from the place they lived during the KR regime. We 
were afraid the relatives of the victims would take revenge against them. 
, the more cruel perpetrators were, the more likely victims were to seek revenge 
against them. If perpetrators were not perceived to be cruel (i.e., their offenses were 
seen as less grave or there were other mitigating factors), the perpetrators were 
usually allowed to live freely in the community. These two government officials (1 and 
2) were talking about the period immediately after the KR were overthrown in 1978 in 
this passage: 
2: But sometimes people took revenge secretly during the disorder right after 
the KR regime. For example if I was in this cooperative and the chief of this 
cooperative was cruel, killed people, or forced them to work too hard, then the 
people got angry and took revenge right after the 1979 liberation. However, the 
policy of the government did not allow the people to take revenge. 
2: If the chief of the group was not cruel, the people did not take revenge, as 
the people loved him too. Some good chiefs of groups are living now but some 
bad ones are not living here. The bad ones mostly are living far away in other 
places such as a third country. They could not live in their villages so they ran 
to the Thai border and then the UN took them to a third country. Some of them 
now dare to come home to visit, because now no one can touch them. The 
people respect the law (IV # 123). 
 
                                               




 Another reason perpetrators might be spared was if victims could empathize 
with the motivations of the perpetrators.  
Motivation 
 As noted in Chapter 5, the motivation of the perpetrators as perceived by 
victims was an important factor in shaping victim-perpetrator relations: it was also a 
key indicator of whether or not the victim would take revenge. If perpetrators were 
seen to be acting on orders from above rather than pursuing their own preferences, 
then victims were more likely to regulate their desire for revenge. For example, this 
victim commune chief noted that the accused perpetrator (Pel) was following orders: 
[Pel] was a spy of the commune (chhlop khum). He guided people to be 
arrested, and also arrested them himself. But to arrest this one or that one was 
not his plan: those were the plans of the village chiefs and commune chiefs 
who ordered him. Because he was a spy, he was the one who took the orders. 
It was difficult to say who did the killing though (IV # 86). 
 
 The concept of the heart is very important for Cambodians and in one interview 
a monk observed that a perpetrator was allowed to go free because he had not killed 
of his own volition, or ‘with his heart’: ‘After the Vietnamese came in during the PRK, 
the people took revenge against those perpetrators who had killed their parents. Achar 
Khun was lucky because he did the killing without heart, he was forced to do it, so they 
did not kill him’ (IV # 24). 
Some respondents were able to allow for other extenuating circumstances, 
such as if the person had not killed, they would have been killed themselves. In one 
example, this respondent who lived in the native village of a senior KR leader 
understood that the leader’s family suffered also: ‘I don't hold a grudge because they 
had some family members die also’ (IV # 119). This understanding of the motivation of 
the perpetrators allowed some Cambodians to release their desire for revenge and let 




Community Population and Proximity  
 Other factors affecting victim-perpetrator relations, and hence the incidence of 
revenge, included the demography of the local community, particularly the percentage 
of victims versus perpetrators living in the community and the physical proximity 
between victim and perpetrator.25
 In a similar example in Southwest-2, a former KR cadre observed that an 
accused perpetrator who he had saved from being killed in the post-KR period 
remained relatively safe from revenge attacks because he lived in a village of primarily 
‘base’ people against whom he had not committed crimes. His victims were all in the 
neighbouring village: ‘The police knew that he had done bad things, but now they feel 
relieved and they don’t care. He killed only 17 April people [‘new’ people] at that time 
but he did not kill the ‘base’ people so they did not get angry with him’ (IV # 93).  
 A commune chief in Southwest-2 observed that the 
perpetrator’s direct neighbours were all ‘base’ people and thus had less interest in 
vengeance (because they had suffered less than the ‘new’ people), while the villages 
of victims or ‘new people’ were more distant so had less contact with the accused 
perpetrator: ‘[Pel’s] relationships in his village are normal, because in his village the 
people were not ill-treated. The communists considered the poor people in his village 
to be the peasant class [‘base’ people] who supported the KR party’ (IV # 86). 
 
 In conclusion, this section has reviewed factors influencing victims’ decisions 
as to whether or not to take revenge. A large variety of factors are involved, including 
some that are weighed in the heat of the moment, and some that change with 
reflection. This process of weighing factors happens unconsciously and is all part of 
the process of reconciliation. The next section deals with the relationship between 
reconciliation and revenge. 
                                               




Reconciliation and Revenge 
This thesis has presented a model of reconciliation which can be applied to 
communities in conflict, as they move towards peace. The model shows transition from 
independence to interdependence, from non-acceptance to full acceptance, and from 
revenge to reconciliation. This section reviews findings pertinent to the relationship 
between revenge and reconciliation. Etcheson suggested that revenge killings were 
used as a means of reconciliation or restoring social harmony in the early years after 
the KR fell: 
. . . [C]ertain instances of extrajudicial execution played a key role in re-
establishing social harmony in the immediate aftermath of the Khmer Rouge 
regime. In 1979 and 1980, the Vietnamese military carried out summary 
executions of Khmer Rouge cadre judged to be ‘especially cruel’ by villagers. 
This reassured many Cambodians that the abuses of the recent past would not 
be repeated, helping to consolidate one of the key prerequisites for 
reconciliation, a sense of physical security (2003: 9).  
 
I concur with Etcheson that revenge killings in that tumultuous post-KR period 
appeared to offer some relief to the traumatized population that had lived under 
conditions of extreme hardship and cruelty. Key informant Sunh confessed to the 
revenge killing, stating that he felt relieved afterwards (see page 180). As the entire 
community seemed satisfied and even complicit in this self-help justice through 
summary execution, it supports the view that some sort of justice is necessary for deep 
reconciliation.  
Although many respondents stated that the time had passed for revenge, and 
they were no longer as angry as before, one respondent spoke of reaching out 
towards a former perpetrator – which can be described as an act of reconciliation and 
even forgiveness (Hartwell 1999: 3). The elderly victim recounted how he spoke 
directly with the perpetrator about the past, and about the possibility of revenge.26
                                               
26 See page 194 for the interview (IV # 108). 
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victim excused the perpetrator because he was under orders (motivation), (2) the 
gravity of the offense was not severe (he was less cruel), (3) the perpetrator 
confessed, (4) the victim felt that the perpetrator was now fearful of the victim (which 
implies some acknowledgement of the crime), and (5) the perpetrator showed respect 
and remorse by buying a gift for the victim: 
The perpetrator had returned to his home village but did not dare to meet 
anybody because he was so afraid. But accidentally he met me and I invited 
him to eat rice at my house because I thought . . . he had nowhere to eat. I told 
him not to fear me because I had no time to take revenge, and because we 
were both Khmer people. Moreover, I bought wine for him to drink in order to 
make him not be afraid because he just came to find his children . . . at first he 
did not dare to drink. I told him not to fear; please drink because I did not want 
to take revenge (sang soek). It was too late to take revenge because you are 
Khmer and I am also. So he lifted his hands to salute and thanked me. I said 
that he did not need to thank me, because it was just my greeting to him and 
even if I had wanted to kill him before, now it was too late to kill. He wished me 
to have good luck and he would come to visit me next time. He told me that he 
would come again. . . He came in 1999 and in 2001 from a distant province. He 
sent me one tao [15 kilogram measure] and a half of rice, because I was 
honest with him. We did not feel anger against him because he confessed 
(sara’pheap) and explained that they had ordered him to do those things. It was 
not his wish. He admitted the things that he did; he had been a soldier in the 
KR period, but his job was the chief who controlled the workers in the rice mill 
hall, though there were other persons who were higher than him. He was not 
so cruel; the one who was very cruel was his chief (IV # 108). 
 
In conclusion, this last quote incorporates many of the factors influencing the 
decision-making process of victims as they are met with perpetrators in their 
communities.  
 
To summarize the other findings in this chapter, I found that most respondents 
reported incidents of revenge killings that they had seen directly or heard of from 
others. In the communities of study, revenge in the immediate aftermath of the KR 
period was reported to be widespread and frequent. Respondents reported that most 
perpetrators who were killed were crueller than other KR, or were responsible for 
killing many people. When former KR were seen as trying to help the community or the 




to the community.27 Most of the killings took place immediately after the KR period 
(1979-1981) though some were delayed, as grudges were held for a few years until 
the mid-1980s – there were no reports of revenge thereafter. Some former KR 
perpetrators who were sent away to prison, or who ran away to the Thai-Cambodian 
border, were killed when they came back. In other cases, KR perpetrators were saved 
from revenge killings by their own friends or families, or by friends or families of those 
contemplating revenge. In addition I heard no reports where revenge extended to 
family members or their networks of friends and colleagues as had happened during 
the KR regime.28
 
 Many former KR perpetrators live peacefully (if not without fear) in 
Cambodian communities today. The next chapter discusses the processes upon which 
those perpetrators and their victims have relied as they progressed from the period of 
mass violence to coexistence today.  
  
                                               
27 In societies recovering from mass violence, there is a great focus on forgiveness and 
reconciliation, but perhaps more important is the ability to refrain from revenge. In situations of 
recovery from mass violence, a shallow coexistence without revenge is the minimum standard 
needed for society to function and, in the short term, may indeed be the best that can be hoped 
for. As noted by Stovel: ‘For the purposes of national peacebuilding, there is no convincing 
reason why the victim needs to reconcile with, or even forgive, the perpetrator. The victim 
should be the one to decide whether forgiving or reconciling with the perpetrator is beneficial for 
her emotional or spiritual health. However, in the interests of peace, the victim does need to 
agree to not take revenge’ (Stovel 2003: 11). 
 
28 Vengeance can be seen as a continuum of varying degree, from no vengeance or no 
response (turn the other cheek), an equal response (an eye for an eye), or a greater response. 
In Cambodia, Hinton describes this greater response as ‘disproportionate revenge’ which lies in 
contrast to notions of Western law and justice, and of Buddhist views on non-violence (2005: 
28-9). Although the KR functioned under the premise of disproportionate revenge as they 
pulled up all the ‘roots of the weeds’, exterminating entire family lines, the revenge spoken 
about by respondents in this study was not disproportionate. Locard also disputes the concept 
of disproportionate revenge in today’s society: ‘Do we see ‘disproportionate revenge’ today 
when farmers are deprived of their tiny land or exploited by monopolistic tradesmen or 




CHAPTER 8 – Processes of Reconciliation 
 
When societies are left in a non-reconciled, post-mass-violence limbo, the 
population may remain traumatized and live in misery. Cycles of revenge can return 
again and again. In order to avoid the continuing trauma or cycles of revenge, victims 
and perpetrators must both be involved in processes which lead towards reconciliation 
and healing of society. However the initial steps or actions of these processes may 
differ: while most involve both victims and perpetrators, some processes are acts 
undertaken by perpetrators (apology, acknowledgement, confession); while 
forgiveness and forgetting can be initiated by victims rather than perpetrators. The 
purpose of this chapter is to review seven different processes of reconciliation, and 
how Cambodians have incorporated various aspects of these processes on their 
journey towards reconciliation.1
 In the last chapter the concept of revenge, the degrees of revenge, and the 
factors that affect it were discussed. We now turn to the opposite of revenge, to 
respondents’ views about processes of reconciliation. Seven processes are analysed: 
(1) build relationship, trust, and interdependence; (2) re-humanize, and develop 
compassion and empathy; and (3) heal hearts and minds; (4) acknowledge, confess 
and show remorse; (5) apologize; (6) forgive; and (7) forget. 
 
 
                                               
1 Sometimes the processes can be facilitated by third parties, but in this thesis I have focused 
on processes that originate within the individual (victim or perpetrator). Although the 
terminology varies, there are a variety of other activities which could be termed processes or 
approaches to reconciliation. These include ceremonies, rituals, memorials, reparations, public 
ceremonial and symbolic acts, contact, projects, trials, and education. Although these are also 





1. Build Relationship, Trust, and Interdependence 
 Some of the first steps of building relationship and trust are reducing anger and 
being able to envision a future of peace. In one example in Northwest-4, communities 
joined together to improve security. A schoolteacher living in a contested border region 
described the steps between the three groups living in his area (Para, KR, and 
government):2
The people could not stop their anger immediately after the war. Whenever 
they met, they always ‘growled’ (krahoem) at each other. Sometimes, when 
they met, they fought each other for a few minutes; they did not stop being 
angry immediately. I did not know how the leaders were, but as for their 
soldiers, they would stop fighting immediately if their leader ordered them to 
stop. However, even when they stopped, they would still have small fights for a 
few weeks, or three or four months. They did not get along with each other 
(trovrov knea) immediately. For most of them, it was about one or two months 
until the lower-level soldiers could get along with each other. Nothing special 
happened during those two months, but they thought about it, and knew that 
even if they took revenge, they would be angrier and this anger would be 
spread out. Because of that, they calmed down and they could get along with 
each other. Moreover, people were happy because the villages could contact 
each other, and they did not worry so much about thieves because they could 
communicate with other villages. Before that, I could not go anywhere because 
the thieves would take the motorcycles along the road. For a long time 
afterwards, people observed that it was useless to be angry anymore so all the 
people calmed their anger down (ram ngoap). Eventually, they could even 
marry between the groups (IV# 104 NT). 
 
 
 As anger is gradually reduced, as described by the above respondent, other 
elements of relationship can be addressed, such as increasing tolerance and reducing 
discrimination. 
Tolerance and Discrimination 
The process of developing tolerance and decreasing discrimination is part of 
the process of building relationship. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the KR and ‘base’ 
people practiced extreme discrimination against ‘new’ people during the KR regime, 
and Chapter 6 reviewed how in Cambodia today the tables have turned, and former 
                                               
2 ‘Para’ refers to the non-communist soldiers who were fighting in the coalition with the KR from 




KR and ‘base’ people report a significant amount of discrimination against them (in 
return). However, this situation appears to be gradually decreasing, as some 
respondents reported lower levels of discrimination than initially. A schoolteacher living 
in a contested war-torn area with many different groups living side-by-side noted: ‘For 
example, the lower leaders of the KR such as the chief of sub-groups or chief of 
groups used to be violent at that time, but now the people don't discriminate (prakan) 
against each other; they love each other as brothers and sisters’ (IV # 107).  
As tolerance for the ‘other’ increases, people can gradually begin to 
communicate even after years of separation due to conflict. 
Communication and Humour 
Communicating and listening are important parts of building relationships. This 
expatriate UN/NGO worker spoke about how to build peace in Cambodia, and the 
importance of communication and spirituality:  
There is a great need [for reconciliation], but how to work on this? That was 
Maha [Ghosananda]’s gift to us. He needed organization to do the 
Dhammayietra [peace walk] — if there were no organizers there would not 
have been a walk. We would be worrying about how to organize, how many 
people do you need to have a movement, etc. One donor asked us this 
question, and Maha answered – ‘We need only one!’. One person can affect 
the spirit of many. Anyone can touch others. But, you do need a language in 
which to communicate. Every part of the population has a different language. 
But how to touch the spirit of the population. If you reach just one person, then 
that person can translate into their group’s language. For example, a reflection 
of the history of the suffering is an important lesson for Cambodian spirituality 
and healing, as in Maha’s peace prayer (IV # 39). 
 
Humour can be a useful tool in early stages of reconciliation: several 
respondents spoke about the need for humour as a means of building relationship in 
the early stages. For example an expatriate UN/NGO staff person recounted a 
conversation between former KR and government officials when they first met after the 
decades of war:  
Yes, there were difficulties but generally it [the initial meeting between KR and 




really, really funny stories . . . one of the Khmer Rouge guys said to a new guy 
from the Department of Education ‘where do you live again?’ And he explained 
where his house was, and the KR guy explained ‘Huh. This may be kind of 
rude but are you the guy that bombed my house many, many times?’ ‘Yeah, 
yeah . . . that was me.’ And they started laughing and he said ‘I forgive you.’ 
But you know, a number of examples of those sort of things—that once people 
started talking and they could see each other in a new role, they would share 
that sort of experience (IV # 27). 
 
 Another expatriate UN/NGO staff person who had been involved in an incident 
of violence perpetrated by some former KR soldiers spoke of his own personal 
experience using humour: ‘I think both sides were victims at one level . . . Because he 
was a victim of the whole situation, he was just a soldier. Here was someone I had 
been in a violent situation with, and he was the perpetrator of that violence. But what 
do you say? You laugh and you joke’ (IV # 39).  
As tolerance increases, and communication begins (sometimes through 
humour), other aspects of the process of building relationship may come into play, 
such as developing regard, recognition, and respect, the topic of the next sub-section. 
Regard, Recognition, and Respect 
The attitudes of regard, recognition, and respect (see Chapter 3 pages 62-63) 
are important factors that can develop during a process of reconciliation. The degrees 
to which these attitudes are achieved are important indicators of a deepening 
reconciliation process. Regard and recognition are inherent in the initial process of 
building relationship, while respect is a deeper, more multi-faceted attitude, related to 
fundamental human rights. Though only one of my respondents spoke about 
respecting their former enemies, a government official when asked about reconciliation 
related a story about reconciliation within his family, where mutual regard and 
recognition of the views of the two parties (he and his grandfather) were developed to 
achieve a condition of respect: 
 Reconciliation is (kar bangruop bangruom). For example, I tried to be close to 




so many questions. Before he was in the court, very close to the King, but 
during the election 1955, there was a split amongst our family members and I 
tried to ask him about this. Finally when he got sick, we were able to talk about 
it, and he realized we had different thinking, but he accepted that and we could 
share our views. Also for example about the holiday on 7 January3
 
 there were 
different ideas of some people, some thought the Vietnamese had invaded, 
and you know I am not pro-Vietnam, but if the Vietnamese had not come, 
would we Khmer even exist now? So we have to be realistic and see different 
sides. Before there was fighting, and we could not talk but if you move the 
people together at one table, we can start to understand each other. When 
there are different interpretations, if we move from the differences that are far 
from each other, and move to sit close by, we can understand each other and 
share views (IV # 132). 
 As the initial steps of reducing anger, increasing communication, and 
developing regard and respect are achieved, an important aspect of these initial steps 
is underpinned by the process of building trust. 
Trust 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the structure and rules of society during the KR 
regime were designed to break down traditional ties between family members and 
friends, and trust was broken (Luco 2002: 72; Zucker forthcoming: 1). The element of 
trust is a significant factor in reconciliation and rebuilding community, which was 
mentioned frequently in the interviews. One way to build trust was reported by this 
UN/NGO worker:  
 Until they believed us, we had to eat rice and do everything with them. If they 
invited us to their child’s wedding, we had to go, if they persuaded us to drink, 
we had to drink. Even if they went to hunt wild animals, we had to go – only if 
they tried to persuade us to kill people, we could not go. This could be 
considered politics, but our NGO considered it as our policy or technique. We 
avoided any accusations by not taking either side: when we went to the Para 
region, we would not downgrade the KR, and when we went to the KR region, 
we would not downgrade the Para. We did this because we did not want both 
sides to continue fighting each other anymore (IV # 103). 
 
                                               
3 A Cambodian national holiday on 7 January marks the end of the KR regime, when Vietnam 
and some early defectors from the KR regime swept into the country from Vietnam while the 
KR leadership fled to Thailand. Whether the Vietnamese invaded (the pro-non-Communist 




Building trust can be a long and delicate process, especially in post-conflict 
countries. An expatriate UN/NGO staff person working on relationship and trust-
building between young adults spoke about the time and experience needed to build 
trust: ‘It is true that after Pol Pot, trust had been broken. So how do communities build 
trust after such a nightmare? Trust is built from experience. People say “I don’t trust 
you yet, because I don’t know you. It takes time. I need to see that I can trust them”. Of 
course you need a minimum of trust or you cannot do anything with them’ (IV # 71). 
Trust may also be an issue at various levels, at the individual, community, and 
national levels, and can take place at different rates at different levels. Several 
respondents spoke about trusting internationals more than their fellow Cambodians. 
Many respondents were especially distrustful of the Cambodian government (which 
includes former KR) to carry out fair trials of former KR leaders through the ECCC. 
This respondent valued the justice he felt the ECCC would bring to him, which he 
could trust as a result of international involvement, as part of his process of 
reconciliation and healing:  
I am not hoping for 100 percent success of the ECCC, but I am hoping for just 
some parts only. If Khmer people sentence Khmer people, I would not trust 
them because the Khmer Rouge leaders are also Khmer people. Nowadays in 
the government, there are lots of Khmer Rouge leaders so the Khmer judges 
will not find justice for the victims and prisoners. If there are rules…when the 
Internationals come, I think they will pay attention for Khmer’s case (IV # 59).  
 
The next component of this process of building relationship in reconciliation is 
to build interdependence, one of the most complex and difficult steps. 
Interdependence 
One way to build interdependence is by reinforcing a common identity. The 
threat the KR regime brought to the Cambodian national identity was noted by many 
respondents in this study. They and other Cambodians over the years have said to me 




to terms with perpetrators, several mentioned reconciliation through common identity 
and interdependence through words such as these: ‘I told him not to fear me because I 
had no time to take the revenge because we were both Khmer people’ (IV # 108).4
Working Together 
 
Although there are many forms of interdependence (such as bilateral trading, lending 
and borrowing money, sharing and exchanging food), none of these were reported by 
respondents. Interdependence is one of the later, more complex and more difficult 
steps of the process of building relationship in reconciliation. As interdependence is 
developed, people recognize that they need each other to survive and to flourish in 
community, and have less chance then to return to a state of conflict.  
Relationships can be developed when former adversaries work together 
cooperatively. A UN/NGO staff person who had assisted former KR and government 
officials to set up development programs in the early years of KR reintegration in the 
1990s remarked upon the process of building trust through initial contact on technical 
issues between former enemies: 
 It was this amazing two-way learning thing. All of a sudden they were starting 
to understand—but through the eyes of service provision—they were starting to 
understand their own history and develop relationships, but through education 
or agriculture or whatever the service was. Through those eyes they started to 
talk about technical things. So . . . how many teachers do you need to teach 
five thousand kids? And what is the curriculum going to be? So we did things 
like identify teachers and bring them to [the city] for crash courses in training 
and then the [city] teachers would go up there and help them set up a mentor 
scheme (IV # 27). 
 
 A UN/NGO worker described reconciliation in these terms: ‘Well, It is unity 
(ruop ruom) or forgiveness (kar at tos)—not to mention what happened in the past or 
to get revenge (sangsoek), nor to break up our friendship. It means to assist people to 
work cooperatively’ (IV # 111). As relationships (even though in some case shallow 
ones) are key to the functioning of rural Cambodia, most Cambodians recognize and 
                                               




value the restoration of relationships that have been damaged by the war, or the 
creation of new relationships in a new society. Relationships can exist in all stages of 
reconciliation (surface, shallow, moderate, and deep) though the depth and complexity 
varies. However, re-humanization of the ‘other’ and the development of empathy are 
processes that are only encountered in deeper stages of reconciliation. 
2. Re-humanization, Compassion, and Empathy 
Re-humanization, and the development of compassion and empathy, are 
processes that are linked and overlapping. Amongst respondents in this study there 
were some expressions of compassion and empathy of victims towards perpetrators, 
but none of perpetrators towards victims. Conditions of deep mutual empathy had not 
been reached. Re-humanization seems to have taken place in the subconscious of 
Cambodians: and certainly not fully. Many respondents spoke about the KR regime’s 
many methods of dehumanizing their victims, and though this still bothered them, they 
seemed to feel more human today and were able to proceed with their lives. The 
embodiment of re-humanization occurs through mutual understanding, and the 
development of mutual respect, compassion, and empathy. 
Expressions of understanding, compassion, and empathy were discussed in 
Chapter 5 on victim-perpetrator relations. Victims expressed their understanding that 
perpetrators were forced to carry out crimes in order to survive. They were able to see 
the perpetrators were ignorant or uneducated – these are important first steps of 
developing compassion and for both victim and perpetrator to feel human again.5
                                               
5 Understanding the influences leading perpetrators to their actions may open them to 
reconciliation (Staub et al. 2005: 328). Mutual understanding also leads to the building of trust 
and re-humanization (Hicks 2008: 12-13).  
 
However, amongst the accused perpetrators whom I interviewed, and the former KR 
bystanders, there were almost no expressions of compassion or empathy towards the 





regime had happened, and their lives were negatively affected and their economic 
development delayed, but there was little sign of them expressing sorrow for the 
suffering of the victims.  
The absence of statements of compassion by perpetrators about their victims 
was probably at least partly due to the limited number of accused perpetrators I 
interviewed, but this lack of compassion of perpetrators for victims has also been 
noted in the press about several notable accused perpetrators. Although some of 
Duch’s (S-21 prison chief) comments refer to an understanding of the plight of his 
former prisoners, and some of the prison guards expressed remorse for their actions, 
in rural Cambodia there have been few reports of empathy of perpetrators towards 
victims. Another important reason for the absence of expressions of empathy by 
perpetrators towards victims is related to the Cambodian cultural tendency to avoid the 
loss of face, and thus not to admit wrong-doing. Once perpetrators acknowledge their 
victims have suffered, they are then on the slippery slope of acknowledging and 
confessing. 
Compassion is an important component of the Buddhist religion.6
                                               
6 The following quotes by the senior ‘peace’ monk Maha Ghosananda (who is well known in 
Cambodia), in his book Step by Step provide a backdrop to Cambodians’ views of 
reconciliation, related to compassion and loving kindness: ‘The suffering of Cambodia has been 
deep. From this suffering comes Great Compassion. Great Compassion makes a Peaceful 
Heart. . . .’ (Ghosananda 1992: 28); ‘The balance of wisdom and compassion is called the 
middle path . . . Wisdom and compassion must walk together’ (Ghosananda 1992: 34-5); 
‘Peacemaking requires compassion. It requires the skill of listening’ (Ghosananda 1992: 51); 
‘There are no boundaries to loving kindness. The Dharma is founded in loving kindness. The 
Buddha saw the whole world with compassion’ (Ghosananda 1992: 55): ‘Loving kindness also 
means friendliness. With loving kindness, all enmity is transformed. Our enemies will no longer 
hate us and, eventually, they will return our loving kindness to us, as friends’ (57); ‘Hatred is 
never appeased by hatred. Hatred is only appeased by love.’ (67);  
 The 
importance of compassion is included in the definition of reconciliation provided by an 
I do not question that loving one’s oppressors—Cambodians loving the Khmer 
Rouge—may be the most difficult attitude to achieve. But it is a law of the universe that 
retaliation, hatred, and revenge only continue the cycle and never stop it. 
Reconciliation does not mean that we surrender rights and conditions, but rather that 
we see ourselves in the opponent—for what is the opponent but a being in ignorance, 
and we ourselves are also ignorant of many things. Therefore, only loving kindness and 





accused perpetrator who is now a schoolteacher (the meanings of the words for 
compassion (karuna) and tolerance (khantei) are similar): ‘I think that it means that we 
negotiate with each other and we are not angry with each other anymore. Totally, we 
reconcile (phsah phsaa) in our heart and mind. We do not negotiate . . . using 
weapons, but we kill the anger of ourselves by developing tolerance (khantei) for each 
other’ (IV # 106).7
The ‘heart’ is often used as a metaphor for compassion and understanding in 
Cambodia, which can be observed through peoples’ actions. A UN/NGO worker living 
in a rural war-stricken area explained how compassion and understanding are 
developed through listening and attention, another way of paying respect: 
  
To know whether people have reconciled, firstly, we needed to look at their 
activities, for example, I am very happy to be interviewed by you Laura, but 
really, my heart is at my rice mill. Even though I acted here, but my heart is 
there as you just saw a moments ago, as I had asked my workers why they did 
not go to the machine room. Therefore, Laura might see my activity, and you 
thought that you might be troubling me, but for me, I thought that Laura came 
from a very distant place so I could not trouble you so take time to listen to you 
and moreover, we had known each other before, is it right Laura? Secondly, we 
could not reconcile the heart of the people, for example, I had asked them to 
build the road, then they went to build it, but some just went and talked with 
each other and some were building the road so we could know that they did not 
like to join with us. These were the activities in their heart. They went to join in 
the meeting, but they did not listen to us. We need to look at all the activities of 
reconciliation (phsah phsaa knea) even if we sat on one place; we needed to 
consider their activities all the time (IV # 103). 
 
 Although empathy is an important component of reconciliation, amongst 
respondents in this study few had recognized it, especially perpetrators.8
                                               
7 The section below on healing of hearts and minds also includes several references to 
compassion, as the heart is the receptacle for compassion in Cambodian Buddhism. 
 I propose 
that this lack of empathy supports my finding that Cambodians are in states of 
 
8 As described in Chapter 3, the process of reconciliation includes a process of gaining self-
confidence, acknowledging humanity in the ‘other’ and distinguishing between a person, and 
their actions (Huyse 2003: 20). In a process of developing empathy it is important for conflicting 
parties to learn to see ‘the other’ in a new light (Schreiter 1992: 52-3). ‘Empathy comes with the 
victims’ willingness to listen to the reasons for the hatred of those who caused their pain and 
with the offenders’ understanding of the anger and bitterness of those who suffered. . . (Huyse 





coexistence, not yet in deep reconciliation – empathy would take place in deeper 
stages of reconciliation. In spite of this lack of empathy, other processes have been 
found, such as healing of hearts and minds. 
3. Healing of Hearts and Minds 
Healing is a core component of reconciliation, especially in the Cambodian 
definition, as the word for reconciliation (phsah phsaa) includes the word healing.9
 Healing is needed for all (victims, perpetrators, and bystanders) and is best 
done when there is a modicum of physical security (Staub et al. 2005: 302). A state of 
relative security has been achieved for most in Cambodia, thus there is now space for 
healing. Several types of healing were identified by respondents, healing through: 
relaxation; doing good deeds, and social activities.
 A 
reconciliation process needs healing at both individual and community levels, although 
all individuals may not be at the same level or stage, nor healing at the same rate, or 
with the same process. Healing has long been a goal proclaimed in various public 
meetings by Cambodians when speaking about the ECCC (Shay 2009). An ECCC 
staff person attributed healing to the types of interaction in the courtroom: ‘The 
testimony was very emotional,’ said Reach. ‘Duch cried. Then the witnesses cried. 
Then the audience cried. And then I cried. Seeing this is part of the healing process’ 
(Brady 2009).  
10
                                               
9 See Chapter 3 for a definition of reconciliation. Healing is underscored by the grandfather of 
peacebuilding Johan Galtung’s concise description of reconciliation: ‘the process of healing the 
traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relation’ 
(2001: 3). 
 Healing occurs in different ways 
in different people. As suggested by research on former soldiers in Yugoslavia, combat 
soldiers may have more in common with each other than with other citizens and thus 
 
10 Several other authors have written about a process of healing that include three sequential 
steps -- acknowledgement, contrition, and forgiveness (Montville 1993: 113). But since my 





may heal better talking to each other (Pouligny, Chesterman and Schnabel 2007: 11). 
Key informant former KR soldier Kuy said that the way he dealt with trauma was to 
seek out his former soldier colleagues and talk about the past.11
I asked many respondents how they could feel relief from their memories of the 
KR period. Several explained they would work, go to the Buddhist temples
 
12
Healing through Social Activities 
, go for a 
motorbike ride, or look at beautiful scenery. Self-healing is described by Mollica as a 
natural response to psychological illness and injury which affects how traumatic 
memories and emotions are repaired; the core of self-healing is the will to survive and 
recover (2006: 94-101). Social activities such as altruism, work, spirituality, use of 
humour, social support, and physical exercise can lead to psychological recovery 
(Mollica 2006: 94-101). Several of these methods are exhibited in the next section on 
healing by relaxation. 
Many respondents described aspects of this sort of self-healing as their means 
of dealing with traumatic memories of the past.13
When I am depressed, I drive my motorcycle around to see beautiful views and 
natural beauty. Whenever I think of going somewhere, for example, I want to 
come to ADHOC organization
 For example, a victim survivor who is 
closely following the ECCC, and a person who suffers from post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), recounted a variety of things he did to relieve his suffering: 
14
                                               
11 Kuy told me this in an informal interview in 1999. 
 I must come. Whether it is useless or useful, I 
 
12 Many respondents spoke about meditating, praying or bringing offerings to the Buddhist 
temples or to their ancestors as a form of relief, but a full discussion of these religious and 
spiritual approaches is not possible to address in this thesis due to space limitations. 
 
13 Several (non-rural) informants interviewed prior to this thesis research spoke about writing 
their stories as a means of healing, as did several prominent Cambodian authors. For example 
Cambodian-American survivor Oni Vitandham said upon the publication of her KR period 
memoire: ‘It felt like a release,’ Vithandham said of finishing her book. ‘Now my memory will not 
crash me into darkness. It’s a release of emotions, anger, forgiveness’ (as quoted in Smith 
2006). 
 
14 ADHOC is the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association which provides 




at least could release my pressure. If I am really depressed, I will drive my 
motorcycle along the riverbanks. When I feel better, I will drive back or 
sometimes I drink coffee in order to forget my suffering so my feeling is good 
until these days. I don’t have nightmares because I try to forget it. In the past, I 
tried to forget it by going to pagoda to offer things, but now I try to forget it by 
walking instead. I walk to wherever I want to (IV # 59). 
 
 Besides motorbike rides and looking at beautiful scenery, doing good deeds 
helped survivors heal from the violence of the KR period. 
Healing by Doing Good deeds 
 As noted in Chapter 5, doing good deeds was an important strategy employed 
by perpetrators to cope with the past: by obtaining merit for the next life, as well as 
obtaining the respect of community members to increase acceptance. Doing good 
deeds is also an important component of the healing process in Cambodia. A 
respondent who lost his father during the KR regime and who spoke often about this 
loss suggested he needed to pay back those who helped him survive: 
It is not my home village, but I had to go through the village to get to my village. 
In that village, some people liked me and my father and my mother. They 
always hid me so it is just like a friendship village that I passed and got food on 
the way to my own village. Otherwise this area was all rice fields so they [the 
KR] could see me and they would arrest me. And that is why I pay back to this 
village. As the proverb says, if you receive the fruit from the tree, you have to 
pay them back. I do not pay individually but I pay the group. My wife likes to do 
this too, so we enjoy it. I have a water irrigation system that I put in the name of 
[my employer] even though it was donated by me. So that is how I healed (IV # 
133). 
Healing through Listening and Talking 
There is a debate as to whether or not talking with others (especially about the 
past) is a culturally appropriate way to relieve tension and reduce trauma in Cambodia. 
However, a few respondents stated that talking to others was important. For example, 
a victim living in a former KR area said:  
When I have some problem, normally I talk with my neighbour, who is a former 
Khmer Rouge. She has told me that during the KR regime it was not difficult for 
                                                                                                                                        






her because she was old and did not have many relatives so they didn’t 
mistreat her. Her husband is also a Khmer Rouge. I like chatting with her only 
about the KR regime, but when I want to talk seriously about other things, I 
phone to my home village and talk about my suffering to one of my friends who 
used to work and study together (IV # 74). 
 
Youk Chhang, the Director of DC-Cam spoke of being listened to as one of the 
most potent forms of healing: ‘I think the most important thing many victims are looking 
for is someone to really listen to their stories. They want to tell you their story. And 
when you listen, it is very helpful. You don't need to do anything. When their children 
learn [about the Khmer Rouge] in school and come back home to talk to them, that is 
the most healing medicine (Carey 2009: 3). This act of being listened to is also a part 
of being acknowledged and is discussed in the next section. 
Many respondents expressed spontaneously their thanks for my listening to 
their stories. The relief of this accused perpetrator and his wife after talking to me was 
palpable:  
I feel better, yes better. I do not have chest tightness (toeng) anymore but I feel 
relieved (thuo). Because you do not make me feel badly, it means that you do 
not make me feel afraid . . . Before if I saw somebody coming like this, I was 
very afraid, for example when brother [Kuy] took some people with cameras 
here so we were very afraid . . . But now I am not afraid and now I am laughing 
– but if we were afraid as before, we would not have let you see us. I said this 
in front of you honestly. Now he is not afraid and feels better (IV # 86).15
 
  
The respondent above who spoke about driving his motorcycle for relief and 
healing, later on in the interview, also said that speaking to me had brought him some 
relief (and in fact it was difficult to end the interview as he wanted to continue talking 
about his KR experiences). At the end he said: ‘Now that I have spoken with you 
today, I can sleep well’ (IV # 59). His relief after speaking to me was also related to the 
heart, body, and mind connection which is the subject of the next sub-section. 
                                               
15 His relief may also have been because I asked him about his post-KR experiences, including 






Hearts, Bodies, and Minds 
Reconciliation is a process that occurs both in emotions, mind, and by action: 
in Cambodia, the process was often described in terms of body, mind, and/or heart. 
The word ‘chet’ in Cambodian, literally means ‘heart’, not the physical heart which is 
‘beh daung’, but can also be translated as ‘mind’. Several respondents spoke about 
the mind versus heart, noting that it was possible to act as though you had reconciled 
without really feeling it, and on the other hand if you did not take any action, then you 
may not be fully reconciled – you must take action to show you are reconciled.16
 Respondents made many references to the heart in interviews. For example, a 
village chief (victim) spoke about using Buddhism to replace suffering with compassion 
in his heart: ‘I know who took my parents and I have suffering in my heart but I take 
dhamma [Buddhist teachings] to put in my heart. I believe that they did these things 
because someone ordered them to do so’ (IV # 91). In another example a UN/NGO 
worker explained the body versus heart/mind dichotomy in several ways. Firstly that 
you can have peace and reconciliation in your actions (or body) but not in your mind 
but that both are necessary for reconciliation. Secondly, that if you take action in the 
negative way of revenge, then you cannot later have peace in your heart and 
furthermore you risk starting cycles of revenge.  
  
We had peace for our bodies in 1993 [with the UNTAC intervention and 
elections], but not peace for the mind because we did not reconcile (phsah 
phsaa) yet. I thought about this since I learned about the reconciliation (kar 
phsah phsaa) at the camp so we took the way of reconciliation of Buddhism to 
educate the people because the peace for the mind is better than the peace for 
the body. Moreover, if you think that you have to kill this person but even if your 
body does not kill, the peace will not exist in your heart. If you killed the other, 
their children will kill us back and if we do not kill the other, they will not kill us 
and the peace will exist (IV # 14). 
 
                                               
16 The concept of heart and mind has also been mentioned by other authors: ‘Reconciliation 
involves social transformation: it deals with the hurts, resentments and enmities that exist (the 
task of repair and healing) and seeks the transformation of relationships with all that implies at 
the spiritual, psychological, social, economic and political levels. Reconciliation requires 
metanoia, a conversion of mind and heart. It demands particular attitudes and practices 




Healing can be increased if people are able to make meaning of the past in 
their minds, including seeking ways to prevent future violence (Staub and Pearlman 
2001: 226). Several respondents spoke about the importance of the ECCC (and other 
approaches such as memorials) to teach the next generation about the crimes of the 
KR, and to ensure that such violence would never happen again. Teaching about the 
past through education programs can be viewed as part of the healing process of 
reconciliation (Pham et al. 2009: 28). 
4. Acknowledgement, Confession, and Regret 
Acknowledgement 
In Cambodia, although there has been a great deal of general 
acknowledgement of victim’s suffering, by many actors (the government, international 
community, and the ECCC), there has been little acknowledgement of past 
wrongdoings by the perpetrators who committed the crimes, and consequently there 
have been few confessions. Indeed, there has been very little discussion of the past at 
all, and hardly any discussion of specific acts of perpetrators, except in the ECCC. As 
has been noted, in Cambodian society in general people are reluctant to admit 
wrongdoing in public (or in private) for fear of losing face (Hinton 2001: 27). This 
avoidance of acknowledgement could also be attributed to people being unwilling to 
take responsibility for their actions, both as a cultural attitude and out of fear of 
revenge (McGrew 2000a: 21). 
One major exception was Duch, the S-21 Prison Director in his trial at the 
ECCC: ‘With passion and intense arm gestures, Duch told Mam [another S-21 Prison 
employee] not to be afraid of death and to “just tell the truth!” Duch explained that he 
has acknowledged his own crimes and told Mam, “I want you to do this same’’’ 




any knowledge of crimes, much less taken responsibility for them.17
 Acknowledgement can be more powerful when it is public or coming from 
outsiders. For example respondents would ask me if I believed them, apparently 
asking me, an outsider and foreigner, for validation and to acknowledge their suffering 
and their history: ‘Do you believe the stories about the KR? . . . Do you believe that 
they just gave people only rice soup to eat? . . . They did not give rice; they just gave 
rice soup to people to eat even if there was rice’ (IV # 110). 
 Some suggest 
that the ECCC may be Cambodians’ last opportunity ‘to receive formal 
acknowledgement and recognition of the grave injustices and losses they have 
suffered’ (Pham et al. 2009: 8).  
Another example of Cambodians’ desire for this acknowledgement by outsiders 
was provided by key informant Sunh: ‘I am very excited that you come and ask us 
questions and bring information to us. We want the world to know what happened to 
the [us] . . . If you don't come, they won't believe us’ (IV # 31). Besides valuing the fact 
that I had listened to his story, and those of other villagers, Sunh felt that an outsider’s 
acknowledgement could add further value to their suffering and the wrongs done to 
them. Acknowledgement is closely related to confession which is the topic of the next 
sub-section: in order to confess, one first has to acknowledge a transgression.  
Confession 
In her study of cycles of mass violence between villagers involved in rebel 
groups in Peru, Theidon recounts several processes whereby former perpetrators 
could be reinstated in communities and be trusted, with a strong emphasis on 
confession and repentance: ‘Confessing, atoning, sobbing, apologizing, begging, 
promising – sincerity would depend on both words and action’ (2007: 110-111). In 
                                               
17Exceptions to this tendency to not confess are: some former KR interviewed by 
Documentation Center of Cambodia; former prison guards interviewed in a film by filmmaker 
Rithy Panh (2003); and two KR cadres who confessed in a film produced by Rob Lemkin and 




Cambodia, however, there have been no such public displays, and very few 
confessions reported in the press, or reported by my respondents.18 Although 
Etcheson stated that if perpetrators were willing to confess they would be accepted by 
their communities, he reported few actual cases of confessions (Etcheson 2005b: 218-
219). In a survey of 25 Cambodians Ramji found that approximately half of them would 
accept amnesty for KR leaders if they confessed and apologized (2000: 145-6). While 
several processes were described by respondents whereby people might be accepted 
into the community, few of them focused on words, instead actions were of primary 
importance.19
The only confession of killing during the KR period I heard from a respondent 
was from a former KR cadre, who stated another former KR perpetrator (his boss) 
confessed to him – but then threatened him not to tell others!:  
  
[The perpetrator] came to tell me that before he killed people, he raped them 
first if they were pretty and then he cut them open and took out their liver and 
gallbladder, even if the person was conscious. First he took the gallbladder out 
and then she was thrown against the palm tree. For example, Mr. San had his 
gallbladder taken out while his eyes were still open. I used to work in the 
commune so I know a lot. He told me because he talked too much (niyeay 
chrul). He told me because he wanted to boast. Then after speaking, he said 
he had talked too much so please don't tell anybody! Be careful or you might 
die, he said: he threatened me! He was a leader! (IV # 93). 
 
In a discussion with key informant Sunh about truth-telling mechanisms, he 
suggested confessions would be important for a successful process of reconciliation:  
If they do like this [truth-telling], people will calm down (tracheak chet)20
                                               
18 The most talked-about confessions in Cambodia today are the confessions made by Duch 
about his involvement in killings at S-21. However these were not without controversy, as some 
Cambodians and foreigners alike have expressed doubt as to the sincerity, accuracy, and 
completeness of the confessions (Ledgerwood forthcoming). 
 
because the perpetrators confess (sara'pheap) to the people. It could be used 
in Cambodia and it is a good idea. As [the accused perpetrator] said yesterday, 
he didn’t confess to anybody. But he admitted it in front of the Vietnamese. 
 
19 Acts taken by perpetrators such as using power, doing good deeds, and showing remorse 
are discussed on pages 128-132 in Chapter 5.  
 
20 Tracheak chet literally translated means cool heart – another example of the importance of 




There are people [victims] full of anger (khoeng) and still holding grudges 
(kumnum), but they do not dare do anything. If the perpetrator called all the 
people and confessed what he did, and that he has now stopped, the people 
would feel relieved (IV # 97). 
 
This respondent also raised the issue of non-repetition, which can be an 
important element of a confession, an apology, or expression of repentance. If 
perpetrators acknowledge what they have done and confess to their bad deeds, there 
may also be an element of remorse and/or repentance which can make the apology 
more heartfelt or meaningful. 
Remorse, Regret, and Repentance 
Remorse and repentance were discussed in Chapter 5 as coping strategies of 
perpetrators to re-enter community. Amongst respondents in my research study there 
were few examples of repentance, which is not surprising given Cambodians’ 
reluctance to be publically shamed or lose ‘face’. As Henri Locard noted, ‘If you 
express remorse and repentance, you lose face, you put yourself in a position below 
the person you admit you have offended or hurt.’ (cited in Eisenbruch 2007: 92). The 
closest mention of remorse or repentance I found in interviews was firstly former KR 
expressing remorse that the KR regime had ever existed, and secondly sometimes 
victims assumed perpetrators were remorseful, based upon their observations of 
actions of the perpetrators. One example of this repentance through indirect actions 
was observed by an expatriate UN/NGOworker involved with the making of the film 
Deacon of Death (van den Berg and van de Put 2004):  
Mr. Karoby [the accused perpetrator] at the time of the KR, was the security 
chief, he was the literal deacon of death. Now he had become the ceremonial 
deacon of death [an Achar]. For us as Westerners this was very hard to 
understand, the same guy who had sent so many people to their deaths was 
now responsible for the cremation at the temple to make sure that everything 
goes right. The response from the Cambodians was that this was his way of 





A former KR base person, whose family had been decimated during the 
internal purges, spoke about the actions of perpetrators in his home village. Although 
the perpetrators did not say they were sorry, he assumed through their actions that 
they felt remorse: 
The three or four perpetrators left in the village never said sorry to the victims. 
At that time, all the people in my village had to work for the KR and we all had 
to work very hard. The perpetrators who killed people were accused by others, 
but they did not dare to accuse them to their faces. As for the perpetrators, 
even when they heard the accusations, they kept silent because they knew by 
themselves that they were wrong and now they are getting old. Yes, I think they 
feel guilty. They started knowing their mistakes when the law was created and 
they knew they had killed people. We observed their feelings because 
everyone knew and heard about who was a perpetrator and who was a victim. 
Even though they did not speak about it, I could guess about the feelings of the 
people. They have to go to the court in order to face what they did (IV # 78) 
 
In some cases, the regret was expressed directly, though not about individual 
actions, but about the regime in general. This UN/NGO worker observed:  
I used to meet a few former KR, who talked about the truth about what they did 
in the past. Because at that time, they did things under orders, forced by their 
leaders so they felt regretful for what they did. They had no intention of doing 
such things. They said they were regretful, when we met them while we went to 
our target villages, educating people about conflict resolution in each house. 
We talked to them, one or two in each village. They dared to talk about it 
without being afraid. Most of the former KR that I know because I have been 
working along the border for a long time, 100 percent tell their children about 
the tragedy of the three years eight months and twenty days [KR regime]. They 
pray to their ancestors and tell their grandchildren to never let it happen again. 
They hate that regime very much. They did not say directly how many people 
they killed or whom they killed, but they just said that they feel regret for what 
they did (IV # 82). 
 
A more difficult step than expressing general remorse and regret is to offer 
apology for specific past acts. 
5. Apology 
This section provides highlights from respondents’ interviews that explain the 





 Hinton suggests that Cambodian hierarchical culture does not encourage 
people to apologize: ‘To do so would involve a slight loss of face both for the child and 
his or her parents. As one informant explained, “to say excuse me makes them too 
lowly’’’ (Hinton 2001: 27). A UN/NGO worker who had lived outside of Cambodia made 
a similar observation: ‘It is difficult here because we do not have the culture to say 
sorry. But now I teach my daughters to say sorry all the time’ (IV # 128).  
In a few cases respondent victims felt that perpetrators avoided making 
apologies. This schoolteacher and young victim suggested that one perpetrator had 
not apologized because he thought no one knew about his past actions. The victim did 
not want an apology because he did not want to bring up the past and preferred to 
forget: ‘No, he has never made an apology. I think he thinks that the younger 
generation does not know about him doing all those bad things. For me, I don’t want 
him to say sorry, because I can rub out all the old memories. If we wanted him to say 
sorry, then we would be reminded of everything again, and it would make us unhappy’ 
(IV # 1). 
But just because apologies are avoided, does not mean that victims do not 
desire an apology. This woman victim living in Southeast-2 wanted an apology for the 
death of her grandparents: ‘I was in Phnom Penh when they arrested my grandparents 
to be killed but then when Phnom Penh fell [1975], I heard from the old people that this 
man took my grandparents to be killed. I have met him since then, and speak normally 
with him, but I still want him to apologize’ (IV # 1).21
 Another example of an apology desired is of this rural traditional healer (kru 
phlom), who also offered a common explanation of why perpetrators have not 
apologized to date: fear of trials and fear of revenge.  
  
                                               
21 This passage also exhibits the condition of shallow coexistence, as she said she wanted him 





To apologize, for both the top and the lower levels is important. However, these 
people are afraid of the trial, and they are afraid of being killed. So if they 
apologize, they would ask for forgiveness and to avoid a trial. If I had done 
things like they did, I think it would be very important to apologize, ask for 
forgiveness, ask people not to be angry, and not to hold a grudge against me in 
the future. No former KR ever apologized to me though. I believe they do not 
dare to show their faces, and they do not dare to say what they did is wrong. If 
they did bad things, they don’t dare to show their face (IV # 34). 
 
Apologies Made and Apologies Heard 
 Although many respondents complained that they had never heard apologies 
from perpetrators, and instead often heard denials, there were some apologies 
reported by respondents. For example, the key informant Kuy stated he had heard a 
(weak) apology in the immediate aftermath of the KR regime, which served in part to 
spare the perpetrator from being killed in revenge: 
In 1979 when the Vietnamese came, I heard [the perpetrator] say ‘I would like 
to apologize for what I did because they ordered me to do it’. I heard only one 
person apologize, this man who killed many people. He killed a lot more people 
than the others did, about 60 people. He said that what he did was under the 
order of the leaders and he did not want to do it. He was a spy (chhlop). At that 
time, some people with guns wanted to kill him but when he apologized, they 
didn’t kill him. The Vietnamese soldiers came and they arrested him and 
planned to kill him in revenge, but before killing him, they asked the people in 
the village about his killing but the villagers were quiet. Then he also reminded 
the people that if they killed him now, it was like what he was forced to do in the 
past also (IV # 1).  
 
A former KR cadre was demoted and punished in the early years of the KR in 
1973, after he had refused to follow orders by his superior to disrobe monks at the 
local Buddhist temple. The KR cadre and his wife were living near his former superior 
who had consequently punished him throughout the rest of the regime and had put 
him in prison. The KR cadre’s wife was still angry, even though she had heard this 
(half-hearted) apology from the superior: ‘He said to me “what could I do because I just 
followed somebody's order so please don't get angry with me!’’’ (IV # 46). When 





 However, public apologies do make a large impact. As noted above and 
elsewhere, Duch, the former S-21 Prison Director who was tried by the ECCC, has 
been very influential because of his acknowledgement of and apology for crimes 
committed during the KR regime. Duch was quoted as having recognized the 
consequences of his crimes: ‘When I find myself faced with the victims, the widowers, 
the orphans, I understand that they condemn me and I bow to these victims. […] I 
regret that not all had a chance to speak’ (Gee 2009a: 7). In this statement, he 
acknowledged the pain and suffering of the victim, he listened to them respectfully, 
expressed remorse and responsibility.22
 Sometimes apologies are expressed through action, as discussed in Chapter 
5, and in the following example. A UN/NGO worker and former monk described the 
process of reconciliation in reference to a former KR cadre who had killed many 
people. The respondent observed that the perpetrator withdrew from the community, 
and also inferred from the perpetrator’s behaviour that he felt remorse:
 
23
This man was a chief of a group (prathean kang), and a chief of the cadre 
(prathean kamaphibal) and he ordered others, fought, and was powerful in 
killing. Later on he came back to live in his commune, and families kept 
complaining that he had taken their gold, that he had forced them to join the 
cooperative, that he had done bad things to them. So how could he live with 
 
                                               
22 However, several observers of the trial have felt that Duch’s remorse and apologies were not 
fully sincere and he demonstrated a non-repentant, boastful and domineering attitude in the 
court. In an article forthcoming in the DC-Cam magazine anthropologist Judy Ledgerwood 
commented on her observations of Duch’s behaviour during his trial: ‘And when Duch 
addresses witnesses, he is able to berate them, belittle them and attack them though the use of 
language – for example by attaching the prefix ‘a’ to people’s names. There is no direct 
translation to English, but scholars often use ‘the despicable’ as in ‘a-Pot’, the despicable Pol 
Pot. During this bullying Duch jabs his finger in the air and raises his voice. This is not a contrite 
man, apologetic for his crimes. Here is the man from the 1970s, the math teacher turned 
conspiracy theorist looking to root out the maggots that had infiltrated the revolution – 
determined to smash them. This gets translated into English as the benign, ‘Mr. so and so’. We 
lose the contempt that Duch still holds for his subordinates and former captives’ (Ledgerwood 
forthcoming). DC-Cam researcher Kok Thay Eng responded to Dr. Ledgerwood’s article and 
added: ‘I went to see Duch's hearing only a few times. He has said sorry, admitted his guilt and 
been cooperative so far. But I do not feel good with the way he speaks. Your article captures 
exactly the way I feel about Duch's behaviour. In Khmer sensitivities, a remorseful person 
should look down and speak softly to whoever listening to him. He should not have the face to 
be overly confident, raise his hand and voice and lecturing the court’ (Eng 2010). 
 




them? He could live with them until now! There are many factors that show how 
he can live with them. The people have been educated that the past was a 
mistake of the politicians, so now the people can live together. However, he is 
disappointed in himself for what he did, so he does not dare to appear or join in 
the community activities. He apologized to a few families who accused him of 
taking their gold and money to offer in the cooperatives. He told them that he 
did it because the KR had ordered him to do so (IV # 60). 
 
Another example of a perpetrator apologizing was this direct apology recounted 
by a victim who had been imprisoned for several years during the KR regime. He 
spoke about meeting one of his former jailers on the road. He seemed to have been 
able to accept the apology because it was sincere (from the heart). He is also one of 
the few respondents who reported a direct conversation between a victim and 
perpetrator about the details of the past: 
He was frightened that I would trouble him. He was frightened until his lips 
turned pale when he met me. I stopped my bike in front of him. I told him not to 
worry because I had no grudge (kumnum) and did not plan to take revenge 
against him. Whatever he did, I forgot it. His lips turned red after hearing such 
words. He had hit me directly. I talked to him for a long time. We talked about 
the past, like ill-treating prisoners and killing prisoners. He said, ‘I apologize to 
you, for what I did badly to you’. He apologized to me because he knew it was 
his fault that he shouldn’t have hit me because of the ten seeds of jackfruit. I 
didn’t hold the grudge (kumnum) against him anymore . . . He apologized by 
himself. He said it from his heart (IV # 59). 
 
This perpetrator was apparently living in a great deal of fear, which could 
explain his preparedness to apologize to his direct victim. But in some cases 
respondents did not want to hear apologies, even if they were offered. 
Apologies Rejected 
 In some cases respondents felt that the crimes were of too large a magnitude 
to be affected by an apology: For example this victim living in a former KR area 
preferred a trial to an apology: ‘Because they killed people with great cruelty and in 
such large numbers. If they apologize just like that, there is still injustice for the people 
who died. Millions of people are dead! Some of us lost 20 or 30 relatives, so apology is 




Apologies can also be rejected because they may be perceived as being 
insincere. A former KR prison inmate stated he was not satisfied with the apology of 
Duch: ‘I am fine but I still have chest tightness because A Duch did not accept his 
mistakes. He just said it to release his crime. What he said is not a hundred percent 
right or from his heart so I still get angry and suffer in my chest’.24
Apology and Responsibility 
 
Respondents recognized different types of apologies. A victim living in a former 
KR rural area felt that the former KR leaders should both apologize and accept 
responsibility, but he pointed out that apologies should be voluntary and heartfelt. 
I think it is very important if they apologize and accept responsibility, because 
they should know by themselves that they are the real initiators of the crimes. 
Both are important, because they should admit that they did wrong and then 
apologize. We have to make sure that they voluntarily apologized by 
themselves and nobody forced them to answer. If someone forced them, the 
apology is not important. If they beat them with a cane to force them to answer, 
that is also not important (IV # 77). 
 
 A victim who almost died in a KR prison spoke about the importance of a public 
apology for his healing (to feel relief) and for justice. He also included a reference to 
the heart, in this case meaning a sincere apology would be important:  
I take the case of S-21 to say that I want those people who worked in the 
torture and killing places to do a ceremony to apologize to the dead people in 
Cheung Ek or Tuol Sleng. I want them to make their apologies from their heart 
in front of the people, including monks. I could not call them alone, but the court 
should call perpetrators in S-21 to tell the people what they did in a ceremony. 
There are about ten people in S-21 such as Mr. Hun, Prak, Pan, and others, 




Once apologies are made, forgiveness may be more likely to occur, which is the topic 
to which we turn next. 
                                               
24 Interview with the victim by my research assistant, at the Chenla Theatre on 7 May 2009. 
 
25 Note this reference to a public ceremony reinforces the view of Harris that such a national-
level process presided over by Buddhist clergy would fit into the Cambodian Buddhist moral 






While several respondents mentioned forgiveness in their definitions of 
reconciliation, only a few spoke directly about forgiving or not forgiving the KR. This 
UN/NGO worker felt that forgiveness was an important part of reconciliation: ‘Well, it is 
unity (ruop ruom) or forgiveness (kar at tos) - not to mention what happened in the 
past to get revenge (sangsoek), nor to break up our friendship (IV # 111).26
The majority of the theological and psychological approaches to reconciliation 
assume that forgiveness is necessary to recover from trauma, a positive step and a 
way to heal, and thus that forgiveness is necessary for reconciliation (Schreiter 1992; 
Staub and Pearlman 2001: 205). Enright argues that ‘one may forgive and not 
reconcile, but one never truly reconciles without some form of forgiving taking place’ 
(2001: 31). On the other hand, this thesis supports the view that forgiveness is a 
desirable, but not necessary facet of reconciliation. Other authors agree that 
forgiveness is not a mandatory component of reconciliation (Broneus 2007: 5; Huyse 
2003). In this research study, an expatriate respondent was able to give a very concise 
and thoughtful explanation of the relationship between reconciliation and forgiveness, 
a more practical approach that fits within the Cambodian context: 
 A former 
KR cadre living in a former KR area described a similar importance to forgiveness in 
reconciliation: ‘Reconciliation (phsah phsaa) means that people get along with each 
other (chea nea) and stop being angry at each other. We talk to them to help them to 
be tolerant (at aon) and forgive (leuk leng tos) each other’ (IV # 77).  
 
                                               
26 A complicating factor in the discussion of forgiveness is the term in Cambodian: ‘leuk leng 
tos’ for forgiveness, which means literally, raise free the guilt. Although leuk leng tos is the 
dictionary definition for amnesty (while ‘to forgive’ is at tos, akphey tos, or ak hao se kam) in 
everyday language this term is used for forgiveness. Thus in some people’s minds they were 
unable to separate the idea of forgiveness from justice or punishment – some did not want to 
say they forgave someone as they interpreted that to mean they did not want the person to be 
punished. If the meaning in Khmer allowed victims to have justice and punishment, and at the 




Reconciliation is a term that is subject to many different interpretations. The 
more important aspect of it is reintegration or re-functioning. I think some of the 
issues of forgiveness and forgiving are probably unattainable and should 
maybe not even be attained, because I think people’s memories of what 
happened and their feelings of distress and blame are very hard to overcome’ 
(IV # 129). 
 
Buddhism and Forgiveness 
Cambodians also consider Buddhist views on forgiveness: Buddhism promotes 
compassion and loving kindness in daily life, but karmic retribution can still be relied 
upon for justice. Findings in this research study echoed this Buddhist interpretation: at 
the community level some respondents spontaneously forgave their former tormenters, 
others were waiting for the results of the ECCC before deciding whether or not to 
forgive, and others said they would never forgive. 
 The Buddhist parable of Angulimala was mentioned occasionally when I asked 
about reconciliation (and justice and forgiveness) in Cambodia.27
  An expatriate UN/NGO staff person working on peacebuilding felt that 
forgiveness was not relevant in Cambodia, as Cambodians believe that the 
perpetrator’s karma would provide ultimate justice: ‘The Cambodians are not looking 
 Although it was 
interpreted by different people in different ways, Angulimala’s relinquishing of his old 
murderous ways, and turning to Buddhism and good deeds was often suggested as a 
reason to forgive the KR perpetrators, as explained by this senior-level monk: ‘I replied 
that [Angulimana] killed 999 people and then he dropped his sword and followed the 
Buddha so they forgave him and he finally obtained Nirvana’ (IV # 38). 
                                               
27 Angulimala was an infamous robber who had killed 999 people and cut off their fingers to 
show his great success in killing. He had decided to kill his mother as the thousandth victim, but 
then met the Buddha who convinced him to stop killing, out of compassion ‘led him back to 
righteousness’. Angulimala became a monk, did good deeds, and could bestow blessings on 
others. However, he still suffered, and was shunned by the community due to his (bad) karma, 
and was thus still destined to suffer the bad consequences of his evil deeds – though because 
of his repentance the consequences were much less (Harris 2005: 65-66). The story could also 
be interpreted as a form of forgiveness, or at least acceptance, as the Buddha explained that 
he had changed his ways so should be accepted in peace, and was a reminder that Buddhists 





for punishment for acts done in the past. They more have a desire to understand how 
and why something happened, why was it so awful, why did you let my mother or 
father die. The meaning of karma for most Cambodians is that these people will pay 
later in their next lives . . . Forgiveness does not come into it’ (IV # 39). 
Forgiveness – by Relinquishing Revenge 
The most common example of forgiveness in this research study was in terms 
of relinquishing a desire for revenge.28 For example, one victim showed clearly, 
through his actions of welcoming a perpetrator, giving him gifts, and inviting him to visit 
his home, that he was in the process of forgiving – although he never uttered the 
actual words (IV # 108).29
I did not say anything to him. He just apologized to me as we rode our bikes 
past each other. I don’t hold a grudge against him. I also don’t hold a grudge 
against the spy (chhlop) who reported me to arrest me. I was the only one who 
was able to escape and survive so I don’t hold a grudge and am not angry with 
them. Also, because when I returned to my home village the people welcomed 
me so warmly, as they saw thousands of people who were arrested and it was 
unusual that only I survived. The reason that I could not hold my grudge was 
also because the spy chief and village chief escaped to their villages so that 
the grudge was no longer held in my mind and I didn’t hold the grudge against 
them anymore (IV # 59). 
 When I asked one former KR prison inmate if he had 
forgiven the prison guard he had met on the road, he answered that he no longer held 
a grudge – not directly saying he had forgiven. His ability to let his anger go was partly 
because he had received a hero’s welcome from the people in his village, and partly 
because he rarely met his former tormenters:  
 
Forgiveness Granted, or Not 
The examples above are of people relinquishing the desire to exact revenge, rather 
than the positive act of embracing and welcoming. Another example is provided in an 
anecdote reported by an expatriate UN/NGO worker of forgiveness between two 
government officials (one former KR, one government) meeting for the first time after 
                                               
28 See Chapter 7 on revenge. 
 




years of war. They had not known each other personally, and did not suffer knowingly 
at the hands of the other. Forgiveness in this case, was indirect and impersonal, 
between two officials living in close proximity and wanting now to promote economic 
development in their war-torn region. ‘And they started laughing and he said “I forgive 
you”. But you know, there were a number of examples of those sort of things—that 
once people started talking and they could see each other in a new role, they would 
share that sort of experience’ (IV # 27). This sort of impersonal forgiveness must be 
easier than forgiving individuals for specific transgressions, which are the next 
examples of victims unable or unwilling to forgive. 
An expatriate UN/NGO worker felt that he had never seen anyone forgive 
another: ‘I have never heard of people saying that they have openly forgiven others . . . 
They tolerate the fact that the other is alive’ (IV # 58). One victim explained why she 
could not forgive the former KR leaders, due to the magnitude of the crimes, but felt 
that in everyday life people should apologize for mistakes. She had been a ‘new’ 
person, and lost many family members, she was now living amongst former KR in a 
former KR stronghold. She as many other respondents was a strong proponent of the 
ECCC: ‘Concerning apologies of the KR, we cannot forgive them, but if in the case of a 
village volunteer, it is good for them to apologize. The KR are different and they can’t 
be forgiven the same as people in the village, because what they did was a much 
more serious problem’ (IV # 74). Several respondents felt that they could not 
simultaneously want justice and grant forgiveness, that once the trials were over they 
could then consider forgiving.  
Forgiveness is not however equivalent to amnesty – while an individual victim 
may grant forgiveness, justice and the granting of amnesties and pardons is a 
separate, if interrelated process. For example, many Cambodians perceived a brief 
statement at a press conference by former KR Foreign Minister Khieu Samphan to ‘let 




something to be requested by perpetrators (McGrew 2000a: 32). Forgiveness should 
also not be conflated with forgetting, because even when victims grant forgiveness, 
they do not necessarily forgo the desire for remembering, justice, or punishment. We 
now turn to forgetting in the context of reconciliation processes. 
7. Forgetting 
Forgetting, similar to amnesty, is another process of reconciliation, which has 
recently received more attention in research on transitional justice. In a study in 
Burundi, Uvin observed: ‘Most people seem to prefer to forget, to be silent, to draw a 
veil over the past. . .’ (2009: 168). In Cambodia, Etcheson also suggested that 
‘collective voluntary amnesia’ may be the best way for villagers to be able to live side-
by-side and start to rebuild broken relationships (2005b: 203, 220). In addition, Rigby 
suggested that forgetting could be a viable alternative for Cambodia: he quoted a 
Cambodian respondent observing that the large number of perpetrators would be too 
hard to send to trial, and it was better to ‘safeguard the living’ (2002: 4).  
Several respondents stated they preferred forgetting as a process of 
reconciliation.30
This issue of forgetting versus remembering is now being explored in 
Cambodia, as more and more local NGOs are getting involved in exposing the past. 
Amongst many other projects, DC-Cam has recently organized travelling theatre 
showings of ‘Breaking the Silence’ which expose the public to vignettes of people 
grappling with the past – and then encourage the audience to engage in discussion. 
 This desire to forget was mainly towards lower-level perpetrators at 
the community level, about whom they could accept mitigating factors such as 
ignorance or orders from above. At the same time, while forgetting the crimes of the 
lower-level perpetrators, they also supported justice for the senior leaders who they 
blamed for the regime  
                                               





The organizer’s purpose is to promote reconciliation through revealing the difficult past 
(Pich 2010). Several NGOs organize dialogue sessions in communities where victims 
and perpetrators, and young people who have not experienced the KR regime can talk 
about the past and what to do about it.31
 
 More time must pass before these fairly new 
endeavours to remember and respect can be fully assessed.  
 In conclusion, the following narrative of a reconciliation process exhibits many 
of the processes described above. This victim respondent, a schoolteacher living in the 
war-affected community of Northwest-4, described his journey of reconciliation: first 
anger, next observations of the perpetrator’s behaviour and then, acting with empathy, 
compassion, tolerance, and ultimately forgiveness and letting go of the past. However, 
this ultimate forgiveness was dependent upon the perpetrator’s actions – the 
perpetrator acted as a ‘good person’ (did good deeds) and thanked the victims 
(showed respect).  
Some spies (chhlop) were violent when they gave rice or food for the people. 
They were very strict at that time. One I know is rich now and has a big house 
but no one has taken revenge against him. There is one here, living to the west 
of this village, but he could correct himself as a good person according to the 
circumstances. Moreover, when the KR ran; he did not follow them. He still 
lives here because his home village is here, so he could live together with all 
villagers and they did not discriminate (prakan) against him as this or that in the 
KR period. The people forgave him. We did not remind him about the past even 
though we know about him being a spy. We told him that we tolerated each 
other as villagers in the same village because in the KR period, some people 
just followed the leaders -- if they did not follow, they would face great 
difficulties. And then, he thanked us and held our hands. We always told him 
when we met each other in other ceremonies. When we came back at first, we 
had anger, but as we met each other every day, we had the idea that we could 
not make violence as that time. We just helped him and forgave him and we did 
not remind him about the past and forgot about it, so everything became better 
because everything happened in the past, we let it go. We did not need to 
remind him or ourselves about this -- if we still kept it in our minds, that problem 
would create new problems (IV # 107). 
 
                                               
31 For example, see Youth for Peace: http://www.yfpcambodia.org; or the International Center 




This chapter has shown that reconciliation in Cambodia is far from a state of 
robust, deep, forgiving interdependence. A strand of coexistence, rather than 
reconciliation runs through each chapter of this thesis. But at least most Cambodians 
have set aside feelings of revenge, and started to build relationships. The next and 
final chapter brings together the findings of the previous chapters in a summary of the 




CHAPTER 9 - Conclusion 
 
This thesis used a qualitative research approach, based on 134 semi-
structured interviews, to examine how victims and perpetrators are managing to live 
together in select Cambodian communities. As the data was collected and organized 
about community-level reconciliation in Cambodia, conclusions were drawn about the 
state of that reconciliation in those communities. Through this sifting and prioritizing of 
information, several models were developed. In this final conclusion chapter, I have 
summarized key findings and highlighted possible practical applications for these 
research findings that could be applied in other countries emerging from mass 
violence.  
 
Summary of Key Findings  
This thesis has provided the reader with the historical and cultural context of 
the conflict in Cambodia, and in particular the years of the KR regime and its effects. A 
trial for the leaders of the KR is on-going (the ECCC) but thousands of lower-level 
perpetrators are living throughout the country. Through this study, I have attempted to 
address several questions: how these victims and perpetrators are managing to live 
together, if and how they have reconciled, and what factors are affecting the processes 
of reconciliation. Although there have been several studies of views of Cambodians on 
justice and reconciliation, as well as a few large random surveys, there have been no 
extensive qualitative studies.  
This research, based on a qualitative study of 123 respondents plus 11 
additional focus groups, has found that Cambodians exist in various stages of 




been identified that affect the attainability of coexistence and reconciliation, including 
which coping strategies perpetrators choose, victims’ acceptance of perpetrators, as 
well as how victims make decisions about whether or not to seek revenge.  
In order to describe these findings, I have proposed several models and 
schemes: (1) a theoretical model of reconciliation; (2) a scheme of perpetrator coping 
strategies; (3) a model of acceptance (by victims of perpetrators); and (4) a victim 
decision-making tree on revenge. In this concluding chapter I provide a summary of 
these key findings. 
Comprehensive Model of Reconciliation 
The Comprehensive Model of Reconciliation in figure 9.1. below combines 





Figure 9.1. Comprehensive Model of Reconciliation 
This model describes a process of reconciliation whereby communities move 
from conflict to reconciliation, through degrees of coexistence (surface, to shallow to 
moderate). As victims begin to accept perpetrators back into community, feelings of 
revenge subside, and people begin to move into the hesitant state of surface 




coping strategies section at the bottom indicates that, in states of surface coexistence, 
perpetrators may be more likely to flee, and withdraw from society: strategies including 
denial of past acts, the use of power, and rationalization are utilized by perpetrators in 
attempts to evade their violent histories. However, as surface coexistence progresses 
towards shallow coexistence, other coping strategies are used, which imply some 
acceptance of the past (though often indirectly) as perpetrators do good deeds, show 
respect and remorse. Through the long process whereby victims and perpetrators 
begin to have societal contact, they begin to accept the presence of the ‘other’, and 
feelings of fear and anger decrease, stages of shallow and moderate coexistence are  
reached. While in shallow coexistence there is minimal cooperation, in moderate 
coexistence cooperation and acceptance increase and a sense of shared community 
develops. Finally as a state of deep reconciliation approaches, relationships become 
more reciprocal, community members are assimilated and interdependent, and 
perpetrators are fully accepted by victims back into community. In the stages of 
moderate and deep reconciliation, confessions, apologies, and forgiveness may occur, 
though not always. 
Reconciliation Today in Cambodia – Has it been Achieved? 
Several authors have observed that reconciliation in Cambodia is already 
achieved (Urs 2007; Widyono 2009).1
                                               
1 See Chapter 3 for full discussion. 
 However I argue that Cambodians are living in 
various stages of coexistence – not deep reconciliation such as might occur when the 
perpetrator confesses their crimes, acknowledges wrongdoing, and apologizes, while 
the victim listens, acknowledges the perpetrators’ wrongdoings or their mutual 
misunderstandings, and forgives the perpetrator. Very little of this ideal, deep 
reconciliation was observed in my study sample. In many cases, the perpetrators were 





victim pitying the perpetrator who was poor, ignorant, or uneducated, or the 
perpetrators using their power or politics, which caused victims to feel afraid.  
Due to the Cambodian culture of conflict avoidance, and a reliance on 
hierarchy and patronage, in many cases, there were no outward signs of animosity, 
but many victims and perpetrators seemed to have superficial relationships without 
true exchange or interdependence. Religious beliefs have been a mixed blessing with 
regard to reconciliation processes in Cambodian communities. Many respondents 
mentioned the law of karma, in that the perpetrators would suffer in the next life. 
However while that approach allowed some victims to go on with their lives and move 
towards forgiveness, others returned again and again to thinking about how 
perpetrators will suffer in their next lives. The trials for KR leaders were supported by 
the vast majority of Cambodians and, although a full exploration of the relationship 
between the ECCC and reconciliation was not possible in this study, it appeared that 
there were hopes that the ECCC would contribute to reconciliation. 
Reconciled already? 
Almost every respondent, and especially those living in rural areas, stated that 
reconciliation had already been achieved. For example, this accused perpetrator, living 
in a mixed former KR, non-communist resistance (Para), and government area 
(Northwest-4), denied any need for reconciliation in his community: 
In this area, I never heard about reconciliation (phsah phsaa); the people just 
came one-by-one to the village normally. I never heard that they were angry or 
discriminated (prakan) against each other for being KR or Para. I think that 
reconciliation means that we negotiate with each other and we are not angry 
with each other anymore. Totally, we have reconciled (phsah phsaa) in our 
hearts and minds. We do not negotiate . . . [with weapons], but we kill the 
anger in ourselves by developing tolerance (khantei) for each other (IV # 106). 
 
However, the question is, what do people mean by reconciliation? Apparently, 
a superficial peace and lack of violence and revenge seem to be what is meant by the 




reconciliation. For example this respondent, a non-KR victim living in a former KR 
area, described a community in coexistence: 
[My relatives] once visited here and they first were afraid of Khmer Rouge living 
here, but when they arrived, and they saw their relatives, they were happy. And 
they said that there are laws in the country so that they wanted to buy land. 
Before, they did not dare to buy land, because they were afraid that the Khmer 
nation would have become something else or after buying there would be war 
in the country. I told them that there is no war in Cambodia. They asked why I 
dare say that. I said that Cambodia is 100 percent united (ruop ruom); no one 
lives in the forest or other regions. They are united (ruop ruom) under one 
Kingdom of Cambodia (IV # 74). 
 
In this example a local-level government official from Southwest-2 knew that 
the accused perpetrator Mr. Pel had received an indirect death threat. However, the 
official denied that Pel was living in fear and explained that the rule of law allowed 
perpetrators to live comfortably in society. His viewpoint was in sharp contrast to my 
findings that Pel was afraid, anxious, and living in isolation:  
The perpetrators ran away in 1979 because they were afraid of people taking 
revenge against them. There were about four perpetrators here, but they were 
just lower level spies (chhlop). But now there is only one left who still stays 
here. He does not feel afraid because he knows that the policy of the 
government does not allow people to kill for revenge. We people and family 
members were angry but we could not do anything because of the policy. They 
are still angry, but they must follow the law, and they are also waiting to see the 
trial [ECCC] (IV # 2).  
 
In this same community, where the local officials were saying the people were 
reconciled, both the accused perpetrator and the former KR soldier whom I interviewed 
felt discriminated against. Pel and Kuy in Southwest 2 both felt estranged from the 
community and, in the case of Pel, also quite afraid. In the northwest former KR areas, 
several former KR spoke about their family and friends being angry with them, and 
several said they wished that the ECCC would move forward, in order that they not be 
blamed for the crimes of their leaders.  
 The public rhetoric of Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ‘Win-Win Policy’ and ‘National 
Reconciliation’ encourages Cambodians to forgive, forget, and to reconcile for the 




their true feelings and state that they are reconciled and even that they may forgive. 
But what does this mean? Essentially they mean they will no longer seek revenge, not 
necessarily that they have been able to release feelings of anger, fear, and pain.2
Shallow Coexistence 
 In 
other words, they are living in a state of coexistence, often of a shallow nature. 
Several sources have revealed similar findings to mine, that reconciliation is 
shallow in Cambodia. For example, Etcheson observed a ‘voluntary amnesia’: 
‘[r]econciliation seems to have advanced to the stage of coexistence, with the villagers 
by and large committed to living together peacefully’ (2005b: 218). This long-term 
expatriate observer stated about reconciliation: ‘No, reconciliation has definitely not 
happened yet in Cambodia! Because if you introduce one person to another, they 
have to know where that person stands and how they are related before they say 
anything. If they don’t have a reference then they can’t trust each other’ (IV # 127). A 
senior government official also acknowledged that reconciliation was not yet achieved: 
'But reconciliation is needed even now, from 1973 up to now and maybe tomorrow and 
after tomorrow! Conflict always exists, and we have to cut down the big differences 
between us’ (IV # 132). 
 An expatriate mental health worker also concluded that reconciliation has not 
yet happened in Cambodia, partly related to the Cambodian conflict style of avoidance 
or withdrawal:  
This is avoidance of reality, or the process of disassociation. Your reality has to 
be different in order for you to live, to survive. You can even sit, play, and eat 
together, but like war crimes, there is a part of the soul that is separate, some 
deep part cannot be cheated, but someday it will come out, and it can come out 
in bad ways, or in later generations. For example if a son marries the daughter 
of a perpetrator; it may seem okay at first, but then something could come out 
to the next generation (IV # 36). 
 
                                               
2 Stovel (2003) described these as situations of ‘forced forgiveness’ and cautions that those 
who wish to seek justice may be accused of threatening peace. This rhetoric is also used in 
Cambodia, as Prime Minister Hun Sen and other politicians accuse those who are pushing for 




 In conclusion, much of Cambodia today is in a state of shallow coexistence 
characterised by a basic tolerance of the other in a culture of conflict avoidance. This 
expatriate UN/NGO worker summed it up succinctly with a ‘minimalist’ definition of 
reconciliation3
My personal . . . view of reconciliation is the absolute minimal one, which is to 
live on without killing each other . . . but I don’t expect much more. And to be 
honest I’ve not seen much more either, especially in Cambodia. I’ve never 
heard of people saying that they have openly forgiven others. They tolerate the 
fact that the other is alive, which has everything to do with the whole tradition of 
avoiding . . . (IV # 58).  
:  
 
Strong Desire for Peace 
The situation can be understood in part by reference to Cambodians’ strong 
desire for peace. Many respondents made statements about peace. Even if they were 
not willing to deal with the past directly, nor apologize or forgive, all Cambodians are 
war-weary and this exhaustion and desire for normalcy affects their stance in relation 
to reconciliation. For example, this former KR cadre was a strong supporter of the KR 
(she did not want the ECCC and thought no apology from the KR leaders was 
necessary, because everyone suffered and everyone makes mistakes). When I asked 
what advice she would have for other people emerging out of a situation of conflict, 
she spoke of her life of difficulty and suffering and made a plea for peace: 
To me, nowadays what I want is for either the United Nations or the 
Cambodian government to ensure that the leaders not argue with each other. I 
strongly wish they should work cooperatively to gain peace and independence 
for the people and the new generations; I do not want them to struggle like me 
because it was so painful (IV # 64). 
 
Obstacles 
 There are still many obstacles to reconciliation in Cambodia. Characteristics of 
Cambodian society that contributed to the mass violence of the KR period still exist 
                                               






today, such as the strong hierarchical system based on patronage, the tendency to 
avoid conflict, and the fear of speaking out against oppression. Widespread corruption 
in society contributes to papering over of valid complaints of the population and leads 
to lack of security, simmering anger, as well as a widespread feeling of hopelessness. 
The trauma to the psyche of the majority of Cambodians who lived through the KR 
period, victims and perpetrators alike, as well as the secondary trauma of the second 
generation, has been an on-going obstacle to reconciliation. People overwhelmed by 
feelings of anxiety and fear may find it difficult to reconcile.  
Cambodians often have difficulty planning ahead and making plans for the 
future. This characteristic could be due to the years of war, poverty, and uncertainty, 
where it was truly impossible to plan and hopes were dashed repeatedly. A lack of 
trust in one’s neighbours and in societal institutions is also related to this lack of hope. 
A UN/NGO worker expressed this link between the traumatic past and the difficulties 
with the future:  
But it is very difficult for reconciliation. Some people had the best luck from 
every regime and the victims are very upset with that situation. For myself I 
don’t know for myself what I will to do for the future. I just do my job but I have 
no clear vision what the country will look like in the future . . . If we talk about 
justice, talk about development, talk about morality, sometimes it is still dark. It 
is not so clear now. Like when we work in the projects, it is like we get one 
kilogram of salt and put it in the river. It is very far to reach the goal (IV # 109). 
 
On the other hand there are many reasons for hope.  
Hope for the Future 
Just because the Cambodians with whom I spoke were not yet close to 
reconciliation, it does not mean that there is no hope for a deepening process of 
reconciliation and healing in the future. There seems to be a great deal of hope for 
reconciliation and peace on the part of both victims and perpetrators. As the ECCC 
continues to struggle forward with prosecutions of the senior leaders and those most 




memorial projects. It is these small-scale projects that may slowly make a difference.4
 Another reason for hope is the compassion and empathy expressed by victims 
towards some perpetrators. As we have seen in previous chapters, Pel was living a 
lonely life in a constant state of fear, as a lone perpetrator amongst a community of 
victims. Many villagers expressed empathy towards him, understanding he was 
uneducated and would have been killed if he had not carried out his orders. None of 
these victims had extended their hands to him, nor had he ever apologized. However, 
hope for the future may lie with the passage of time, as memories fade further and 
Buddhist teachings of living in the present erode feelings of fear, anger, and pain.  
 
Many Cambodian victims remarked that they wanted to find the truth and justice but 
had felt frustrated that the perpetrators remained silent, and these projects may offer 
them some hope. An expatriate working long-term in Cambodia expressed hope for 
the future of reconciliation: ‘I think it’s on the way. Reintegration and the functioning of 
a society is coming, and I think that in that sense Cambodia has gone a lot further than 
many other societies in a post-conflict situation of this nature’ (IV # 129).  
 This long-term expatriate UN/NGO worker suggested that hope exists by 
extending one’s reach:  
You have to keep reaching for something that is beyond reach. I think in 
Cambodia people should be reaching for reconciliation, knowing that they won’t 
get to that point. But by doing it, they will achieve some kind of reasonable 
social structure that was totally destroyed and that was so weak in the first 
place. But what they need to build society is to … rebuild this social life, 
reweave this fabric of social life… that’s good enough (IV # 58). 
 
 One way to extend hope to the future is through change agents. 
                                               
4 Several NGOs are working on such projects including: the DC-Cam, the International Center 
for Conciliation (ICFC), the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID), Youth for Peace (YFP) and 
others. Much further study is needed, as all of these projects have been initiated by NGOs from 
outside the communities, and are usually Phnom Penh-based: it is doubtful that any of the 





My years of experience in community-based reconciliation projects in other 
countries such as Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, as well as my reading, led me 
to believe that I would find the effect of ‘change agents’, of individuals such as Bishop 
Tutu in South Africa, or local-level individuals who make great moves towards 
reconciliation and/or healing. At the national level there have been several ‘change 
agents’ in Cambodia. For example, the monk Maha Ghosananda led the ground-
breaking peace walks into former KR areas throughout the 1990s and beyond, and 
Chea Vannath made early overtures to former KR low-level leaders for discussion 
(Center for Social Development 2002). While at the community level I did not find 
individuals who were recognised for their activities of healing or reconciliation, several 
key informants could be considered as emerging change agents. Kuy was 
discriminated against for his identity as a former KR soldier, but continued to make 
overtures to community members and tried to carry out development activities in order 
to improve his status. And Sunh, who was well-known in his community for having 
taken revenge against former KR cadres, still sought out former KR to introduce to me. 
Khin, a former monk and UN/NGO worker, and another former monk working at the 
same organization have worked for decades in very difficult and war-torn areas of the 
country and seem to have made a difference. Further study on the effects and efficacy 
of change agents is needed.  
From these indication of hope for the future, we now move to the next section 





Significance of Findings and Practical Applications: 
Next Steps – How to Build the Future 
The Use of Religion and Public Ceremony 
As Buddhism is an integral part of the identity of the majority of Cambodians 
and a factor in how people think about justice, forgiveness, and reconciliation, some 
special conclusions on the topic are warranted. Harris found a consistent theme from 
contemporary Cambodian Buddhists, that the justice process of the ECCC ‘should 
eschew a “politics of anger”, or retribution, in favour of reconciliation, understood as a 
reordering of the world in accord with dhamma’ (2005: 82). The former head of the 
Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID), Mr. Lao Mong Hay suggested such an event 
based upon these principles with a public confession by the KR leaders in the national 
stadium, presided over by a central figure of status, preferably the King (McGrew 
2000a). A KR prison survivor (IV # 42) also suggested this, as did an expatriate 
UN/NGO worker, if led by a change agent such as Maha Ghosananda who could 
touch the spirit of many through their actions (such as the peace walks) (IV # 39). 5
 These religious approaches to reconciliation hold promise, as Buddhist 
traditions remain strong in Cambodian society: ‘The greatest resource for sustainability 
is rooted in the people and their setting’ (Lederach 1997: 94). Through the Buddhist 
clergy who are working on community development projects intertwined with 
 
                                               
5 The full quote from the expatriate UN/NGO worker was:  
There is a great need [for reconciliation], but how to work on this? That was Maha 
[Ghosananda]’s gift to us. He needed organization to do the Dhammayietra [peace 
walk] —if there were no organizers there would not have been a walk. We would be 
worrying about how to organize, how many people do you need to have a movement, 
etc. One donor asked us this question, and Maha answered – ‘We need only one!’ One 
person can affect the spirit of many. Anyone can touch others. But, you do need a 
language in which to communicate. Every part of the population has a different 
language. But you can get any part of that population to touch their spirit. If you reach 
just one person, then that person can translate into their group’s language. For 
example, a reflection of the history of the suffering is an important lesson for 
Cambodian spirituality and healing, as in Maha’s peace prayer (IV # 39). 
Unfortunately, Maha Ghosananda has passed away and there are no other obvious change 




reconciliation efforts, a vision of a shared future may be possible. Interfaith religious 
dialogues underway by various NGOs could supplement the Buddhist approaches to 
include all Cambodians.6
Restore Dignity 
 An important aspect of the use of religion in reconciliation 
efforts is related to restoring dignity. 
 As described in the last chapter, one of the processes of reconciliation is to 
restore dignity to both parties. I posit, from the many statements from victims about 
their feelings of dehumanization, that some recognition of these past actions by the 
perpetrators or the leaders is needed for reconciliation in Cambodia. And on the side 
of the victims, although many do indeed re-include some perpetrators in their moral 
communities, allowing for the excesses of the regime and their need to carry out 
orders to avoid being killed themselves, many other victims do not seem to have 
translated their acceptance into real actions towards former KR.7
Joint Sorry/Healing Approach  
  
Because in Cambodia there is a cultural tendency to avoid conflict and to avoid 
losing face, the ‘Joint Sorrow/Healing Approach’ as suggested by Galtung could be an 
appropriate model in Cambodia (2001: 14-15). This approach could include victims 
and perpetrators discussing how a war could have been avoided, or other common 
topics. The purpose would be to create a situation whereby victims might meet 
perpetrators, with a focus on healing through joint sorrow and shared pain (Galtung 
2001: 14). This approach would seem to complement the ECCC, and fit in with victims’ 
                                               
6 For example, the Alliance for Conflict Transformation has a program on interfaith 
peacebuilding: http://www.actcambodia.org/sub.php?id=1 
 
7 Some perpetrators and others involved with the former KR regime still live outside the 





needs and desires to know why Khmer killed Khmer and to promote the compassion of 
Buddhism. 
Community Efforts – Participatory, Local Approaches 
Starting in the late 1980s, development projects were initiated all over 
Cambodia to promote community participation in economic development. However, 
these projects did not focus on building relationships because the war was still on-
going, and many factions of society were still separated. On both sides of the civil 
divide, leaders sought to incite their constituents in order to find enough soldiers to 
keep fighting the war. Now two decades later, participatory development projects are 
much more common, and security is much improved. Economic development projects 
that support the entire community and are done inclusively can be important tools for 
reconciliation as people focus on the economic gain and future vision, and in the 
meantime can build relationship, trust, and interdependence (Chayes and Minow 
2003b: xix-xx; Galtung 2001: 15). But lessons learned from other countries have 
reinforced the idea that the initiative for such projects, especially those involving 
reconciliation, are more successful when the initiative originates with the conflict-
affected population rather than from outsiders (Stovel 2003: 11).8
I would give more support to community efforts. Here it was difficult because of 
security and there was still fighting going on. But in other post-conflict 
situations, the fighting has stopped. I would provide more support to work 
together to rebuild the country. Pagodas came up with the assistance 
themselves. There could have been more community participation. The first 
thing was to restore normalcy, and to get the schools going and to provide 
respite for the parents. What we see in the post-KR period is the children grew 
up with very little emotional support. The parents didn’t have it, and the schools 
also were not providing support. So another lesson learned would be to provide 
more emotional and psychological support. We need to rebuild esteem and 
 This UN/NGO 
worker who had worked in Cambodia since the early 1980s suggested several 
possible approaches which could facilitate reconciliation in similar settings: 
                                               
8 Stovel observed: ‘Even when the attacker and victim are from the same family or community, I 
do not think inter-individual reconciliation and forgiveness are important for peace and indeed 
pushing victims too hard to reconcile or forgive may at best trivialize the meaning of these 




confidence of the people . . . I thought to let people work through their trauma 
with monks and doctors is the best rather than bringing in external 
psychologists (IV # 127). 
 
 The plethora of indigenous NGOs in Cambodia provides hope for the future. 
Since many of them focus on rural development, including sorely needed infrastructure 
projects, the standard of living of rural populations will hopefully improve. As 
mentioned earlier institutional strengthening is crucial for reconciliation processes, and 
many NGOs are focusing on good governance, transparency, anti-corruption, 
improving the judicial system, and promoting and protecting human rights. The issue of 
human rights, in the context of rebuilding societal institutions is an important element 
of reconciliation in post-conflict countries. Many respondents spoke about human 
rights, and a common thread was the references to the impunity of both the KR 
leaders and of current leaders that contributed to social decay.  
Building Trust – Don’t Say No! 
 An expatriate UN/NGO worker, who had broken the security rules to enter 
former KR areas, spoke about the importance of taking risks in order to build trust and 
break down initial barriers: 
Because I was prepared to go, knowing we were going into the unknown. 
Breaking all the rules  . . . you do things because of the importance of a 
moment and sometimes you have got to push the boundaries of the 
procedures and make it happen. . . you’ve got to take advantage of the 
moment. And sort it out later. That is more important than following the 
procedures . . . Because he [former KR leader] had asked me to go [into the 
former KR area], and I thought, early on, I would try to avoid saying ‘No’. 
Because I wanted to build a relationship and I wanted him to believe that we 
could do something. I didn’t want him to say ‘come visit me’ and find that all he 
got was flowery words and no action. Once I had agreed with him and trusted 
him, I needed to show him that that was true. And you have to do it one or two 
times to show that your words have meaning. I think that is really important in 
these kinds of moments. You have to show that you are in fact an honest 
broker. You will take some risks because you are being true to your word. 





Another way to build trust, according to key informant Khin, was to join in the 
activities of conflicting parties in a neutral way and not to criticize them.9
Just Do It! 
  An additional 
approach was described as taking initiative and daring to take risks – ‘just do it!’ 
 One expatriate UN/NGO worker who had been involved with Cambodians for 
more than 30 years described how the process of reconciliation occurred in his 
experience: ‘That’s the trick in reconciliation, you try to find the acts or actions that 
people do all together, activities to help bring them together. But don’t use the words 
peace and reconciliation. These are words you use afterwards when you reflect on it. 
Just do it!’ (IV # 39). Another lesson for interventions for reconciliation was suggested 
by another expatriate UN/NGO worker, who had worked in the former KR areas as the 
war was ending. He spoke about his early forays into the KR area that he did without 
permission from the UN security network, but he’d seen an opportunity to go and see 
the situation for himself: ‘We head off on this bloody trip. . . .There was a reason to go 
there because there was someone quite important who we could talk to in the area 
and sort of, you know, get a feeling for what was going on. It was probably against the 
rules. Because we just had to do things’ (IV # 28). 
Build Social Capital  
Several of the former KR cadres felt that their communities had better social 
cohesion during the KR period as compared to the current society: ‘Yes, there was 
more solidarity than now . . . in the past people were so united. Before . . . we usually 
ate rice sponsored by the Red Cross, so we were full of solidarity. Nowadays, we work 
privately, so the rich work with the rich and the poor work with the poor. It is not the 
same as before!’ (IV # 65). Although I am not advocating a return to the communal 
eating methods of the KR period, some respondents were nostalgic for a period of 
                                               




more solidarity; NGOs could address these concerns and find ways to reconstruct 
social institutions such as traditional associations that could generate social capital. 
As I noted in Chapter 5, there can be a fine line between victims and 
perpetrators and in any reconciliation process the complexity of guilt versus innocence 
must be addressed in order to increase social cohesion. All KR are not necessarily 
perpetrators. And the fine line becomes even finer in the case of child soldiers. Private 
and public discussions of these fine lines could benefit all sectors of society and 
contribute towards mutual understanding and the development of empathy. In 
Cambodia’s climate of conflict avoidance, and fear of public shaming, few perpetrators 
are likely to speak out; however, innovative ways to discuss these thorny issues would 
help move Cambodian society towards healing and reconciliation. 
Reconstructing the Cambodian Identity 
 A refrain I heard again and again, and that was discussed in Chapter 4, was 
‘why did Khmer kill Khmer?’ For example, this long-term expatriate UN/NGO worker 
observed: ‘For the people, it was hard to know why. [They wondered. . .] What is it 
about us that this happened, why did Khmer kill Khmer? And why does the 
international community react so strongly against us, reject us and refuse to give us 
aid? This had a deep psychological effect on the people’ (IV # 127). The damaged 
sense of the Khmer identity travelled with Cambodians overseas, as when they met 
people from other countries, their main identity was as victims of the KR – but they no 
longer wanted to be seen as merely victims from events 30 years ago. In addition, 
former KR were burdened with the collective guilt of the crimes of the group – all 
former KR have been seen as guilty by association, no matter what they did during the 
regime. This lost and damaged sense of identity and belonging could be an important 




Top-down Versus Bottom-up – Focus on the Leaders 
 As we heard from many respondents in Chapter 5 and elsewhere, the conflict 
in Cambodia was more dependent upon the leaders than upon the rank and file. This 
expatriate UN/NGO worker, speaking about implementing projects in the former KR 
areas, observed that no progress was made until the leaders were on board: ‘You 
didn’t have the leadership, but you did have the people. And when [my colleague] went 
there, bang! It happened. So it was a leadership issue, it wasn’t the people’ (IV # 28). 
Another respondent, a schoolteacher in Northwest-4, observed: ‘I did not know how 
the leaders were, but as for their soldiers, they would stop fighting immediately if their 
leader ordered them to stop’ (IV # 104). 
 This issue of leadership has implications for planning interventions to promote 
reconciliation, as well as for conflict prevention. Although interventions are not the 
topic of this thesis, the findings clearly point to both a bottom-up and a top-down 
approach. In Cambodia, with its hierarchical social structure and culture, there can be 
little significant change unless the leaders approve. The leadership still controls any 
attempts at justice or dealing with the past, which is the topic of the next sub-section. 
Justice and Dealing with the Past 
Many observers suggest that Cambodia must confront its past in order to build 
a new future. Youk Chhang, the director of DC-Cam stated: ‘Reconciliation in Khmer 
terms is reconnecting the broken pieces. It is our obligation to put these broken pieces 
together, so that we can understand’ (Roasa 2010).The findings of this research are 
less clear – many victims and the entire small sample of perpetrators preferred to deal 
with the past by forms of amnesia , relying on the ECCC to find justice for the crimes of 
the past.  
Although some authors consider justice a mandatory precondition for 




violence. The millions of dollars spent on a trial for KR leaders through the ECCC will 
provide justice for many Cambodians, but the question of ‘why Khmer killed Khmer’ will 
not be fully addressed. Other processes of truth and healing are needed, not the least 
to address the silence about the crimes of lower level perpetrators.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis has addressed the question ‘has reconciliation 
occurred in Cambodia?’ Some observers suggested that Cambodians are already 
reconciled. This thesis refutes that observation, instead showing that amongst 
respondents in this study many prefer not to think about the past, and that they merely 
live in an uneasy truce with their neighbours with much left unspoken. Most 
perpetrators are living quite separate lives from their direct victims in states of various 
stages of coexistence. However, with my long experience in Cambodia, I personally 
have great hopes for the future. The people have suffered greatly but overcome 
enormous obstacles and demonstrated remarkable resilience. Reconciliation and 






APPENDIX A – Research Phases 
 
Phase Title Process 
Phase 1 Grounding 1986-1987 – Worked on the Thai-Cambodian border  
1987-1997, 1999, 2003-2006 – Worked on projects related to 
reconciliation in Cambodia  
1997, 1998, 2000-2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 – Worked as a 
consultant on reconciliation or coexistence projects in other 
countries 
Phase 2 Background 
Research 
1999-2000 – Conducted independent research on ‘truth, justice, 
reconciliation, and peace in Cambodia’ 
Phase 3 PhD 
Preparation 
2005-2006 – Decided on graduate school, applied, enrolled, 
chose a topic, prepared research proposal 
Phase 4 Preliminary 
Research 
2006-2007 – Completed research proposal, conducted 17 formal 
preliminary interviews, to assist in development of research 
proposal, completed ethics procedures and permissions 
Phase 5 Field 
Research  
2007-2008 – Conducted 123 interviews and 11 focus groups in 
Cambodia. Visited reconciliation projects of NGOs, attending 
meetings on reconciliation, mental health, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and other subjects 
Phase 6 Analysis and 
Write-up 
2008-2010 – Processed interview transcripts, analyzed, and wrote 
up;. reviewed another approximately 120 documents, including 
notes from meetings, informal interviews, and field trips with other 
NGOs; also reviewed about 25 interviews done by others, 




APPENDIX B - The ‘I’ of Research  
Especially in the case of lengthy field research involving different cultures, the 
researcher must consider several important issues in order to separate the researcher 
from the research. Neutrality and objectivity, the influence of the researcher’s 
presence, and the construction of narratives of the ‘other’ were all considered in the 
process of conducting this thesis. 
Self-imposed neutrality or impartiality is aptly described in Adam Curle’s Tools 
of Transformation (1990), as he describes his personal journey as mediator and his 
struggles to see different sides of a conflict to increase the parties’ understanding and 
knowledge. During the course of this research I have attempted to keep the ‘I’ of the 
researcher in mind so as to objectively view this complicated and emotion-fraught 
topic. As noted in Baker ‘This does not mean that you must forget or disregard your 
values, but rather that you can place your values in a framework where they compete 
with contrary values’ (1994: 4). Stepping back to consider the cultural setting and to 
question one’s own culture and perspective is an important part of the research 
process.  
Although one thinks of narrative as what the researcher hopes to gather from 
their respondents, it is the researcher who constructs that narrative. Pouligny et al. 
suggest criteria for research in post-conflict countries: the researcher must pay 
attention to complexity, have adequate historical knowledge, have capacity for real 
listening, and for ‘understanding beyond the words and the silence’ (Pouligny, Doray 
and Martin 2007: 30). Through the extensive interviewing, discussions with my 
research assistant, lengthy travel times, and participant observation, these criteria 
have been met in the field research. Deep listening was especially important in the 
case of accused perpetrators, to put aside any rumours heard about their past, and to 
listen with empathy. Pouligny et al. also noted that narratives occur ‘at the 
intersections of collective history and psychic history, individual histories and group 
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relations, and group linkages and the working culture (Pouligny, Doray and Martin 
2007: 30). In Cambodia, these intersections have been paramount and are discussed 
in the body of the thesis. Furthermore, because of the trauma suffered by Cambodian 
respondents who were involved in the mass violence, their narratives are a function of 
their selective and painful memories.  
There is much literature on the difficulties for the researcher to actually 
represent the ’other’ (Stronach and MacLure 1997 cited in Stark and Torrance 2005: 
34), which is of course compounded when the interviews are taken through the lens of 
an interpreter. However the cross-checking described above allowed for the smallest 
amount of error and misinterpretation possible. 
I have had to be very careful not to advise any of the respondents or give my 
own value judgments – partly because that is the nature of research, but also 
important because of cultural relativity. I had started this research with the personal 
belief that one cannot walk through life with a festering wound of anger or sought-after 
revenge lying just below the surface – that in many cases dealing with the past and 
acknowledgement of past wrongs helps the future. But I have maintained an open 
mind, to learn from Cambodians what their experiences are. What is reconciliation to 
them, and how can they best heal from the trauma of the past? Indeed as will be seen 
in later chapters, talking about the past may not be the most common cultural 
experience for Cambodians. 
Part of the reason the data collection period took a long time was that 
interviews often took longer than expected. Once people started discussing their past, 
they often wanted to tell me about their suffering, and wanted to make sure I knew 
about the hardship of the KR period. Especially when I asked about ideas about 
reconciliation, forgiveness, and apology, respondents were asked to think about things 
that could evoke painful memories. I had to be particularly sensitive to the symptoms 
of mental health and trauma, and respondents were provided with counselling 
resources if needed.  
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A particularly poignant (but frequently faced) dilemma in this research was that 
respondents often asked for money or assistance during or after the interview. These 
requests are common when working in, visiting, or doing research in Cambodia, but 
nonetheless, make the researcher uncomfortable, as poor rural villagers were often in 
dire straits, with great difficulties faced in obtaining basic health care and other 
services. At the end of each interview, I would ask if the respondent had any questions 
to ask me, hoping to elicit unexpected observations. But often requests for assistance 
were made. For example when I asked these two elderly neighbours if they had any 
questions, they replied with an explanation of illness and hardship:  
No, I have no questions but I just ask you to help the people in this village . . . I 
just got sick. I stayed in hospital for a month. I am hot and tired because I lack 
blood . . . I borrowed money to stay in the private hospital because you can get 
better faster. In the government hospital, a small illness quickly becomes 
serious (IV # 108).1
 
 
                                               
1 Interview references are provided in shorthand as in the above example: Interview (IV) 
number (#), 108. 
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APPENDIX C – Research Question Guide 
 
PART I – To ask Cambodians who were in Cambodia during the KR period 
 
1. Where were you before/during and after the Khmer Rouge (KR) period? 
What were your experiences during that period? Have you lost friends and 
family members? How many people have died or are missing? How do you feel 
about what happened to you? Your family? Do you feel that you were a victim? 
Perpetrator? Bystander? Mixed? 
 
2. How do your past experiences affect you now? Did you, and do you now, 
feel any suffering or trauma? Have you returned to your native village? Have 
you met anyone that you knew from the KR years?  
 
3. Do you know any people who have done direct harm to you or your family 
during the KR period or during the war? How do you feel about them now? 
Do you want to forgive, punish, forget, or seek reparations? 
 
PART II – To ask of all informants 
 
4. What does reconciliation mean to you? What does the word mean (phsah 
phsaa knyear / bangruom bang-ruop knea/samros samruel)? Has reconciliation 
happened already or not? Between who and who? How did reconciliation 
happen? What is the process of reconciliation? Has reconciliation and healing 
taken place? If it has not happened, then should it? How important is it? How 
do the following relate to reconciliation: truth, justice, forgiveness, healing, 
trials, religion, trauma, relationships, long term, peacebuilding, coexistence? 
What is national reconciliation (bangruom bangruop cheat) and has it 
occurred? How do individual, community, and national reconciliation relate to 
each other? Are there any lessons you or others have learned in Cambodia 
related to reconciliation that could be helpful to others going through similar 
conflicts and recovery in other countries? 
 
5. Do you know any direct victims and perpetrators who have, or had direct 
contact with each other? How did or do they relate to each other? Have you 
ever seen or heard of any apologies or forgiveness? 
 
6. Do you know any projects or activities by individuals, organizations or 
government (third-party interventions) that have worked for or resulted in 
reconciliation? If so, who and how? What was their impact or results and how 
were they measured? Were there knowledge, attitude, and/or behaviour 
changes? What caused the project to be successful or unsuccessful? At what 
level did these occur, individual, community, or national level? 
 
7. Can reconciliation and healing be done through projects and activities? If 
so, how? Should this be done? Why? 
 
8. How do you feel about the Trials for the KR? Do you trust the process? Are 
you hopeful? Is the KRT important? What will it accomplish? Is justice 





APPENDIX D – Data Collection Processes 
This section on collection processes describes the details of the process of 
obtaining research assistance, developing questions, conducting interviews, and 
generating transcripts. 
Research Assistance 
I recruited a research assistant to assist with administrative tasks (such as 
copying, reading documents in Khmer, and selecting related documents to copy), 
translating written documents, transcribing tapes, and assisting in interpretation 
(between Khmer or Cambodian and English). The research assistants were recruited 
from the University of Phnom Penh’s Schools of Psychology and Sociology so that 
they could assist in referring any interviewees who might feel they want to consult a 
counsellor. Although I had good understanding of Khmer, lengthy experience in the 
country, and was able to crosscheck the translation, using an interpreter allowed for 
time to take notes, and to speak with the research assistant later about impressions, 
reactions, environmental factors, and other issues. One full-time assistant worked from 
2006 through 2009, and has remained a resource for questions about the translation 
of the transcripts throughout the writing-up period. In addition, two additional assistants 
were hired for a period of several months to assist with the transcription of the auditory 
tapes. 
Question and Questionnaire Development 
A detailed set of guiding questions was developed for the in-depth interviews, 
keeping in mind the recent literature on reconciliation. A shortened version was used in 
the field as an ‘aide memoire’, see Appendix C. Many of these questions could not be 
asked directly, but had to be indirectly approached due to their sensitive and personal 
nature. If respondents were interviewed more than once, the more sensitive questions, 
as well as specific follow-up questions, were asked in later interviews. The majority of 
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these questions were from a questionnaire I developed in my 1999/2000 study 
(McGrew 2000a). However, a large number of other questionnaires were consulted 
during the development of these questions, including a questionnaire used on a 
reconciliation program in Cambodia (Saltsman 2006), and questions used in qualitative 
research on justice and reconciliation in Cambodia by Pham et al. (2009). However, to 
allow for serendipitous findings, and to keep an open mind necessary for these 
complex topics, additional questions were added during the research period. 
Reliability and validity of questions was checked during preliminary and initial 
interviews, and informally through discussion with my research assistant. In addition, 
all questions used on my 1999 survey had been checked for reliability and validity and 
had been translated, and reverse translated to check for appropriate terminology – 
these questionnaires were used as training materials for the research assistant. 
Discussions with the research assistant also confirmed internal consistency within 
individual interviews, as well as crosschecking of information received from various 
respondents about the same people or experiences. 
Conducting Interviews and Generating Transcripts 
For the majority of the interviews, the research assistant and I were both 
present: although I conducted the interview, if the respondent or I had difficulty 
understanding, the research assistant would translate. All interviews started with 
formal greetings and brief introductions. We then proceeded with the consent 
procedure, which included explaining the purpose of the research and asking the 
respondents to agree to the interview on tape. We both took notes, and if permission 
was granted, the interview was tape-recorded. However, given the sensitive and 
personal nature of the interview questions, we also made sure to attentively listen to 
the respondents by making occasional eye contact, nodding, and providing verbal 
cues. Later the notes, and or the audio files were converted into written transcripts. 
When recording was not possible (in the case of informal interviews or serendipitous 
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interviews when I did not want to risk disturbing the interview with technology (16 
interviews), or when the respondent denied permission (three interviews), notes were 
taken at the site, then the notes completed and typed up soon thereafter. For 
participant observation, when the setting did not allow note-taking, then memory 
guides were used and notes filled out later. Only the primary interviews were analyzed 
using the qualitative analysis computer program (see next section).1
Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to two hours, averaging about one hour to 90 
minutes each. In order to avoid either boring the respondents or taking time away from 
their everyday tasks needed for survival, questions were geared towards each 
respondent’s identity, though certain basic questions were asked of all respondents, 
such as what does reconciliation mean to you, and do you think it has been achieved. 
 
Often we had to use different ways of asking the same questions such as the 
question ‘what advice would you give to others seeking to reconcile after civil war.’ 
Rural respondents in particular were not used to being asked their opinions in this way, 
but some gave thoughtful and interesting replies. 
Open-ended questions were asked to avoid yes/no answers. Easier, less 
threatening, and less sensitive questions were asked first, which usually led to the 
respondent talking about their experiences under the KR period – then towards the 
end more sensitive questions were tackled. 
For respondents who spoke English as their first language, or with ease, I 
conducted interviews usually alone, in English (13 Cambodian and 16 expatriate). 
Some of these interviews I transcribed myself, a few were done by my research 
assistant, and a few I paid an expatriate transcriber to do. I conducted one interview in 
French, and translated it and transcribed it to English myself. With Khmer-speaking 
informants, interviews were conducted in Khmer, either by me or with assistance of the 
research assistant. Most interviews were tape-recorded. In the case when the tape 
                                               




was difficult to hear, notes were used to complete the transcripts. At first the tapes 
were transcribed into Khmer by the research assistant, and then into English, but, due 
to the lengthy process of transcription, tapes were later primarily transcribed directly 
into English. I reviewed all transcripts and checked the English translations for 
accuracy through discussions with the research assistant as well as by listening to the 
auditory tapes. Most transcripts were reviewed, corrected, and clarified at least four 
times by both myself and the research assistant.  
We made special efforts to include replies from women, which sometimes took 
repeated encouragement, and silences to wait for responses, as women were in 
general less likely to speak openly, especially in the presence of men, officials, or 
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An Analysis of Reconciliation in Cambodia:  The Influence of Third Party Interventions 
1. Summary of proposal 
The overall aim is to identify key factors facilitating processes of community-level reconciliation 
in Cambodia, with particular reference to the significance of third party interventions. The 
specific objectives include: (1) To analyze concepts and understandings of reconciliation 
processes held by Cambodian and international stakeholders; (2) To identify the key third 
parties and interventions promoting reconciliation in Cambodia; (3) To identify the key factors 
impacting upon the efficacy of different forms of third party intervention in the promotion of 
grass-roots reconciliation in Cambodia; and (4) To develop a theoretical framework of the 
process of reconciliation through third party interventions to promote reconciliation in ‘post-
conflict’ societies. 
 
This study builds upon research done in 1999 and 2000 (McGrew, 2000) when I spoke with 
over 180 Cambodians in individual interviews and focus groups.  I have maintained many of 
these contacts which will be used to follow up with this study, facilitating access. 
 
Two villages in each of two provinces (Kampot and Banteay Meanchey) will be chosen based 
on the following selection criteria:   
• Physically located near former KR strongholds; 
• Presence of former KR (perpetrators) living alongside their victims; 
• One village in each province will have had the presence of at least one third-party 
intervention process, while the second village will have not. 
 
Intensive and repeated interviews will be done to compare and contrast two villages – one that 
has had third-party interventions, and one that has not.  Additional interviews will be collected in 
Siem Reap Province (third KR stronghold) and the capital, Phnom Penh for interviews with 
national level government, NGO, international organization informants who have direct or 
indirect experience with reconciliation and/or third party interventions.   
 
This qualitative research will be examined through: 1) literature review (including identification 
of measures used in the literature to assess impacts of interventions of elsewhere); 2) 
document review (primary and secondary sources from government, UN, NGOs, etc); 3) field 
research.  The field research will have several components including: (a) interviews (semi-
structured) with key informants (Planners and policy-makers, practitioners and funders (30 
interviews); (b) interviews (semi-structured) at the community level with villagers (victims, 
offenders and bystanders) practitioners, and others (80); and (c) observations (markets, 
temples, health clinics, KR tribunal outreach events, etc).  All informants’ identifies will be kept 
confidential and the appropriate consent procedures and ethical guidelines will be followed. 
 
In order to do a deep analysis of concepts and understandings, individual interviews are the 
best methodology.  Once participants start discussing their views on the past however, they 
may recover old painful memories.  But the two NGOs that offer counselling for persons 
suffering from previous traumatic events, both state that talking about the past may indeed help 
the person deal with the past, understand the past and be able to move forward in the future.  
The consent procedures include giving all informants telephone numbers of counselling 
services if needed.  The participants will lose the time taken speaking to the researchers, but 
the previous research project has shown that in fact the majority of the participants feel very 
positive that the researcher has taken the time to listen to the participant. In addition, benefits 




2. Sample of participants 
Participants will include two groups:  1)  key informants in government, non-government 
organizations and international organizations at the central level, both Cambodian and 
internationals (50) (Written or audio taped will be obtained); 2) Cambodians living at the village 
level (80) (audio taped consent will be obtained).  See Appendix A for Email concerning full 
details of consent form planning.  Putting signatures on paper (or thumbprints) is a highly tense 
and dangerous act in Cambodia for many people.  This is because signatures and thumbprints 
are linked to people being forced to vote for certain parties, to sign over land that they don't 
wish to and other human rights abuses.  So even if they can read, starting off an interview with 
a signature will immediately put people very ill at ease.  Also with a very low literacy rate, many 
villagers that I would plan to speak with, will not be able to read a consent form, so will not even 
know what they are signing. 
 
Exclusion criteria will be those potential participants who refuse to participate, those that are 
suffering from observable symptoms of mental health disturbance (severe depression, 
avoidance or anti-social behavior, etc.), or those who may be implicated in the upcoming trials 
for the Khmer Rouge. 
 
Data will be stored in the researcher’s and research assistant computers, but will not be printed 
out with names included.  Both computers will be protected with passwords.  A separate 
document will be kept to record the key of pseudonyms given for case studies to be used in the 
research results.  Any interview transcripts sent to others such as the supervisor or advisors will 
be given pseudonyms. 
 
3. Site/s location 
Cambodia – primarily Phnom Penh, Battambang, Banteay Meanchay, Kampot, and Siem 
Reap Provinces 
Tick / Cross.  *Where answered ‘NO’, please give reasons on separate 
page. 
 Yes No*  
4. Scientific background, design, method and conduct of the 
study.  
a) Have you given a justification for the research?  
b) Have you commented on the appropriateness of the design, the 







5. Recruitment of participants.  
Have you provided a comprehensive account of the characteristics of the 
population including the process for obtaining access as well as the inclusion 





6. Care and protection of research participants and researcher.  
Have you given an account of any interventions, situations and risks which have 





7. Access, storage, security and protection of participants’ 
confidentiality.  
Have you identified who will have access to the data and what measures have 






8. Informed Consent.  






9. Community considerations.  
Have you considered how this study will benefit the participants or the 





10. Participant information Sheet and consent form.  









APPENDIX F – Verbal Consent Form 
 
Coventry University Ethics Committee 
Verbal Consent Form 
Laura McGrew – Final – Revised 29 March 2007 
An Analysis of Reconciliation in Cambodia: The Role of Third Party Interventions 
 
Hello, my name is Laura McGrew and I am a PhD student at Coventry University. I have 
worked many years in Cambodia as well as some other countries such as Sri Lanka and 
Afghanistan and am interested in post-conflict peacebuilding. I am looking into how 
communities are managing to live with their past and build a new future together. I have asked 
to speak to you, because you have had some experiences related to this topic. I want to listen 
to your stories and ideas so that I can better understand the situation here and to help me write 
up my PhD thesis. I want to ask you how your experiences during the war time are affecting 
you now. And how those experiences relate to how you and your community are living together 
today. I will ask how you feel about topics like truth, justice, and reconciliation. I believe lessons 
from Cambodia can help other countries.  
 
Our discussion could take about an hour or two, and is entirely voluntary. We can stop or pause 
the interview at any time you wish. Your name will not be used in the report, and I will not share 
your identity with anyone else besides my research assistant who is helping me in translation. I 
have planned this research on my own, and it is not being funded by any organization. The 
research has been approved by Coventry University where I am studying. If you have any 
questions, you can reach me at the number on this card [researcher hands respondent 
business card with information as per below].  
 
If you agree, I would like to record our conversation and take notes so that I can make sure I 
understand everything clearly and do not miss anything. I will give you a few minutes to think 
about it. Do you agree to speak with me? [If participant agrees, Researcher turns on tape 
recorder.] 
So could you please say that you agree to speak to me on the tape recording? [Participant 
gives verbal consent] Thank you very much, now we can continue. [Interview proceeds] 
 
[At the end of the Interview] 
 
Sometimes when people talk about the past, or about difficult events, they may experience 
some feelings that are related to the past. This is normal, and will probably come up more often 
now that they are discussing the trial for the Khmer Rouge. However, if you would like to speak 
with a health professional that is used to helping with these kinds of feelings, then you may 
telephone TPO, whose telephone number is on the card I have given you. They have a free 
‘hot-line’. If you have any further questions you may call me, or the research assistant. 
 
[Respondent Business Card content] 











Transcultural Psychological Organization 
[Telephone number] 
 
[Business card includes Coventry University letterhead and ethics committee information]
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APPENDIX G – Written Consent Form 
Research Project:  
An Analysis of Reconciliation in Cambodia 
Consent Form 
2 April 2007 
Laura McGrew, PhD Candidate, Coventry University, Coventry, UK 
 
 
Laura McGrew is a PhD student at Coventry University. She has worked many years 
in Cambodia as well as some other countries, such as Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, and 
is interested in post-conflict peacebuilding. She is looking into how communities are 
managing to live with their past and build a new future together. She has asked to 
speak to you, because you have had some experiences related to this topic. She 
wants to listen to your stories and ideas to better understand the situation here and to 
help write her PhD (doctoral) thesis. She wants to ask you how your experiences 
during the war time are affecting you now. And how those experiences relate to how 
you and your community are living together today. Topics will include truth, justice, and 
reconciliation. Lessons from Cambodia can help other countries.  
 
The discussion could take about an hour or two, and is entirely voluntary. We can stop 
or pause the interview at any time you wish. Your name will not be used in the report, 
and Laura will not share your identity with anyone else besides the research assistant 
who is helping me in translation. She has planned this research on her own, and it is 
not being funded by any organization. The research has been approved by Coventry 
University. If you have any questions, you can reach Laura McGrew or her research 
assistant at the number below. Furthermore if you have any questions about the 
conduct of this research, you can contact the Coventry University Ethics Committee, 
numbers below. 
 
If you agree, Ms. McGrew would like to record the conversation and take notes to 
make sure she understands everything clearly and does not miss anything. You make 
take a few minutes to think about participating.  
 
If a person has experienced stressful or traumatic events, sometimes when these are 
discussed, some people may experience some feelings that are related to the past. 
This is normal, and will probably come up more often now that they are discussing the 
trial for the Khmer Rouge. However, if you would like to speak with a health 
professional that is used to helping with these kinds of feelings, then you may 
telephone TPO, whose telephone number is on the card I have given you. If you have 
any further questions you may also call me, the research assistant.’ 
 
Please sign below if you agree to be interviewed for this research project. Your 
signature indicates that you understand the purpose of the research and the conditions 
of the interview as outlined above. Do you agree to speak with me? 
 
_____________________   ____________________________ 
(Signature)        (Date) 
_______________________   ____________________________ 
(Witness signature)       (Date) 
261 
 
APPENDIX H – Coding the Transcripts 
This memo describes the coding process as it changed over the research 
period. Coding in the NVivo 7 software program allows both free nodes (unrelated to 
each other) and tree nodes (mother nodes have one or more child nodes as sub-
categories). The preliminary coding list consisted of a large list of free nodes, which 
were drawn from my research questions, as well as from the specific guiding research 
questions on the questionnaire guidelines.1 Many of these codes were descriptive 
(versus analytical or topical). This very large list of preliminary codes was used as a 
basis for reviewing transcripts in another similar data set (Saltsman 2006).2
These codes were then reviewed, analyzed, and modified during the period of 
the preparation of the transcripts after some sample interviews were coded. As I 
developed the nodes, I wrote in descriptions of what each node included and in some 
cases what was not included. Then while coding if I needed a reminder I would check 
the definition. At this point a few additional codes were added such as: apology 
(separated from forgiveness), Cham/Chinese, civil society, and cruelty. As the coding 
continued, other subsets were removed or combined as they were found not to be 
used: development (added to economics), prison, social capital (combined with 
 Then 
categories were grouped together as ‘tree’ nodes, as themes emerged from the initial 
coding of the interviews.  
                                               
1 Preliminary codes included: culture/art, development, Diaspora, ECCC, economics, 
empathy/sympathy, evaluation, forgive, gender, healing, history, impunity, intervention, justice 
and KRT, justice transitional, killing, KR, memory and memorial, morality, narrative, new 
people, old people, peace, peacebuilding, perpetrator, politics, poverty, power, prison, PRK, 
reconciliation, refugee/IDP, reintegration, religion, reparations, responsibility, 
revenge/vengeance, ritual, security, social capital, space, survival, torture; trauma; truth; victim; 
violence; youth. 
 
2 The codes used for this project, as designed by the author and the project coordinator 
included: access to info; cruelty; current needs; development/poverty; forgive/forget; 
forgive/poverty; gender, impunity and ROL; justice and KRT; KRT and peace; memory and 
history; morals; old/new people; politics; UN and other countries; questions; reconciliation and 
coexistence; religion; responsibility; revenge; reintegration; torture; trauma and healing; 




community) and survival (too broad and unclear). The final codes included all three 
types of coding: descriptive, topical, and analytical – as descriptive nodes were 
combined into categories, more topics became apparent. These were grouped into 
seven categories: community, context, emotions, individual (characteristics), 
intervention, justice, and reconciliation. The codes related to reconciliation included: 
advice to others; apology, acknowledgement, and truth and reconciliation commission; 
contact; definition; forget; forgiveness; healing; heart; ECCC and reconciliation; 
memory and history; mutual assistance; peacebuilding; reintegration and national 
reconciliation; relationship; reparation; respect; tolerance; and trust.  
In addition, there were six free nodes that were not included under those main 
categories, some of which tagged areas of interest for future research (Diaspora, 
gender, miscellaneous, questions to ask me, quotes, and youth). The free node 
‘quotes’ gathered together all important areas of the interview transcripts which were 
highlighted as possible use for quotes: this allowed me to double check any parts of 
the text that were particularly important and to reduce duplicative quotes. 
After the transcripts were completely prepared, during the final stages of data 
analysis, the number of codes was consolidated to focus the findings. Several 
categories were combined into one node, for example: 
• justice and the KRT and transitional justice were combined  
• economics and poverty were combined 
• new people and old people merged into discrimination 
• Cham and Chinese deleted – as these were mainly descriptive and not the 
main topic of the research 
 
Another important issue is trying to avoid the possible overlap of different 
discrete categories. For example, as I was processing the transcripts, I had noted I 
wanted to add nodes on anger and fear. I was thinking these should be separate from 
‘trauma’ but in fact, often when someone is talking about trauma, or I am asking about 
it, this will be related to emotion. On the other hand, if someone is talking about being 
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fearful of someone, it is related to trauma, but not necessarily directly. Thus in the end, 
I coded all of these separately: anger, fear, and trauma. 
At a fairly early stage, I noted that there were some nodes that seemed not to 
be coded very often, yet appeared to be important themes, so I left them in. Here are 
some observations I made about those codes during the process: 
• security - I had identified security as a topic/node, but very few people spoke 
about security per se, though in certain areas they talked about fear and 
insecurity in the past. I had not asked a specific question about security. 
• community and social capital – This is also a very important issue, but it seems 
hard to code this. 
• identity – is also an important issue, and offhand I can think of the majority of 
the Cham people identifying themselves as part of a special group, but cannot 
see that this will be coded very often. Hopefully I can link it up later as a theme. 
 
Periodically, I reviewed the numbers of nodes and the numbers of sources and 
references for each node. I then re-thought the coding system to see if things should 
be organized differently. When I added new nodes, I would mark the master list so I 
could go back and re-code the previous transcripts that had not included that node. 
For example, after the first third of the interviews were coded, I added a separate node 
for ‘heart’ as the word was mentioned frequently. I had highlighted this concept in my 
initial literature review and then realized it should actually have its own code. I also 
added one for morality and about half way through for respect. 
Some of the codes were not directly linked to the research questions at first 
glance, but because I was interested in these topics, I added them: (1) Peoples 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK – related to the very early stages of recover and 
reconciliation in 1979 and 1980); and (2) forced marriage. In the end, both were useful, 
as I did gather a great deal of information on the PRK and will be able to write an 
interesting follow-up article, and because I was able to supply some interesting 
information to some other researchers investigating forced marriage. 
NVivo has a system to create ‘cases’ which in my data set would have been the 
same as individual interviewees. Each case can be assigned attributes, which are 
defined as per the data: for example, gender, age, etc. Then queries can be run, such 
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as reviewing what female victims said about revenge. This assignment process took 
quite a long time, but I thought it worthwhile so as to assist in making specific queries. 
However, what I finally discovered, after consulting an expert in NVivo, was that I 
would have had to manually re-code many of the interviews in order to make ‘cases’ 
out of the interviews that had more than one person in them. (I never had the intention 
to make cases out of the focus groups, as I was not able to consistently assign text to 
individual focus group participants.) Thus, for this thesis I was not able to use the 
‘cases’ and the attribute function of NVivo. 
As I coded the data, I wrote observations in a journal, and this memo will end 
with a sample of those observations. 
Observations 
Following are some examples of observations written in my journal as I 
analyzed the data. These themes have surfaced in the final theories developed in the 
thesis. 
• Progression of Interviews 
The progression of the interviews is usually similar, starting out with context, 
which is interspersed with community as it applies to the context. This includes their 
history, for example about the KR period, PRK, etc. Towards the end it moves to more 
specific questions. 
• Time 
I did a word frequency search today and had thousands of references for time, 
more frequent than reconciliation for example. I should re-check, as time is definitely 
an important theme. 
• Cruelty 
I am often coding the same passages for perpetrator, cruelty, killing, The 
subject of cruelty has come up much more often than I had imagined. Sometimes, they 




Finally someone mentions empathy spontaneously, though he is a community 
facilitator and has received training. 
• Hierarchy 
Some good insights on hierarchy, references to leadership in KR and how 
people operate under hierarchy which I propose -- here I think I show that hierarchy 
has an important role in reconciliation. If your leaders tell you to do it, you do it, an 
important first step. While during the war, Prime Minister Hun Sen was ready several 
times to reconcile, but when he did, and suddenly welcomed former KR leader Ieng 
Sary into the fold (after keeping them as the enemy ‘other’ for a decade) he was vilified 




APPENDIX I – The Respondents 
This appendix supplements the text about the respondents of this research 
study. General information about the respondents from the three study areas 
(southwest, northwest and Phnom Penh) was reviewed in the body of the thesis, while 
this appendix provides more detailed information about the respondents and their 
characteristics. 
When possible, basic demographic information was collected on all 
respondents of formal interviews including: (gender, age, marital status, education, 
religion, ethnicity, nationality, occupation, whether or not lived under the KR or not, and 
group identification as old-base person, cadre, new person, and if lived in Cambodia 
since 1979 or was refugee).1
I conducted a total of 134 interviews, 123 individual interviews and 11 focus 
groups. I attempted to conduct individual interviews with one person alone, but 
especially in rural Cambodia, it was difficult to focus on just one respondent, as family 
members and neighbours would come to listen and join in, and it is rude to tell people 
to leave (especially in their own homes). Of the 123 individual interviews, 101 were of 
one person, 20 were two-person interviews, and two interviews included three people - 
they are labelled individual interviews because even though more than one person 
 Because the demographic information was not possible 
to collect for all respondents, especially in more serendipitous interviews, or the large 
focus groups, no conclusions were drawn about various identifying characteristics 
(age, gender, etc.) and respondents’ views or experiences of reconciliation. 
                                               
1 I tried to interview people with a variety of socio-economic statuses. However, in the time 
allowed for the interview, we did not have time to do a formal rating system of socio-economic 
status such as observation of belongings. However, in general most respondents whom we 
interviewed at home in communities were of low or middle income. In Cambodia this means 
they had a small wooden house, sometimes with a foundation, a few farm animals, and usually 
some small land to grow rice. For the focus groups we did not visit people’s houses so could 
not even estimate socio-economic status. 
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may have been present, each person was asked to answer each question and all 
statements in the interview were attributed to a unique individual.2
The 11 focus group interviews were primarily set up by local NGOs, and 
ranged from three to nine persons, with an average of five persons per focus group. 
Two of the focus groups were all women, five were all men, and four were mixed. Four 
of the focus groups were all former KR, five were all victims, and two were mixed. The 
majority of the focus group members were community members, except in some of the 
former KR areas when many of the focus group members were also government 
officials such as village and commune chiefs. The vast majority of the quotes used in 
the text were from individual interviewees, though a few were from focus groups.  
  
The ages of the respondents ranged from 18 to 88, but the vast majority of 
interviews were in their forties, fifties and sixties. I was unable to ask the age of all 
respondents so summaries or averages are not possible, especially for the focus 
groups. However only seven of the respondents were under 38 years of age, thus the 
remaining 127 respondents would have been at least 5 years old at the beginning of 
the KR regime, and all of the younger respondents stated they were able to remember 
some of the KR period.3
 
  
                                               
2 During small focus groups (of four or five persons) names, ages, and gender of all participants 
were recorded, but in the larger groups it was not possible to collect all the data nor to attribute 
statements to particular individuals.  
 
3 Individual or small group respondents under 38 years of age included:  
IV# # 7 # 8 # 20 # 24 # 49 # 55 # 60 




APPENDIX J – Talking About Perpetrators 
While respondents were eager to talk about their experiences in general and 
how much they suffered, most were much less eager to discuss specific perpetrators, 
especially if they were still living nearby.1 During my initial visits to communities, it was 
often difficult to find out if there were alleged perpetrators living there, as many were 
reluctant to speak. Once trust was built however, these discussions became more 
open. In addition to being reluctant to talk about specific perpetrators, most non-KR 
were also reticent to discuss the details of particular individuals whom they had 
witnessed committing crimes, or even heard about committing crimes. Perpetrators 
were often referred to in general terms, such as Pol Pot, A Pot, or Angkar (terms for 
the KR regime).2
On one hand, the reticence to speak about perpetrators seemed to be related 
to fear or safety issues. On the other hand, sometimes victims seemed not to want to 
openly accuse another person (thus risking open conflict). Some admitted they were 
afraid. Several respondents said that they didn’t see, they were taken away at night, or 
they never dared look at their faces – they kept their eyes on the ground (IV # 95, IV # 
29). ‘If we talk about witnessing it is a bit difficult because at that time I did not see with 
my eyes that this person really killed people or not. I just heard them talk about this’ (IV 
# 61). In research on KR narratives, Sanders found that the victims omitted specific 
memories of local-level perpetrators from their narratives. She suggests that these 
omissions impede trauma healing because the local perpetrators remain faceless in 
victims’ narratives so the second generation cannot understand the past (Sanders 
2006: 89). 
 This terminology allowed respondents to blame the regime in general 
rather than individuals.  
                                               
1 Sanders noted that ‘[t]he most important subject that Khmer Rouge survivors wish to forget is 
the subject of the perpetrator. Yet everything they wish to remember revolves exactly around 
this very subject’ (2006: 62).  
 
2 The prefix ‘A’ before a name, ‘A Pot’ can be translated as ‘despicable’.  
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An exception to this reticence was certain urban-dwelling non-KR respondents 
who were very eager to talk about specific perpetrators, and several of these victims 
would tell me the same or similar stories over and over again. In these three particular 
cases, the victims had focused on one or two particular individuals whom they held 
most responsible for their father’s deaths (IV # 101, IV # 6, IV # 84). All three of these 
persons expressed symptoms of post-traumatic stress, as all three spoke about 
nightmares, crying, and feeling very angry. Their reactions, and the comparative 
approaches of talking, versus not talking about the past, are discussed in Chapter 8 on 
Processes of Reconciliation.  
While many respondents were reticent to speak about specific perpetrators or 
their actions, all respondents were clear on differentiating themselves from the ‘other’: 









APPENDIX K – Setting the Stage – Conflict Analysis 
 This section provides an overview of respondents’ views of the war, and how 
the war affected them. The leaders of Cambodia used their political means to gain and 
hold power, and especially given Cambodia’s patron-client linkages, and reliance on 
hierarchy, the population easily followed. However, all respondents looked back at the 
war period with regret and realized they had been used for the gains of the politicians. 
The conflict caused cleavages in society between KR and non-KR but these cleavages 
were essentially manufactured by the economic and political conditions, as 90% of 
Cambodians are of the same ethnicity. All areas of Cambodia suffered from a long 
history of war and violence, but stories reverberated for different areas at different 
times. Many areas in the northwest suffered multiple displacements from the 1970s 
through 1990s. In the southwest however, because the defections of the former KR 
occurred in 1994 (rather than in 1998 as in the northwest), the stories of war and 
violence were less severe than those heard in the northwest region. A history of war 
and violence are impediments to reconciliation, as the traumatic experiences cause 
insecurity and also may cause psychological and physical problems leading to 
negative emotions such as fear, hatred, and mistrust. These negative emotions are 
compounded by the multiple displacements that Cambodians have suffered. 
This background helps the reader understand and empathize with the 
community members, so as to better understand the processes of reconciliation they 
describe. As noted in the previous chapter, reconciliation depends upon firstly an 
analysis of the conflict, including historical and cultural factors. This conflict analysis 
reviews the nature of the conflict, including issues of power and politics, war and 
violence, multiple displacements, cleavages, conflict between former KR and non-KR, 




The Roots of the Conflict - Power and Politics 
Several respondents spoke of the power politics at leadership levels that 
caused suffering for citizens and soldiers alike. They suggested that the conflict was 
essentially a grab for power by leaders in which the individual soldiers for the most part 
did not have ideological reasons for fighting. This former monk, and long-term 
UN/NGO worker based in highly contested areas, provided a sophisticated analysis of 
the power struggles between the political leaders: 
We could analyze the conflict as the political conflict because they wanted the 
power and they all wanted to be the top leaders. As for the Para [non-
communist resistance forces], they wanted their armies to be strong and, as for 
the KR, they also wanted their group to be strong. Until 1993, they used the 
political conflict. At that time it could not be reconciled (phsah phsaa) easily 
because they still had their guns. If they use the power, we cannot reconcile 
(phsah phsaa). When the villagers hated the other, they always shot at each 
other. . . We can say that power can make people stop knowing their sisters or 
brothers any longer; they just want to hold onto the power. When they had 
power, they can do everything. In 2000, the human rights program started 
because at that time we did not think that the Para and the KR could 
understand each other (yol chet knea). They still hated each other (sa'op 
knear) very much (IV # 103). 
 
 The idea that the war in Cambodia was created and fuelled by super-power 
politics was explained by this former KR soldier, followed by his firm commitment to 
peace: 
In Cambodia, America supported Lon Nol to oppose Samdech Sihanouk, and 
the people were in favour of Sihanouk so Lon Nol killed many people. America 
also took B-52 bombs to bomb for 300 days and 300 nights in Cambodia that 
left big, big holes that are still there now. It is difficult when one country pushes 
another country to have war with each other. The war caused everything to be 
damaged, many people died and were separated and it was very difficult 
because I had these experiences. So I tell my children from now on to stop 
making war. It is not a game, it is not good. I decided to do a small business; I 
don't want to be very rich, I just want to have enough food. If we are rich, we 
will have jealousy and start to get involved in bad things (IV # 61). 
 
 Part of conflict analysis is the examination of the factors that brought the 
conflict to a close, which may be a ‘hurting stalemate’ when both parties tire of the 
costs of the conflict, see no other options, and come to the negotiating table (Zartman 
1995: 8). This is what happened in Cambodia (primarily as a result of patron foreign 
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government fatigue) but the concept is captured through a Cambodian proverb: this 
rural former KR soldier described the hurting stalemate in Cambodian terms of two 
cows with worn-out horns that have stopped fighting. Finally, the conflict abates further 
as the government started to focus on development:  
. . . if we compare to the cow, it means that we were fighting until our horns are 
worn out so we don't want to fight anymore. . . after reintegration, my village 
and commune have developed. We did not have schools then, but under 
Samdech Hun Sen ruling, we have developed from year to year (IV # 61). 
 
As the above respondent suggested, development and the alleviation of 
poverty are foremost in many Cambodians’ minds. Because both former KR and non-
KR live in relatively similar levels of poverty, they have the common goal to improve 
their economic situations. Indeed as the areas of Cambodia that had been controlled 
by the former KR began to open up at the end of the 1990s, and non-KR flocked there 
looking for free land, reconciliation happened fairly seamlessly, as most did not know 
each other during the war periods.  
These analyses of the roots of the conflict originating with power-hungry 
leaders facilitates a reconciliation process, because the conflicting groups did not have 
strong ideological, ethnic, racial, political, or economic differences between them. 
Because they saw themselves as primarily Cambodian, and as victims, they do not 
have deep-rooted identity differences. Thus reconciliation processes focus primarily on 
dealing with their past history of actions during the war period, and does not have to 
deal with decades or generations of deep ideological difference, of stereotypes, or 
other differences which are difficult to surmount.1
                                               
1 Many respondents said they wanted to know ‘why Khmer killed Khmer’, or they don’t believe 
that Khmer could kill Khmer, instead blaming their historical enemies, the Vietnamese. 
 The next topic of conflict analysis 
summarizes that past history of war experience, as respondents’ views and memories 




 Massive displacements occurred throughout the conflict period, though people 
in the northwest suffered more than the rest of the country. The displacements 
occurred in four distinct periods. Firstly prior to the KR regime, during the Lon Nol and 
Sihanouk periods in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many people fled their rural 
homes for the relative safety of urban areas, due to fighting and bombing in the 
countryside. Secondly during the KR period, one of the signature acts of the KR 
leaders during their almost four years of rule, was to frequently displace the 
population. This was done to try to cultivate the greatest amount of land in search of 
the widespread agrarian revolution, and to keep the population confused, disoriented, 
and separated from friends and family. Thirdly, after the KR regime fell, millions of 
Cambodians fled to Thailand (and to a lesser extent, Vietnam).  As the civil war 
continued to rage in Cambodia throughout the 1980s and 1990s, displacements 
continued, including one massive displacement in 1993 when refugees were 
repatriated from camps in Thailand. Finally, after the civil war had ceased with the 
defection of the KR leaders in 1998, displacement occurred on an economic basis, as 
poor Cambodians travelled to KR areas seeking affordable land. The following quotes 
describe the displacements of these four periods, which often merged together in the 
minds of respondents living in these war-affected areas:  
This region was the contested (tug-of-war) region because if one side fought, 
they said that the people in this village were on their side and if the other side 
fought, they said that these people were on their side. We faced very many 
difficulties in the war (IV # 103). 
 
About the integration period…I could not remember anything. . . . Well, the 
standard of living was so poor . . . I was faced with difficulty . . . . Oh, escaping 
from bombs exploding. After that we were not afraid or fearful, only we just kept 
collecting things to support our standard of living only (IV # 65). 
 
After I repatriated from Site 2 camp, I came to Battambang in 1993. Then, I 
thought that I was refugee and I had no land so I decided to come to Pailin. I 
came to Battambang because I could live with my relatives, but their house 




 As each of these displacements occurred, people lost belongings, homes, and 
ties to ancestral lands (which are very important in Cambodian culture). As family and 
friends were separated, traditional cultural ties and support networks were loosened. 
These fractures in social capital then caused difficulties in reconciliation, as people 
were inhibited by fear, lack of trust, and lack of support. These cleavages between 
people are an important unit of analysis in conflict analysis, and in reconciliation. 
Cleavages 
The divisions in Cambodian society have been discussed in previous chapters, 
as cleavages in society create conflict, and thus also must be overcome in 
reconciliation. Most respondents were able to identify various cleavages between 
people as root causes of conflict, though as in the quotes above, many recognized the 
false nature of the cleavages, as they were created through propaganda from leaders 
seeking power. This senior government official describes deeper divisions as several 
waves of cleavages throughout recent history: 
If you find out about everybody’s past you will have a problem in the whole 
country. Because Cambodia, it was divided since the beginning. When we 
started the coup before the war, before 1970, there were some groups, such as 
the rebel group against Sihanouk. There were differences between the two 
groups then. After that, after the coup, Cambodia was divided even further. But 
if we point at each other this will destroy the country. When the KR took whole 
country, they divided into the old people and new people, and this separated 
the people, and made them very divided. We see that we have to be realistic, 
because everybody is a victim of the KR policy! You cannot continue [the 
cycles of revenge] and if you can continue, even I can kill people in my village. I 
could do that because we were divided for a long time (IV # 132). 
 
The above analysis by a government official living in Phnom Penh suggests 
deeper cleavages than those described in the descriptions of most of the rural 
respondents. One explanation of this difference, is that people living in rural areas may 
reconcile more easily as they are forced to live side by side and do not have the 
means to change locations. In contrast, those living in the urban areas can choose to 
live separate lives and may be able to avoid contact with those to whom they feel in 
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opposition. The next section also speaks to the cleavages between people, between 
former KR and non-KR, in the context of rural Cambodia. 
Conflict Between Former KR and Non-KR 
While specific relationships between individual former KR and non-KR are 
discussed in Chapter 5, in general most respondents stated that there were no 
conflicts based upon these relationships. In interviews, especially in the northwest 
former KR areas, I would begin with the relatively safe topics of general questions 
about the situation in the community, including conflicts in the area. In only one of the 
interviews did a respondent admit that people used the KR versus non-KR label when 
involved in current-day conflict: 
Such conflict rarely happens, as the main conflicts are neighbourhood conflicts, 
domestic violence, land conflict, and business conflict like cutting forest 
illegally. If concerning the conflict mentioned that you are Khmer Rouge versus 
you are from the Para [non-communist resistance], it occurs rarely. People 
rarely mention about it. When they get drunk however, they might have said 
that if you were so strong, why don’t you go to the forest to be with the Khmer 
Rouge? (IV # 60). 
 
 This finding was initially surprising, in that one would expect people with a 
history of mass violence between victim and perpetrator groups, to fall back upon their 
past history and identities when involved in conflicts. However upon further 
examination, the Cambodian approach to conflict resolution (avoidance) and reliance 
upon hierarchy probably inhibited the development of such conflicts. This avoidance 
reaction however does not mean that conflicts are forgotten, but they are often merely 
filed away and then may explode at a later date in a violent reaction. 
Violence and Security  
The culture of violence remains a problem in Cambodia but it affects both 
victims and perpetrators fairly equally. Levels of societal violence, though debated, 
seem increased in today’s Cambodia in comparison to levels before the war. 
Eisenbruch attributes an upsurge in violence (domestic violence, rape, sexual abuse, 
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women hurting women, parental murder) in the late 1990s to a loosening of 
government controls with an ‘explosion of personal freedoms’ (2007: 83). As noted in 
Chapter 3, human security is a basic human need, and without security the process of 
reconciliation is difficult. Since much of the violence today is either state-condoned or 
due to ineffectual security forces, all citizens are angry at their government for a lack of 
protection.  
A theme that arose frequently in the interviews is the issue of land disputes. 
The vast majority of disputes reported by respondents were related to land, especially 
in the northwest provinces, where there is more free land, land speculation, and recent 
migration. This focus group member noted ‘There were mostly land cases’ (IV # 79). 
The most common and the most problematic land cases I heard about were military or 
government officials seizing land from others, then using their power to violently 
remove people from their land. This is a common problem throughout Cambodia 
today. People’s common suffering at the hand of unequal treatment from powerful 
people above them can even be a factor promoting reconciliation as people can find 
solace in their common suffering. A society with adequate security measures to control 
violence is the ideal context for reconciliation and in which to promote peace. 
Peace  
 As noted by Lederach, peace is one of the pillars of reconciliation (1997). 
Throughout the interviews, respondents made strong statements promoting peace and 
disarmament, and shared their sadness about the futility of the many years of war. 
One example is this strong and eloquent plea for peace made in this focus group 
(participant 1 was a former KR soldier and participant 2 a government soldier): 
1: Based on my view, we should create one organization to call both leaders to 
meet each other and negotiate because the war doesn’t have any benefit at all. 
On the other hand, it damages your country. The benefit is for the country 
which sells weapons to you! In conclusion, we should call both leaders to study 
and discuss about the law and to respect human rights. . . . 
2: . . . I don’t only want peace in Cambodia but I also want peace in the other 
countries which are having war. As evidenced in Vietnam, and Hiroshima in 
Japan, those bombs still affect the people in those countries. The children were 
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born without hands or legs because air pollution of those bombs in Vietnam, 
trees did not grow anymore since they threw chemicals on them. It affected the 
health of the people even it happened since 1945. It is still there from 50 to 60 
years ago. It has great effect on the people so I request the leaders in the 
countries which have war come to see Cambodia about peace and 
development after we finished the war. These are all of my requests and ideas 
(IV # 81). 
 
 The presence of a peaceful society, with security and respect for human rights, 
is an important basis for the development of reconciliation (though in many post-
conflict countries such as Cambodia a great challenge to obtain).  
 In conclusion, an analysis of the conflict is an important starting point for an 
analysis of reconciliation. This section on ‘setting the stage’ explains respondents’ 





APPENDIX L - Children of Former Khmer Rouge 
 This section describes how respondents viewed the integration of children of 
former KR members into society. Discrimination is still an issue in Cambodia today, but 
the few second generation respondents in this research study denied any 
discrimination against children of former KR. For example, this interview with a former 
KR soldier, his wife, and daughter suggest that second generation former KR are not 
discriminated against, and other young people in the school are not aware of the 
background of each other’s parents: ‘Father: No, she is not accused as being KR. 
Daughter: No, they did not accuse me. Father: My child was very young so she did not 
know anything. They probably did not know who she is. Daughter: No, they did not 
know me’ (IV # 50). Another example was provided by this teacher in a mixed KR and 
non-KR area about former KR respondent # 17: ‘Anyway, I see that her children are 
welcomed by other students, there are no problems with them at school’ (Email 
correspondence with teacher 10 August 2008). 
 When I asked this 18-year-old young man who had moved from a government-
controlled area to a former KR stronghold village if he knew any children of former KR 
he replied: ‘No, not really’, an obvious falsehood, as there were many children of 
prominent former KR leaders in his high school (IV # 91 NE). In general there is 
certainly reticence to address such sensitive issues as to who is former KR, and who is 
not, directly in conversation. On the other hand, a young UN/NGO worker whom I have 
known for several years spoke freely about who was who amongst her friends and 
community:  
Close to my house there is one KR family living. I don’t know any others who 
have come to live in my village. The former KR family is rich; they have a big 
house and a lot of land. We don’t have much contact with them. The husband 
is a military officer and he married a woman I knew, after his first wife died. She 
was divorced and had a small business in another village and they met there. It 
is possible that others are around here too, but they hide their identity. These 
neighbours hide themselves; maybe they feel they are outsiders. But their kids 
go to school, and mix normally with the others. I don’t think the other kids at 




In conclusion, this appendix summarizes comments by respondents concerning 
discrimination against the children of former KR. While both parents and children 
denied discrimination against the children, we have learned in Chapter 5 that the 







English Khmer / Transliteration1
 
 
Key Vocabulary  
amnesty (also forgiveness in common 
usage)  karelIkElgeTas kar leuk leng tos 
anger 
 kMhwg kamhoeng 
anger – to tie anger (as in the day to tie 
anger or day of hate, 20 May)  kMhwg - cgkMhwg ¬éf¶cgkMhwg¦ kamhoeng - 
chang kamhoeng (thngai chang kamhoeng) 
(to be) angry 
kMhwg khoeng 
angry in my heart 
xwgkñúgcitþ  khoeng knong chet 
anxiety 
karfb;)armÖ kar thoparam 
association 
smaKm  sakmakum 
blood avenges blood 
QamsgQam  chheam sang chheam 
brother 
bg  bang 
Buddhist layman  
Gacarü Achar 
calm down 
s¶b;citþ/ RtCak;citþ rMgab;  s'ngap chet, tracheak 
chet, ram ngoap 
Ceremony of the Ancestors 
buNüP¢MbiNÐ  Bun Pchum Ben 
chest tightness 
twgRTUg  toeng truong 
commune 
XuM  khum 
compassion (compassionate actions) 
 kruNa  karuna 
(to) confess 
sarPaB  sara’pheap 
                                               
1 This glossary includes words which have more than one meaning in Khmer or in English, or 
were used commonly in the thesis and do not have a clear equivalent in English (such as ‘base’ 
people).  When words used by respondents were consistent and unambiguous, (such as 
suffering (vetenea) or justice (tolakar) these words were not included in this glossary.  The 
transliteration was done using the ‘Transliteration Table’ created by the Documentation Center 




kac  kach 
cruel (very) 
sahav  sahav 
deaf and mute 
Kføg; kor 
despicable (familiar or derogatory 
prefix for men’s names Ga  A 
dhamma (Buddhist teachings, also 
righteousness) Fmµ ,Fm_  thormak, thor 
discriminate 
erIseGIgKña/ Rbkan;  reus aeng ( knea), prakan 
district 
Rsuk  srok 
(to) do again, to repeat  
eFVIeLIgvij  thveu laeng vinh 
(to) do bad things (commit sins) 
eFVI)ab  thveu bap 
elder (respected elder) 
cas;TuM/ cas;RBwT§acarü  chas tum, chas 
proetheachar 
empathy 
karyl;citþ  kar yol chet 
face 
mux  mok 
facilitation 
sRmbsRmYl  samrap samruol 
forbearance 
 xnþI  khanti 
forest spirit – (old man of the forest, 
guardian spirit, or ancestor spirits) Gñkta  neak ta 
(to) forgive 
 Gt;eTas/ GP½yeTas at tos, akphey tos, ak hao 
se kam 
elIkElgeTas leuk leng tos (common usage) 
forgiveness 
 karGt;eTas /karGP½yeTas  kar at tos, kar 
akpheytos 
karelIkElgeTas kar leuk leng tos (common 
usage) 
(to) get along with 
RtUvKña RtYvrUv RsuHRsYl Cana  trov knea, trovrov, 
sroh sruol, chea nea 
grandfather 
ta  ta 
grandmother 
yay  yeay 
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grudge or hold the grudge 
KuMnuM> cgKuMnuM  kumnum, chang kumnum 
(to) hate (each other)    s¥b;  sa'op   Kña (knea) 
(to) heal 
pSH Ca Büa)al sah, chea, (sah chea), pyabal 
healer (traditional – some other healers 
are sub-categories of Kru Khmer) RKUExµr  Kru Khmer 
healer (traditional - who uses his 
breath (blowing) for healing) RKUpøMú  kru phlom 
healer (traditional – magical) 
RKUmnþGaKm kru mon akum 
heart 
citþ , ebHdUg chet, beh daung 
kapok tree 
edImK  dam kor 
karma (Buddhist law of cause and 
effect) kmµpl/ kmµ  kamphal, kamma 
Kathin (Buddhist lent) 
kzin   Kathin 
(to) lose face (to be ashamed) 
)ak;mux   bak’ mok 
mediation 
sRmuHsRmYl  samroh samruol 
mercy (loving kindness, compassionate 
thoughts) emtþa metta 
moral force 
kMlaMgcitþ  kamlaing chet 
national reconciliation 
karbRgÜbbRgÜmCati kar bangruop bangruom 
cheat 
non-communist resistance (Para, or 
NCR) RkumGñkts‘URbqaMgkuMmuynIsþ  krom neak tasou 
prachaing komuynist 
non-violence 
GhwgSa akhoengsa (ahimsa) 
pardon 
 Gt;eTas/ elIkeTas/ GP½yeTas  at tos, leuk tos, 
akphey tos 
Peace Walk 
FmµyaRta  Dhammayietra 
province 
extþ  khet 
(to) reconcile 
pSHpSa> bRgÜbbRgÜm phsah phsaa, bangruop 
bangruom 
reconciliation (see national 
reconciliation) karpSHpSa> karbRgÜbbRgÜm kar phsah phsaa, kar 
bangruop bangruom 
(to) relieve (release) 




sMNgCYsCul  samnang chuos-chul (verb sang) 
reunite 
rYbrYm  ruop ruom knea laeng vihn 
revenge 
 karsgswk  kar sangsoek 
(to take) revenge 
 sgswk  sangsoek 
sangha (Buddhist Clergy) ្រពះសង្ឃ pheah sang 
sin (or bad) 
)ab  bap 
solidarity 
samKÁIPaB samakipheap samKÁI  samaki 
solidarity groups  
 RkumsamKÁI   krom samaki 
spiritual education  
karGb;rMpøÚvcitþ  kar abrum phlov chet 
stupa (Buddhist religious monument) 
ectIy/ emn chaydei, men (often called stupa) 
talk too much 
niyayRCul  niyeay chrul 
ties (of patronage) or literally, string  ExS kse 
tolerance  
karGt;eGaneGay  kar at aon aoy, kar 
akthyeasrey 
xnþI  khantei 
(to) understand 
eyaKyl; yok yul 
(to) understand each other 
yl;citþKña yl;   yol chet knea, yol 
(to) unite (or live together) 
rYbrYm  ruop ruom 
unity 
PaBrYbrYm/ karÉkPaB  pheap ruop ruom, kar 
ekakpheap 
vengeance 
 karsgswk  kar sangsoek 
village 
PUmi  phoum [common usage "phum"] 
virtue (or everyday use, ‘good’) 
buNü/ kusl   bun, kosal 
 
 
Khmer Rouge Vocabulary   
Angkar (the) Organization (refers in the 
DK to the top leadership) GgÁkar  Angkar 
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base people (old people) 
GñkmUldæancas;  neak moulithan chas 
cadre 
kmµaPi)al  kamaphibal 
chief 
RbFan  prathean 
children’s group 
kgkuma  kang komar 
cooperative 
shkrN¾  sahakar 
east 
bUBa’  bopear 
educate (euphemism for taking to kill) 
ksag   kasang 
mobile work groups 
kgcl½t  kang chalat 
new people (17 April people) 
GñkfµI  neak thmey 
northwest 
Bay½Bü  peayoap 
social affairs 
kargarsgÁmkic©  kargnear sangkumkech 
southwest 
nirtI   near'ordei 
spy 
Qøb/ Pñak;gar  chhlop, phneakgnea 
transport group 
RkumdwkCBa¢Ún krom dik chenhchoun 
women’s group 
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